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May 1975

Technical Note SSC-TN-3115-8

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
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Prepared for:

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans Department of the Army Washington, D.C. 20310

Contract DAAG39-74-C-0082



SRI Project 3115

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STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER

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ABSTRACT

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DISCLAIMER

The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position unless so designated by other authorized documents.

CONTRACTUAL TASK

This Technical Note is in partial fulfillment of Task Order 74-2, under Contract DAAG39-74-C-0082.

FOREWORD

This study of U.S. Strategy in the Event of a Failure of Detente (Task Order 74-2) is one of four study tasks undertaken for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations (ODCSOPS), Department of the Army, to complement ODCSOPS in-house planning activities. The other three tasks were: Great Power Interests and Conflicting Objectives in the Mediterranean-Middle East-Persian Gulf Region (Task Order 74-1), An Analytical Framework for Assessing Combat Service Support and Related Security Assistance Requirements (Task Order 74-3), and Quick Reaction Research Support (Task Order 74-4).

The study was prepared under the general supervision of Richard B. Foster, Director of the Strategic Studies Center, M. Mark Earle, Jr., Senior Economist and Assistant Director, SSC, and Harold Silverstein, Special Assistant to the Director, SSC. The initial project leader was Dr. Wynfred Joshua, then an Assistant Director, upon whose departure coleadership of the project was undertaken by William M. Carpenter and Dr. Stephen P. Gibert. Other members of the project team were Dr. James E. Dornan, Jr., (Consultant), William F. Lackman, Paul P. Stassi, and Walter F. Hahn and Dr. Nils H. Wessell (Consultants). An input to the study on comparative strategic force growth potential was prepared by General Electric.

Richard B. Foster Director Strategic Studies Center

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I INTRODUCTION

A. Background

Detente is now a common if imperfectly understood word in the language of international relations. Although it is sometimes used to describe the quality of relationships among all the world's major powers, its most frequent usage is in characterizing an allegedly new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Specifically, detente is regarded as formally having come into being with the signing of the extensive series of U.S.-Soviet agreements during the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972.

Prominent among the documents signed on that occasion was the "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." This statement was a first attempt to set down general rules for the conduct of American-Soviet relations, outside the framework of any specific issue or crisis. "Basic Principles" is generally considered to be a guideline for detente although, for fundamental reasons deriving from the basically different ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union conceive and carry out their national strategies, each side interprets these principles in its own way. It is nevertheless true that in spite of a wide range of perceptions and definitions of what detente is--or is not--there is widespread agreement that at a minimum the state of U.S.-Soviet relations is different from what it was during the cold war. Detente is variously described as a condition, a process, a strategy, a policy, or a combination of these. As this study will show, there are fundamental differences between the American and Soviet perceptions and objectives of detente. Furthermore, because it is a dynamic concept in a dynamic setting, detente is subject to change. These factors created the need for this study and established its central purpose: to examine the alternative national strategies available to the United States in the event that detente collapses.

Needless to say, it is never easy to determine with a high degree of confidence the foreign policy intentions and objectives of a closed society such as the USSR. The Strategic Studies Center, in undertaking this study of the new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, draws upon a broad base of prior studies of the political, strategic and economic factors in the Soviet system. Particularly valuable are the insights gained through an ongoing working relationship between the SSC and research institutes in the Soviet Union (and in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Japan). A basic purpose of these working relationships is to provide an environment in which sensitive issues can be examined in depth, with greater freedom than would be possible on a government-to-government basis.

In addition, the Center has undertaken a thorough survey of the available Soviet literature dealing with current international issues. Official statements, press commentary, and the published output of government agencies, institutes, and the like were carefully analyzed, both on their own terms and in relation to recent Soviet behavior in world politics. Outside experts on the foreign policy of the USSR were consulted, and their views taken fully into account as the Center's staff formulated its judgments. The Center is confident that its interpretation constitutes a highly accurate assessment of both the broad direction and the specific orientations of Soviet behavior in the contemporary world. The analysis has been developed at some length, as an essential backdrop to the study's examination of the various options open to the United States.

B. Kesearch Objectives

The overall objective of the study is to identify and assess alternative integrated U.S. national strategies for a future situation in which: (1) detente collapses; (2) tensions increase and the cold war resumes; and (3) the avoidance of conflict between the superpowers continues to be a mutually shared objective. Specific objectives include:

1. Analysis of the Differing Conceptions and "Ground Rules" of Deterta

Chapter II addresses this objective, considering first the American perception and strategy of detente and the derived ground rules for implementing the detente process. This is followed by a parallel analysis of detente from the Soviet perspective and the ground rules inferred from Soviet declarations and actions regarding detente.

2. Processes That Threaten Detente

Out of many processes which can threaten detente there have been selected four salient ones for analysis in Chapter III. Plausible trends in these processes are projected, and the consequences for detente examined; these selected processes thus are treated as indicators of change in the relationship of the superpowers.

3. Options for the united States in the Event of Failure of Detente

Chapter IV examines options with regard to three situations pertaining to detente: (1) policies which can be pursued with the objective of sustaining the present detente; (2) policy options for dealing with a partial breakdown of detente; and (3) policy options designed to cope with a situation in which detente collapses. The options are described in terms of alternative integrated policy approaches. Within each integrated option, the various policy elements—political, military, economic—are presented.

4. Military Implications of Detente Options

The final chapter of the study analyzes the implications for military planning of the broader national policy options derived in Chapter IV. Options for both strategic forces and general purpose forces are examined, vis-a-vis Soviet forces and in the context of general U.S. force postures worldwide.

11 DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS AND "GROUND RULES" OF DETENTE

To the extent that U.S.-Soviet "detente" characterizes a relaxation of tensions and thus a more relaxed condition on the spectrum of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is by no means a new phenomenon. The history of the postwar relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union can hardly be plotted along steady curves. Rather, the relationship has gone through varying periods of relative enmity and relative reconciliation. Thus, Stalin's "Stockholm Peace Crusade" of the early 1950s, whether it reflected a sincere Soviet effort to meet the West half-way or, more likely, a ploy to undermine Western defenses, nevertheless represented a short break in the pattern of sharp hostility that marked Moscow-Washington relations before and after. The same applies to the Khrushchevian "thaw" and, more specifically, to the "Spirit of Geneva" and "Spirit of Camp David" which punctuated U.S.-Soviet relations in the middle and late

Detente thus has been a relative phenomenom, all the more difficult to define because it never has been pervasive or categorical. To a substantial degree, detente is "in the eye of the beholder"—that is, a period of detente exists because one or both superpowers declare its existence. In this latter respect, however, the present era of detente does appear to differ from its predecessors. Both the United States and the Soviet Union characterize the current climate as one of detente. More significantly, both allegedly have endeavored to integrate detente into the way in which they set goals and pursue policies in the international political arena. Most important is that detente proceeds in a vastly changed global environment. In this environment a basic change has taken place in the correlation of forces between the United States and the USSR, with the Soviets on the ascendancy. There consequently arises a growing awareness of limits upon U.S. power and political will.

The present detente also differs from past situations in that the term describes superpower strategies as well as ongoing policy processes.

Clearly, however, the strategies of the United States and the USSR as well as their perceptions of the process differ in basic respects. It is the purpose here to examine these strategies and perceptions in order to determine: (1) the contradictions between them that could prove inimical to the detente process itself, and (2) more generally, the perceived ground rules which, if violated, may erode or lead to a collapse of detente.

A. U.S. Perception and Strategy of Detente

From the perspective of Washington, the current era of detente is based on a set of broad assumptions and principles, initially applied to U.S. policy in Asia, around which a more comprehensive conception has evolved. The salient assumptions are described below.

1. U.S.-Soviet Strategic Nuclear Parity is an Accepted Dimension of the World Balance of Power

U.S. policy declarations have consistently focused upon three pives of change which are considered to have rendered the global imperatives of power vastly different from those which confronted the United States in the immediate postwar era.

First, the Soviet Union has reached rough equality in strategic nuclear power with the United States, ending the era of U.S. nuclear superiority which prevailed in the first two postwar decades.

Second, along with the advent of superpower parity (and to some extent as a result of it), the relatively simple pattern of bipolar alignments in the earlier postwar period has given way to a more complex environment. The new situation has been described as a threefold phenomenon: the recovery of economic strength and political vitality by Western Europe and Japan, the increasing self-reliance of the states created by the dissolution of the colonial empires, and the breakdown in

the unity of the communist bloc. Although bipolarity persists in the strategic nuclear arena, the structure of international relations is evolving into a kind of multipolarity—incipient, vaguely defined, but nevertheless different from that which pertained before. Even the bipolarity in the strategic nuclear relationship is subject to future change, as the Chinese capability grows.

Finally, there is the changed temper of the American people—a dimming of the idealism and a deterioration of the American consensus which infused and sustained the active international role of the United States in the postwar period. This change has been described as the "growth among the American people of the conviction that the time had come for other nations to share a greater portion of the burden of world leadership."

A Multipolar World

Central to the new foreign policy is the concept of a "new structure for peace." To implement such a concept, it was declared to be necessary to continue, with both American friends and adversaries, to build an international system which all will work to preserve because the complexities of the contemporary world make it impossible for any one power to achieve world hegemony and because all recognize their interests to be at stake in its preservation. Although the precise nature of this new "structure" or "international system" has not been clearly spelled out, the basic prescription seems to call for a new balance of global power consisting of five "power centers"—a "pentapolar world."

In this emergent balance, the United States and the Soviet Union would remain the heaviest weights on the scale. The adversary relationship of the two superpowers will continue, if no longer so acutely, because of

U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace.

A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United

States, p. 3 (Washington, GPO, 1972) (9 February 1972).

² Ibid.

power considerations. While continuing their rivalry, however, the two, recognizing their joint trusteeship of global survival, will grope progressively toward new ground rules of competition. They will try to stabilize their central (nuclear) relationship through SALT, and perhaps other arms constraints. Beneath the strategic-nuclear level, massive Soviet predominance in land power must continue to be balanced by countervailing American power, primarily in the air and in the oceans, augmented by the rising strength and self-sufficiency of countries allied to the United States.

The third major piece in the balance is the People's Republic of China. Although not on a par with the United States or the Soviet Union in military forces and near-term technological potential, the PRC derives its power from its considerable resources and future power potential. The breakthrough in relations between Washington and Peking was described as "the rapprochement between the most populous nation and the most powerful nation of the world... 1 Communist China draws additional weight from the obsessive concern it apparently has introduced into Moscow's perspective. By dint of geography and resources, China in effect balances Soviet power in Eurasia--at least to the extent of blocking any Soviet expansionist ambitions eastward. Because of the same credentials, the PRC is bound to cast a lengthening shadow southward into Asia--perhaps progressively so as the United States reduces its former pervasive presence in the Far East. Yet the exercise of this influence--and particularly its extension via military force--should be constrained by China's task of internal modernization, by the abiding confrontation with the Soviet Union, by emergent subspheres of influence in the region (for example, the one commanded by North Vietnam), and by sobriety of leadership in Peking. Moreover, China will continue to be constrained to the degree that American military power remains visible and credible in the area.

By virtue of their economic power, two other centers, Western Europe and Japan, according to the new American foreign policy concept, would join the major actors in the balance. It has not been clear how

Ibid., p. 5.

this economic power is to weigh upon the global scales in relation to the military power of the United States, the Soviet Union and potentially of China. The nations of Western Europe have been only marginally capable of mustering the political will necessary for pooling their resources so they can register telling power on the global balance. In the case of Japan, the question is twofold: whether that country can cross the psychological divide toward true independence of policy, with all of the political and military decisions this entails, and, once having made that transition, how Tokyo will cope with the shifting roles of Chinese, Soviet and American power in the Pacific.

The "new structure of peace" policy left unanswered a host of other questions, such as how countries like Nationalist China, South Korea, and Thailand and regions like South Asia and the Middle East are to fit into the structure. By implication the policy approach appears to include the following: (1) the priority task in the construction of the new system based on the multipower balance is the fashioning of new relationships in the Sino-American-Soviet triangle; (2) these dramatic shifts at the highest levels of global power obviously will entail some traumas and rigors of adjustment on the part of nations that had direct and immediate stakes in the old confrontations; and (3) to ease their pains of adjustment the United States will continue its commitment to their protection, if not to the whole array of their previous objectives. 1

3. Assumptions About the Soviet Union

From the foregoing it seems clear that detente in the U.S. view is cast into a context of balance-of-power politics. Central to any workable system of power balances is a shared principle of "legitimacy." Henry Kissinger, the architect of this new structure of peace, in his

To be sure, the precise nature of this repeatedly reiterated American commitment has never been spelled out, and uncertainty concerning future U.S. intentions in the Third World has increased in the wake of events in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

treatise on the Concert of Europe of the 19th Century, defined legitimacy as follows:

Stability...has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy. "Legitimacy" as here used should not be confused with justice. It means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable agreements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework of the international system by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that, like Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy. I

By this definition, no system of power balances can assure stability and peace in the face of a power intent upon upsetting the status quo. Therefore, if a system of power balances is to work, and if diplomacy and negotiations are to be harnessed meaningfully to such a system, revolutionary ideology cannot be the basic driving force of national ambitions. This is an important reason why the new American foreign policy deemphasized ideology as a motivating force in world politics.

This presupposes, however, that the Soviet Union is departing somewhat from its Marxist-Leninist heritage and placing less stress on its avowed role as the power base and vanguard of an inexorable global revolutionary force. The views of the U.S. Administration on this issue have not been expressly stated. Implicit in the Administration's statements, however, and in its diplomacy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union seems to be at least the hope, if not the assumption, that the ideological generators behind Soviet policy are slowing down for a variety of reasons, not clearly spelled out.

This assumption about gradual evolution in the Soviet Union is also implicit in Administration judgments regarding the changed nature of the Soviet leadership. As Dr. Kissinger once stressed in discussing

Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22, p. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957)

the problems of American diplomacy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the United States faces a collective leadership in Moscow in which the variable of ideology is compounded by chronic factional disputes. The task of American diplomacy, beyond reaching settlements in areas of mutual interest (e.g., SALT), is to maintain the kinds of communication that will prevent Soviet policy from veering into dangerous directions. Therefore, the United States needs to prevent the development of circumstances in which the "hawk" faction in Moscow can capture policy. 1

This view also underlies the general detente strategy which the United States has adopted vis-a-vis the USSR, described as a strategy of linkages designed to create an "interdependence of vested interests." Kissinger described this strategy when he returned from the Moscow summit in 1972:

Past experience has amply shown that much heralded changes in atmospherics, but not buttressed by concrete progress, will revert to previous patterns at the first subsequent clash of interests. We have, instead, sought to move forward across a broad range of issues so that progress in one area would add momentum to the progress in other areas. We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of negotiations and that it would become convinced that its interests would best be served if the entire process unfolded. We have sought, in short, to create a vested interest in mutual restraint.²

The statement implies both method and objective. The method is to foster a mutual reinforcement of progress in negotiations over a wide spectrum of U.S.-Soviet relations. This applies to linkages not only in one functional field—e.g., between CSCE and MBFR—but across functional boundaries. Thus the theory is that if the Soviets want to enjoy the fruits of intensified trade and technology transfer, they will have

See Secretary Kissinger's speech before the Philadelphia World Affairs Council on 16 March 1972.

² White House Press Release, 15 June 1972.

to demonstrate their cooperative intent in SALT and MBFR, and vice versa. The objective is to build an interlocking structure of agreements that can be tampered with only at the risk of bringing down the entire world edifice.

4. The Ground Rules of Detente from the U.S. Perspective

When viewed against this backdrop of assumptions and particularly within the framework of balance-of-power politics, the outlines of detente as seen by U.S. policymakers become somewhat clearer. It denotes in very general terms a relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union that, on the one hand, is considerably more restrained than the direct confrontations and unqualified struggle for superiority of the past, but which, on the other hand, stops well short of a global condominium between, let alone a convergence of, the two superpowers. It denotes a U.S. policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union that has abandoned residual ambitions of complete military containment and seeks instead to solicit the Soviet Union's adherence to common ground rules of what might be termed a responsible Realpolitik within the constraints of an emerging multipolar balance of power.

The specific ground rules for implementing the detente process have not been fully articulated. Nevertheless, past statements and actions by the U.S. Administration—and the logical requirements of a practicable balance of power—suggest at least some general outlines. Briefly, the basic ground rules are as described below.

a. Mutual Noninterference in Domestic Affairs

The U.S. version of the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence seems to be that the two superpowers, while remaining ideologically irreconcilable, can exist in mutual toleration so long as neither endeavors to impose its socio-ideological preferences upon the other. The continuing global competition between the two inevitably will feature some measure of ideological contention, such as U.S. support in CSCE for the principle

of free movement of people and ideas. Yet, ideological objectives must be abjured in the direct relations between the superpowers. Secretary Kissinger made it clear that the U.S. Administration was prepared to abide by this principle when he opposed Congressional efforts to link trade concessions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union with changes in Soviet emigration policies. Presumably, similar restraint is expected from the Soviet Union—for example, that Moscow refrain from exploiting racial or other domestic difficulties in the United States.

b. Abstention from Direct Military Confrontation

Although the American and the Soviet powers continue to confront each other in a geographical and physical sense--particularly in Europe—the salient purpose of the deployed military power of both sides is to balance and not to confront. The United States articulated its concern to avoid situations that could lead to the risk of nuclear war in the agreement of May 1972 with the USSR on the Statement of Principles and in its subsequent accord of June 1973 on the prevention of nuclear war.

C. Abstention from Direct Use of Force Beyond Accepted "Domains" of Power

Although this ground rule can only be inferred, the grist for inference was substantial during the Middle East War of 1973. Clearly, the U.S. Administration's response in that crisis to the perceived threat of Soviet unilateral military intrusion in the Middle East, as well as Secretary Kissinger's subsequent references to a "threshold" of Soviet "irresponsibility," implied that any such unilateral initiatives would be incompatible with detente.

On the basis of past events, it is reasonable to assume that this principle would not be applied to Soviet actions in the Soviet Union's acknowledged sphere of influence. Thus a new Soviet military intervention

in a Warsaw Pact country might be considered by the United States as detrimental to detente (as it was in the case of the Czechoslovak invasion in 1968) but not necessarily inimical to the broad relationship. Any Soviet thrusts beyond their acknowledged "domain," however, even ones directed against countries not directly under the U.S. protective umbrella (e.g., Yugoslavia or China), would undoubtedly be deemed a breach of the tacit rules of detente.

For its part, the United States would probably expect Soviet tolerance vis-a-vis possible American military moves in support of clearly recognized national interests and commitments. This would apply to potential U.S. initiatives in such regions as Latin America as well as actions in support of threatened allies anywhere—recognizing, however, the existence of possible "grey areas" wherein the parameter of "justified action in support of commitments" would be ambiguous. The recurrent crises over Cyprus probably represent one of those grey areas.

Although this general ground rule is to some extent a "spheres-of-influence" politics, this is clearly not the goal of U.S. detente strategy. For example, it seems to be accepted by the U.S. Administration that the political and economic rivalry between the two superpowers can spill over the boundaries of respective regions of superpower preeminence, including in Europe. What does appear to be prominent in U.S. concepts of detente is the notion that neither superpower should directly impinge upon the vital interests of the other.

d. <u>Mutual Observance of the Principle of Approximate Parity</u> in the Military Relationship Between the Two Superpowers

This principle is at the core of the balance-of-power definition of detente from the U.S. perspective. Negatively expressed, it means that neither superpower will endeavor to achieve the kind of clear-cut advantage in military capabilities over the other that will upset the balance and enable one power to dictate political settlements. In

practical terms, given the domestic constraints upon U.S. defense efforts, it means that the Soviet Union will refrain from striving for military superiority.

This concept applies particularly to the strategic nuclear balance. The central U.S. objective in SALT has been to strive for a numerical definition of parity in strategic nuclear capabilities. The United States sought to obtain Soviet agreement to a balance that, though dynamic within certain inevitable margins of the continuing superpower competition, could not be shifted to the decided advantage of either one. There is not yet a consensus on what would constitute Soviet strategic nuclear superiority. The accepted common denominator, however, seems to be the amassment of Soviet capabilities that would enable the Soviet Union to mount a crippling first strike against substantial portions of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal.

The same ground rule extends, albeit even more ambiguously, to opposing theater capabilities, particularly in Europe. Again, a central objective of the United States in MBFR is to gain Soviet concurrence to a rough balance of military capabilities in Europe, and hopefully at a reduced level. The definition of such a balance in theater forces is even more difficult than in the strategic nuclear category. As a minimum it means from the U.S. viewpoint that the Soviet Union will not build up Warsaw Pact capabilities to the point where the Soviet Union, by dint of clearly recognized military superiority beneath the strategic nuclear level, has the potential to apply crushing political pressure upon the countries of Western Europe, individually or collectively.

e. Gradual Movement Toward Mutual Observance of Alignments

The broad thrust of U.S. detente policy aims at the development of a world distribution of power that includes additional power centers. Such a diffusion of power not only is deemed inherently more stable

than the original bipolar confrontation, but the assumption seems to be that even if the two superpowers should continue to tower above other aspirants like China, Western Europe and Japan, the growing assertiveness of these regional actors will tend to constrain superpower competition.

It is clear that Western Europe and Japan will not be transformed into power centers simply by U.S. prescription, nor is the Soviet Union expected to help actively in this process. The United States does expect the Soviet Union, however, to recognize that a balance between the superpowers resides not only in capabilities but in global alignments as well. The implicit ground rule is that the United States will not seek to change the present political-military constellation to the detriment of the Soviet Union—be it by subverting Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe or by aligning with Peking against Moscow. For its part, the Soviet Union must refrain from attempts to change the current alignments of power—e.g., through rapprochement or war with Communist China, or by drawing Western Europe or Japan into the political and economic sphere of the Soviet Union.

f. Ground Rules in Application

The above seem to be the largely tacit but operative ground rules by which detente is measured by the present U.S. Administration.

There is a substantial body of literature which examines whether bipolar or multipolar systems are more stable. No consensus has emerged, but most analysts believe that multipolar balances are more conducive to avoiding great power conflict but not necessarily war between smaller powers. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," and Richard Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future," all in David Edwards, International Political Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970). For implications of different systems for strategic problems, see Richard Rosecrance (ed.), The Future of the International System (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1972).

To the extent that detente is a subjective phenomenon that exists as much by declaration as by measurement, it cannot be predicted with confidence that the breaching of any one of these ground rules would cause detente to fail. It can be confidently assumed, however, that any such breach would change the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union; detente, if it continued to be mutually perceived, would at least be a different process. Finally, it cannot be projected that future U.S. administrations will hew to precisely the same design of global balance and embrace the same ground rules. Given reasonable continuity in U.S. foreign policy, however, it can be assumed that, although future U.S. administrations may change the emphasis of policies, they will adhere to roughly similar principles.

B. Soviet Perception and Strategy of Detente

1. Soviet View of Detente

An analysis of the Soviet strategy of detente requires examination of both the authoritative statements and the actual international behavior of the Soviet Union. In this respect it should be borne in mind that ideological rhetoric fulfills multiple functions in the Soviet Union. Ideological statements serve not only as authoritative pronouncements of official policy but also as ritualistic self-justification.

Moreover, depending on the audience for which such rhetoric is intended, they will vary in tone, accent, and even in content. Despite these limitations, however, statements by the leadership group of the USSR can be significant indicators of Soviet intentions. For it is by verbalizing policy that the Soviet leaders and their spokesmen give general policy guidance to decisionmakers at the action level while instructing elites and the general populace in the requirements and limits of official policy.

In terms of both assumptions and actual behavior, the Soviet strategy of detente contrasts markedly with the U.S. approach. Whereas many U.S.

officials apparently anticipate the gradual evanescence of rivalry between the two superpowers, Moscow assumes that competition and conflict will continue to characterize relations even in an era of detente. For the Communist Party leaders in Moscow to think otherwise would mean their abandonment of the dialectical view of history upon which their Marxist world view is based. Such concepts as legitimacy and stability have no place in the Soviet view of international politics, which perceives relations between different social systems as inherently unstable and constantly changing. It is therefore not surprising that while the United States tends to regard detente as a policy goal or end-state, the Soviet Union views detente both as a dynamic process and as a broad strategy to advance its interests and achieve its policy objectives. This difference has important consequences for Western countries, where policymakers are often constrained by the public expectations created by their own rhetoric.

As with the American policy of detente, the Soviet strategy of peaceful coexistence has been based on a number of assumptions and expectations. While significant areas of overlap between U.S. and Soviet conceptions have thus far sustained improved relations, Soviet objectives differ importantly from American goals. Soviet assumptions below reflect this marked contrast:

a. Permanent Crisis in the West Leading Toward Growing
Western Political and Military Weakness Has Forced
the West to Revise Its Policies Toward the Soviet
Union

As one authoritative Soviet commentary put it, the U.S. Government "has been forced to adapt American foreign policy to the changing ratio of forces in the world, to the new conditions that have been created as a result of the further weakening of the military-political and economic positions of the United States, on the one hand, and the increase in the might of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community on the other. 1

^{1 &}quot;Doktrina Niksona: deklaratsii i real'nost," SSha, No. 2 (1971).

Even before the onset of the Arab oil embargo and the energy crisis in the Western world, Moscow was convinced that the balance of world power had begun to shift in favor of the "socialist" states. This view, since reinforced, has two critical implications.

First, it means Moscow believes that American commitment to detente, despite occasional setbacks, is fundamentally conditioned by "objective" circumstances over which Washington has little control.

Second, and stemming from this, the Soviet Union views U.S. and other Western foreign policymakers as constrained from undertaking active military intervention in areas of less than absolutely vital national interest. Thus, Soviet leaders view the proclamation of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger Doctrine as an involuntary act forced on the United States by world events.

Moreover, Western countries are seen as discouraged from pursuing "activist" national security policies in many areas. The view that Western weakness has made detente necessary derives from various factors, including Soviet attainment of strategic parity; the growth of Soviet naval and other conventional military capabilities; the rise of national liberation movements; Western economic and political instability; the energy crisis; the rise of assertiveness in the Third World; and, not least, the lack of public support for an active U.S. role in the international arena.

Surveying that arena, Moscow has found evidence confirming this view, particularly in the inability of the NATO allies to formulate a common response to the 1973 Mideast War and subsequent use by the Arabs of the "oil weapon." In a somewhat different vein, American interest in arms control (especially SALT) is seen as stemming not from a desire to reduce tensions and the risk of war but from a recognition that Soviet military strength has made efforts to achieve American "superiority" excessively costly, if not impossible.

b. U.S. Imperialism Remains a Great Danger to Peace

Despite its view that U.S. retrenchment was inevitable and involuntary, Moscow continues to focus on the inherently aggressive nature of imperialism. This view of the United States as both weakened and dangerous is actually not surprising; nations and individuals have a clear tendency to interpret new information (in this case, U.S. weakness) in a way that will sustain the initial image of the adversary as dangerous. Thus, Soviet spokesmen continually assert that imperialism poses a "tremendous threat to peace." Moreover, according to the authoritative resolutions of the most recent (1971) Congress of the CPSU, "reactionary tendencies and aggressive aspirations are most pronounced in the policy of U.S. imperialism, which presents the greatest danger to the independence of peoples and world peace, and is the main obstacle in the way of social progress. What is especially characteristic of the United States is its aggressive foreign policy line."

Public reiteration of this theme justifies maintenance of domestic political controls. It also explains to the Soviet public the need for a continuing military buildup (within parameters set by arms control agreements). This is consistent with Brezhnev's proclamation that it is a "sacred duty" to bolster "the defense might and combat readiness of Soviet troops." Furthermore, the portrayal of imperialism as aggressive legitimizes often unpopular Soviet assistance to defend other Communist and "progressive" regimes under attack by "imperialists."

Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith, eds., <u>Image and Reality in World Politics</u>, pp. 16-39 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

² Sanakoyev, International Affairs, p. 12 (November 1972).

L. I. Brezhnev, "Report to the Sixteenth Congress of the Young Communist League," Pravda (28 May 1970).

c. Detente Requires Intensification of the Ideological (Political) Struggle

In a major foreign policy speech in June 1972, Brezhnev declared that "we are aware that success in this important matter [peaceful coexistence] in no way implies the possibility of relaxing the ideological struggle. On the contrary, we must be prepared for this struggle to be intensified and become an ever sharper form of the confrontation between the systems."

While "ideological war" means intensified repression of domestic dissidents, it refers above all to the external world. "In ideology just as in other spheres of our relations with the West," Brezhnev said in 1970, "the Soviet Union is on the offensive and the West on the defensive. The impact of our ideology is tremendous; it is mounting with every day, undermining the mainstay of the non-Soviet system from within." On other occasions, however, the Soviets have emphasized the ideological struggle as a means of tightening political controls at home and in Eastern Europe. As expressed by one Soviet writer, "the ideologists of anti-communism do not conceal their hopes that in conditions of a detente the ideological staunchness of socialist states will be weakened and opportunities will arise for the ideological penetration of socialist countries with the object of undermining them from within."

Two Western concepts have especially provoked Soviet hostility: the theory of "convergence," according to which capitalism and communism will gradually become similar, and the idea of the "end of ideology"—that is, that the dynamism of ideology is eroding, that

¹ Pravda (28 June 1972).

Quoted in Y. Kudinov and V. Pletnikov, "Ideological Confrontation of the Two Systems," <u>International Affairs</u> (Moscow, p. 64 (December 1972).

³ Ibid.

evolutionary change is supplanting revolution, and that the ideological bases of foreign policy are giving way to political realism. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has dismissed out of hand all calls for "pragmatism" in its foreign policy.

The slogan about the "intensification of the ideological struggle" is directly relevant to detente and the future of East-West relations. It is not just a ritualistic incantation of the old theme that profound ideological differences will continue to persist between the two systems, and that the ideological purity of the Soviet system is untainted by any trade deals or agreements. Soviet authorities have made it clear that "ideological struggle" has more than academic significance. On the contrary, it has to do with the most important of issues: the political struggle between West and East, which they assert will persist indefinitely.

If ideological confrontation requires not just philosophical polemics but also political and economic struggle, it clearly conflicts with the often stated Soviet desire to create an aura of trust in international relations. Arms control, technology transfer and capital investment involving long-term loans are difficult to imagine except in an atmosphere of mutual trust.

d. <u>Detente Does Not Mean Acceptance of the International Status Quo</u>

On the contrary, the Soviet Union views detente as a means of promoting the "class struggle" in the international arena. This means detente can and should be used to promote "contradictions" within capitalist countries leading to the accession of "progressive forces" to power. Furthermore, the Soviet Union expects the relaxation of international tensions to confer greater legitimacy on communist parties in their domestic milieu: in a period of detente the charge that local communists are dangerous because they are puppets of Moscow will carry less political weight.

Soviet officials appear to believe that over the next few years domestic political developments in several countries will lead to the weakening of their ties to the United States. This process could culminate in either a de facto international realignment or withdrawal from alliances with the United States. Italy and Portugal, to name only two examples, are viewed as prime candidates for such a development. Should these situations occur, detente may serve to deter "imperialist" interference in such a process. No less an authority than Lenin is cited for this point of view:

The policy of peaceful coexistence is based on the respect of the right of every nation to choose for itself the social system it prefers. Peaceful coexistence promotes the development of the revolutionary movement of the working class in the capitalist countries and creates conditions for successful struggle by oppressed nations against colonialism, for freedom and independence. 1

As the reference to the "anti-colonial" struggle indicates, the Soviet view of detente foresees new opportunities for upsetting the international status quo by means of either revolution or the radicalization of existing regimes in the Third World. Radicalization, moreover, may take the form of anti-Western action by conservative and even "feudal" governments, as in the use of the oil weapon by Mideast producers. Moscow's encouragement of the oil embargo indicates that the Soviets will seek, even in an era of proclaimed detente, to magnify and exploit the disruptive consequences of Arab oil actions and similar behavior by other Third World nations which will damage the West.²

V. I. Lenin, On Peaceful Coexistence, p. 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967).

For a recent discussion of Soviet Middle East policy, see Foy Kohler, Leon Goure, and Mose Harvey, The Soviet Union and the October 1973

Middle East War: The Implications for Detente (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1974).

In one critical respect, however, the Soviet conception of detente requires acceptance of the international status quo. Western countries, particularly the United States and West Germany, are expected to recognize as inviolable both the boundaries and social systems of East European states.

e. Detente Does Not Preclude Use of Force Under Certain Circumstances

Soviet authorities do not maintain that relations between Communist countries should be based on the principle of unlimited sovereignty and the total renunciation of force; detente does not exclude Soviet intervention in the domestic affairs of the "socialist commonwealth," even with military force. Otherwise it would be difficult to justify a repetition, if necessary, of the "fraternal assistance" extended Czechoslovakia in 1968. Shortly after that invasion, Pravda warned:

Those who speak of the "illegality" of the allied socialist countries' actions in Czechoslovakia forget that in a class society there is and can be no such thing as non-class law. Laws and the norms of law are subordinated to the laws of the class struggle...

There is no reason to suppose that such quasi-legal underpinnings of detente as the Basic Principles of Relations Between the U.S. and USSR, signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at the 1972 summit, are any more independent of the laws of the class struggle.

Moreover, according to official Soviet doctrine, peaceful coexistence does not mean that Communists in the West must invariably

Sergei Kovalev, "Sovereignty and the Internationalist Duty of Socialist Countries," Pravda (26 September 1968).

use peaceful means in their struggle; peaceful coexistence "promotes the intensification of all currents of the revolutionary process" and the development of "both peaceful and nonpeaceful forms of the struggle for power." Thus Moscow supported Allende's choice of the electoral route to power in Chile and subsequently cautioned against radical measures there that might invite a counterrevolution. But at the same time wars of national liberation are not excluded by the Soviet concept of detente, for they are considered progressive wars which the Soviet Union ought to support. Recent instances of such support include, among others, the use of Soviet pilots in the Yemeni civil war after the 1967 Mideast War; massive Soviet arms shipments to Egypt and the stationing of large numbers of military advisers in that country in 1970-72; the provision of some \$2 billion in arms to Syria since the 1973 war; and continuing shipments of weapons to North Vietnam. Moscow has not made clear how support for "little wars" can be squared with another frequently repeated thesis in Soviet literature that "there are not now, strictly speaking, local wars and conflicts; each one involves in our time the interests of dozens of states and becomes a problem for the whole world." There seems to be no answer to this contradiction, unless one argues that a local war that goes well from the Soviet view is not a danger to peace.²

2. Long-Range Soviet Detente Objectives

Soviet sources do not usually mention potential Soviet benefits from detente such as diplomatic support in the Sino-Soviet conflict, Western loans to the Soviet economy, the modernizing impact of a massive infusion of Western technology, the probable slowdown of West European integration, or a reduction of the American military presence in Europe. Nevertheless, Soviet leaders view detente as an instrument to facilitate

¹ V. Osipov, "The Logic of Coexistence," <u>Izvestiya</u> (17 February 1973).

² For a discussion of Soviet concepts and support for certain types of conflicts, see Stephen P. Gibert, "Wars of Liberation and Soviet Military Aid Policy," Orbis (Fall 1966).

achievement of both short-term and long-term goals. In this respect the Soviet approach to detente is strategic and pursues the following objectives:

a. Fractionate the Western Alliance by Making It Appear Unnecessary to Peace

Unlike the Soviet Union, the Western democracies are perceived as unable to sustain simultaneous policies of detente and a strengthening of military forces. Reinforcement and modernization of Warsaw Pact conventional forces have not been matched by NATO since public opinion in member-countries has been unwilling to support the necessary measures in a climate of detente. From Moscow's vantage point, then, detente undermines Western unity and strength by appearing to render military preparedness unnecessary. By lulling Western publics into a false sense of security, detente gives free rein to divisive tendencies within NATO and within member-countries. Moscow seeks to exploit these divisions through bilateral diplomacy with individual Western countries.

Soviet participation in the CSCE and MBFR talks represents a similar attempt to use multilateral forums as a means of driving a wedge between NATO member-countries while reassuring Western publics that Soviet revolutionary zeal is a thing of the past. Recent Franco-Soviet coordination of positions on the CSCE has been one fruit of this approach. In the MBFR negotiations, the Soviet strategy is to bide its time while awaiting unilateral Western reductions as part of this process.

b. Reduce the Tempo of the American Defense Effort and Phase Out U.S. Military Presence in Europe

The long-term Soviet objective of reducing and ultimately eliminating the U.S. military presence in Europe dovetails with this strategy. Many commentators believe that Moscow seeks a gradual rather than precipitate pullback of U.S. military forces from the Continent in

order to avoid administering a shock to Western Europe that might generate repercussions harmful to Soviet interests (for example, greater military and political integration in Western Europe, or Anglo-French nuclear collaboration). Soviet proposals for equal reductions and equal-percentage reductions of forces on the Central Front are designed to advance this goal in the short run while accentuating already existing Western inferiority in conventional forces. By providing for the establishment of ceilings on national forces which would restrict the size of West German force contributions, the Warsaw Pact proposal has sought to constrain the development of greater defense collaboration within Western Europe. By contrast, the NATO participants in the MBFR talks have proposed eliminating the present Pact advantage of 150,000 men and 9,500 tanks by setting a common ceiling on overall ground force manpower. Although the Warsaw Pact countries are negotiating seriously, Moscow has utilized the atmospherics of detente to dull the awareness by Western publics of the political, military and geographical asymmetries between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 1

c. Win Strategic Superiority Over the United States

Although the present balance of strategic forces—and any balance that might emerge from a SALT II agreement embodying the Vladivostok guidelines—makes achievement of this objective unlikely in the short and medium term, strategic superiority apparently remains a long-range Soviet goal. There is no evidence that the Soviets have ever made the mere achievement of military parity with the West the final objective of their national security policy. Indeed, throughout the period of detente the USSR has proceeded with an ICBM development and deployment program characterized by the Secretary of Defense as "unprecedented in its breadth and depth." Recent reports indicate that in addition to the SS-16/SS-19 ICBM series, now being

Louis G. M. Jacquet, "The Role of NATO Military Forces as Part of the Alliance's Overall Objectives," NATO Review, pp. 6-13 (December 1974).

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, <u>Annual Defense Report FY1976</u> and FY1975 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. II-14.

deployed, the Soviets have a dozen new missiles of varying types and ranges under development.¹ They have already passed the United States in several key indices of strategic power, such as numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers and missile throw-weight.

Moreover, the USSR has made substantial progress towards acquiring a nuclear warfighting capability through development and deployment of weapons with—again in Secretary Schlesinger's words—"a significant hard target kill capability." There are indications as well—explored in another Strategic Studies Center study now nearing completion—that the Soviets may develop their own version of a "multiple options" doctrine for limited use of nuclear weapons in certain contingencies. In any case, from Moscow's viewpoint, the possession of a nuclear war—fighting capability (whether or not its actual use is intended) not only bolsters deterrence but promotes Soviet goals in altering the world balance of forces. Moscow expects to exploit its counterforce capabilities and its strategic power generally to limit Western strategic and policy options in time of crisis. Soviet detente policy seeks to restrict further these options by strengthening the growing hostility in the West toward defense spending in general and strategic procurement programs in particular.

The Soviet Union agreed provisionally at Vladivostok to equal ceilings with the United States on numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and numbers of MIRVed launchers. Nevertheless, Soviet advantages in throwweight and in numbers of land-based and heavy land-based missiles remain. Soviet strategists can thus be expected to attempt to manipulate third-country perceptions of Soviet strategic strength to achieve political objectives. 3

See, e.g., Edgar Ulsamer, "How Russia is Tipping the Strategic Balance," Air Force, January 1975, pp. 48-53, and John W. Finney, "Development of New Missiles Reported," New York Times, 26 July 1974.

² Schlesinger, op. cit.

Paul Nitze, "Vladivostok and Crisis Stability," Wall Street Journal (24 January 1975).

d. Reduce the Chinese Military Threat

The West, despite its economic and military strength, is not considered as immediate and direct a threat to the Soviet Union as China. Despite its economic backwardness and (relative) military weakness, China constitutes a serious danger from Moscow's perspective. China is seen as possessing political will and self-confidence; it rivals the Soviet Union for influence throughout Asia, and in the long-term future could pose a serious challenge in the Middle East and Africa. Soviet authorities seem to fear that Chinese population pressure will imperil the Soviet Far East within several decades.

Soviet detente strategy targets two objectives in relation to China: to win Western acceptance of a free Soviet hand against China; and to construct an Asian "collective security system" containing Chinese influence. Although Soviet attempts to enlist Western support against the PRC have thus far failed, Moscow may hope that Western troop reductions in Western Europe will yet permit redeployment to the Sino-Soviet border of Soviet European forces. The Soviet proposal for a collective security system in Asia is dusted off from time to time, accompanied by assurances that it is not anti-Chinese in design. Although only three Asian states have endorsed the proposal (Mongolia, Afghanistan, and Iran), Moscow will persist in trying to use detente to drum up support for isolating the PRC.

e. Obtain Western Capital and Technology to Modernize The Soviet Economy

Soviet objectives in this area appear to be directed towards securing long-term credits, establishing joint ventures in energy and raw material extraction, and obtaining infusion of advanced Western technology.

Representatives from thirty countries and twelve "international democratic organizations" attended a Soviet-sponsored conference in Samarkand on Asian collective security, 25-27 September 1974. J. C. Kun, "Peking, Moscow and the Problem of Asian Security," Radio Free Europe Research (undated).

These programs would require multibillion dollar investments in exchange for energy supplies to be delivered some time in the 1980s. The participation of the advanced industrial nations in these plans would prop up the civilian sector both by the transfer of technology and by making it possible to release for military purposes resources which would otherwise be needed in the Soviet civilian sector.

The Moscow agreement of 1972, concerning cooperation in the transfer of technology, states:

The two sides consider it timely and useful to develop mutual contacts and cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Where suitable, the USA and the USSR will conclude appropriate agreements dealing with concrete cooperation in these fields. 1

This agreement precipitated a drive among U.S. businessmen to promote technology and product sales to the USSR. At the forefront of the campaign were components of industry involved in "high technology" product development and manufacturing for the DOD. Although the marketing efforts were clearly oriented towards nondefense activity, the commercial business of such companies as Boeing, McDonaldDouglas, Lockheed, IBM, Raytheon, and others is often linked to advanced manufacturing techniques which have been derived from the defense R&D program. Thus the transfer of products equipment and manufacturing knowledge to the USSR also carries the implication of compromising the U.S. lead in both R&D and military production technology. Once multibillion dollar investments are made, and Soviet control over U.S. investment has been established, American technological and thus political leverage would be severely limited.

Originally a long-term objective requiring negotiation of contracts in the near term, the infusion of U.S. technology will at least be delayed by the cancellation of the Soviet-American trade agreement.

Moscow: Basic Principles of Relations, Article 8, p. 2 (29 May 1972).

Apprehensions sometimes voiced in the United States that Japan or Western Europe would monopolize the Soviet market by default if the United States failed to seize the opportunities offered are now less often heard. The amount of money needed by the Soviet Union is not likely to be available in Japan and Western Europe, although Soviet foreign exchange earnings from oil exports and gold sales will suffice to finance some projects. However, multinational companies of U.S. origin with roots in Europe may provide a source of both capital and technology.

Detente has served Soviet purposes in this respect both directly and indirectly. By generating a climate of trust, it encourages Western corporations and governments to lower their estimates of the political risks involved in investing in the Soviet Union. The intertwining of detente and trade also creates vested interests in the West favoring a continuation of both on the grounds that they are mutually reinforcing.

3. Short-Range Soviet Detente Objectives

In addition to these objectives, the Soviet policy of detente serves as an instrument to facilitate achievement of short-term politicomilitary goals. They include:

a. Manipulating Conflicts Throughout the World to the Advantage of the Soviet Union

The ambiguities in Soviet behavior surrounding the 1973 Mideast War demonstrate that Moscow hopes to use detente to further its regional objectives by adroit management of local conflict. Publicly, Moscow credits detente with promoting U.S.-Soviet cooperation in reaching a cease-fire. In fact, Moscow took advantage of U.S. expectations that its commitment to detente would restrain Soviet policy. Soviet leaders

concealed their advance knowledge of an Arab attack, urged other Arab states to give all-out support to Egypt and Syria, frustrated efforts to obtain a cease-fire until after Israeli forces were on the brink of a major military victory, pressed for the Arab oil embargo as a political weapon against the United States, and readied troops for a possible unilateral intervention on Egypt's side.²

In Southeast Asia, the policy of the Soviet Union has been to resolve the conflicts there to its own advantage. Thus Moscow has placed higher priority on strengthening its influence in Hanoi (by continued heavy outlays of military and economic assistance) than on promoting fulfillment of the Paris Peace Agreement.

b. Changing Local Balances of Power

A great "arc of insecurity" reaches from Scandinavia through the Middle East to Korea in which nations, great and small, are exposed to the threat implicit in Soviet possession of preponderant military power. Under the umbrella of detente, the Soviet Union will seek to translate its military might into political influence. This may take various forms. Least likely but most destabilizing would be the direct application of violence (invasion). It is more likely that Moscow might make demands accompanied by the implied threat of the use of force. The more subtle forms of political pressure are most likely. Although direct Soviet military pressure against sensitive "grey areas" such as Yugoslavia at some future date is a possibility, the gradual growth of Soviet influence in Europe is far more likely.

Reports from Eastern Europe that Brezhnev has told leaders there that detente is a tactic permitting the Soviet Union to establish

It is not known exactly how much in advance the Soviet government knew of the impending attack, but it is certain that it knew at least a few days before the war.

Kohler, Goure, and Harvey, op. cit., esp. pp. 59 and 123-127.

political-military superiority in the 1980s are relevant in this respect. The Brezhnev statements, while possibly motivated by a desire to conciliate hardline opponents of his detente policies, also suggest the future advantages that may accrue to the Soviet Union from detente, which encourages the West to lower its guard by lulling Western public opinion.

In accord with the requirements of detente, there should be no direct Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the countries of Western Europe. Nevertheless, some of these countries may reach the conclusion that elementary prudence demands a reorientation of their foreign policy, not because they are faced with open threats but simply because this will correspond with the gradually changing balance of power.

Such a change in the political climate of Europe would probably involve in the initial stage only closer economic ties and, to a lesser extent, closer political relations with the Soviet Union. But it is likely to lead eventually to more far-reaching changes: abstention from actions which might be interpreted as inimical to Soviet interests, self-censorship as far as criticism of the Soviet system is concerned, and a loosening of the ties with NATO and the United States.

4. Range of Soviet Views of Detente

Finally, it should be borne in mind that, while the Soviet view of detente is not monolithic, neither is it kaleidoscopic. Soviet differences in the approach to detente exist, but contrary to the situation in the West these differences occur within a narrow spectrum of viewpoints. No Soviet spokesman has launched a frontal assault on detente, and by the same token none has obviously castigated Brezhnev for failing to improve Soviet-American relations more drastically.

[&]quot;U.S. Hears of Brezhnev Reassurance to Bloc that Accords are a Tactic,"
New York Times (17 September 1973).

5. Ground Rules of Detente From the Soviet Perspective

When several years ago the current Soviet leaders opted for detente, they regarded it as a long-term strategy to remain in force for the next two or three decades. They believed that during this period the global balance of power would slowly change in favor of the Soviet Union and that the ground rules of detente would be altered from time to time. While there is no reason to assume that the Soviet leaders have a detailed blueprint extending into the distant future or that, generally speaking, much of their time is devoted to speculation about likely developments in the more remote future, it is even less likely that they regard detentethe peaceful coexistence with the non-Soviet world according to present rules--as necessarily permanent. The duration of detente thus, may well depend on the strength of the West, measured in terms not only of political stability, but also of economic viability, technological proficiency, and cultural stamina. A collapse in one or more Western countries, the emergence of a number of pro-Soviet regimes in key Third World countries. or the elimination of the Chinese danger might hasten the demise of detente.

Seen in this light, the ground rules governing detente can hardly be identical for both the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet view of the ground rules must be inferred from official statements and past crisis behavior, it is apparent that those ground rules exist at least implicitly in the minds of Soviet leaders. As briefly summarized below, the Soviet ground rules are compatible with their U.S. counterparts in some respects and divergent in others.

a. No U.S. Interference in Soviet Domestic Affairs

The Soviet Union considers interference in its internal affairs to include activities ranging from foreign radiobroadcasts to

For a view that the "free flow of information is a euphemism for informational imperialism," see Ya. N. Zasurskii, "Sredstva massovoi informatsii i ideologicheskaia bor'ba na mezhdunarodnoi arene v sovremennykh usloviiav," Vestnik of Moscow State University (Journalism Series), No. 1, pp. 3-11 (1974).

linking U.S. trade concessions to freer emigration. But for a variety of reasons Moscow has not been able to convert this ground rule into an absolute principle. Despite developments in jamming technology, the communications revolution has made it impossible to seal Soviet borders to Western broadcasts. Likewise, Soviet insistence at the CSCE that the flow of ideas and people be in accord with the "sovereignty, customs and laws of each country" has not won Western agreement to the expansive Soviet definition of "interference in internal affairs."

The principle of noninterference has also been enunciated in the Soviet rejection of the trade agreement with the United States. Although the Congressionally imposed ceiling on U.S. export credits was one motivation for its action, Moscow made clear that it will reject public efforts to modify its internal policies. Nevertheless, the question is left open as to whether "private diplomacy" in pursuit of the same objectives violates the rule, although it is plainly less offensive than the open attachment of conditions.

"Noninterference in internal affairs" operates asymmetrically in one key area favoring the Soviet Union. While Western diplomats are isolated from the institutions of power in Moscow, Soviet representatives enjoy full access to decisionmakers and legislators in Washington. There is no comparable opportunity for American diplomats to ply the corridors of the Central Committee and Kremlin offices, lobbying for self-restraint in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

b. Abstention from Direct Military Confrontation Between the Superpowers

Although it is fundamental to detente, this principle has been severely strained from time to time, most recently in the 1973 Mideast War and during the U.S. mining of Haiphong harbor just prior to the 1972 Moscow summit. The Soviet decision to draw back from unilateral military intervention during the Mideast War, however, was very probably less in observance of the ground rules of detente than it was a recognition

of American commitment to oppose such a move. This strongly suggests that this ground rule is far from being enshrined as a general principle of superpower behavior.

c. <u>Mutual Exercise of Caution in Crisis Situations That Can</u>
Lead to Superpower Confrontation

As a corollary of the above, caution in crisis situations was formally codified in the "Basic Principles of Relations" signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in 1972:

The United States and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations... They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit. Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives...

Although Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev generally has eschewed the reckless initiatives of the Khrushchev era, Moscow has not been passive. Soviet support of India immediately prior to and during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and massive Soviet arms shipments to Syria since 1973 evidently reflect an assessment in Moscow that even the most cautious leadership would be remiss in its duties if it were not to make the most of the weaknesses of its adversaries.

d. No Direct or Indirect Interference in the Accepted
Sphere of Soviet Influence and No U.S. Effort to
Change the Status Quo in Areas Where the Soviet Union
Enjoys a Favored Political Position

In Moscow's view the maintenance of detente requires that the status quo in Eastern Europe be preserved from both internal and external sources of disruption. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia

in 1968 and the Brezhnev Doctrine justifying it set this basic parameter of Soviet policy. In this sense, the reestablishment of the Soviet political position in the CSSR was the necessary prerequisite for an expanded detente with the United States. A renewed U.S. attempt at bridge-building to Eastern Europe without the prior acquiescence of Moscow would be regarded as a breach of an essential underpinning of detente.

Moscow can tolerate Rumania's declaratory posture of independence within the Warsaw Pact so long as Bucharest retains membership in the Pact and limits U.S. influence to a scattering of economic cooperation projects.

Although in a somewhat different category within the Soviet sphere of influence, Finland and Afghanistan likewise are areas which Moscow expects will remain isolated from association with Western military and economic blocs.

The status of Yugoslavia in the Soviet conception of detente remains ambiguous. The Soviet Union can be expected to resist any attempt by Yugoslavia after Tito leaves the scene to reorient its foreign policy in the direction of closer ties with the West. Moreover, Moscow may actively seek to strengthen its influence by open or covert interference in Yugoslav internal affairs. Under detente ground rules, the Yugoslav situation is one in which superpower misunderstanding and rivalry are likely to occur since past precedent for "acceptable" behavior is lacking.

e. Ground Rules Are Subject to Change According to the Relative Balance of Power

Official Soviet and American statements at the highest level have implied that detente can be transformed into a permanent

[&]quot;Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine," prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969).

condition. Despite repeated evidence that Moscow views detente as a process rather than a culmination of policy, Brezhnev has several times asserted his commitment to making detente irreversible. In greeting Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Brezhnev most recently stated:

The leaders of the Soviet Union are determined to do their utmost to impart a historically irreversible nature not only to relaxation of international tensions as such, but also to the real turn to long-term, fruitful, mutually advantageous cooperation of states with different social systems. 1

Despite this and similar statements, the Soviet conception of the "rules of the game" is dynamic and changing. Acting as a modifier of the above ground rules is the principle, apparent from Soviet behavior in the 1973 Mideast War, that the rules of the game change with alterations in the "correlation of forces" in the world arena. Soviet spokesmen claim that the "growing might of the socialist countries" has fundamentally transformed the world balance of power with the capitalist states. Soviet attainment of strategic parity, the modernization of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and expanding Soviet naval deployments bear witness to this claim.

But the perception by Moscow of a favorable shift in the global balance of power does not in itself signal the end of detente. It could have this effect if the Soviet leaders should decide that the West had become very weak. In that case, an aggressive Soviet foreign policy would no longer run major risks and Moscow would be likely to reap immediate and substantial benefits, whereas to continue to espouse detente would merely hold the promise of limited gains in the more distant future. Such a change of mind in the Soviet leadership is conceivable under some circumstances. But it is more likely that they would change the emphasis of their policy by merely altering the present ground rules of detente in order to capitalize more fully on emergent opportunities.

[&]quot;Brezhnev Returns to View, Hits Kissinger on Mideast," Washington Star-News (14 February 1975).

III PROCESSES THAT THREATEN DETENTE

The previous chapter has analyzed the basic perceptions by the United States and the Soviet Union of detente as a condition, a process and a strategy of superpower interaction. The analysis highlighted differences in the fundamental assumptions made by the two superpowers about detente (or "peaceful coexistence" in the preferred Soviet terminology) and in the "ground rules" of interaction adduced by them.

These differences, to the extent that they mirror varying assumptions regarding the detente process as well as disparate strategies and objectives, in and of themselves herald contradictions that imperil the future of detente. The contradictions, in turn, are likely to be exacerbated by processes in the world at large, many of which are unfolding beyond the effective power of either superpower. Finally, there are processes which can be influenced by Soviet or American policy choices, affecting, either consciously or inadvertently, the state of detente.

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine and project plausible trends in selected processes which may threaten detente. To examine in full all the processes which are either visibly at work in the world today or are in the category of future contingencies would be beyond the scope and objective of this chapter, which is to establish a framework, for consideration in the following chapter, of U.S. policy options for coping with the failure of detente. Accordingly, four processes have been chosen:

(1) shifts in the balance of power, (2) destabilization within geographic areas, (3) leadership changes in the USSR, and (4) Soviet-American trade.

Each of the processes chosen can produce changes which would be detrimental to detente. Because detente is a dynamic phenomenon and its existence or nonexistence depends significantly on the perceptions of the participants as well as on the realities of their interrelationships,

judgments are not made regarding each process as to the degree to which that process itself damages detente. Rather, the inference is drawn that the trends described in each process would weaken or undermine detente, and that the cumulative effect of the several processes must be given appropriate assessment to determine the resultant effect on detente. This latter evaluation will be undertaken in the succeeding chapter, in the course of considering options relevant to three detente conditions, namely: (1) assuming there is presently a detente of meaningful dimensions in the U.S.-USSR relationship, what options are available to sustain it in the event it begins to disintegrate; (2) what options are available to cope with a partial failure of detente; and (3) what options might be selected to deal with a total breakdown of detente. Thus, as analyzed here, the selected salient processes are indicators of change.

A. Shifts in the Balance of Power

As was indicated earlier, the concept of "balance of power" is at the heart of the interpretations of detente by the United States and the Soviet Union and therefore the key to its durability. The United States sees a general and mutually restraining system of balances of power on a global scale as the principal foundation of a "structure of peace." The Soviet Union defines "peaceful coexistence," at least in the first instance, as the willingness by the United States and the West to adjust to a change in the "correlation of forces" in the world--that is, to an accumulation of power by the Soviet Union and its allies. From the Soviet perspective, some such adjustment has been made thus far, as demonstrated by the American retrenchment on a global scale (particularly from Asia) and more particularly by the willingness by the United States to acknowledge formally the shift in strategic-nuclear power in SALT and other U.S.-Soviet accords. From the perspective of the United States, the crucial question is whether the Soviet Union is willing to settle in the foreseeable future for a general condition of "parity" with the United States in the strategicnuclear competition as well as in other military realms -- whether, in short, the Soviets are willing to play the "balance of power" game within the limits of mutual restraint and responsibility.

"Balance of power" can be roughly defined to function in principal arenas: the strategic-nuclear confrontation, regional military balances, and major alliance relationships.

1. The Strategic-Nuclear Balance

a. Trends

The "Vladivostok guidelines" for SALT II, agreed to by President Ford and Chairman Brezhnev in November 1974, have been hailed as a "breakthrough" in the complex U.S.-Soviet negotiation to slow down the strategic-nuclear weapons race between the two superpowers and to legitimize "parity" between them in this crucial arena of competition. Secretary of State Kissinger cited the following gains for the United States in the Vladivostok accords: (1) agreement on a delivery vehicle ceiling for both sides; (2) the establishment of a ceiling on the number of MIRVed delivery vehicles; (3) equality in these ceilings; (4) the willingness of the Soviets to exclude from these totals American forward-based systems (FBS) in Europe and British and French strategic-nuclear forces; and (5) the freedom by both sides to "mix" their forces according to their respective force designs beneath the agreed-upon ceilings. 1

The details of the agreement notwithstanding, the chief "breakthrough" claimed by U.S. officials for the Vladivostok agreements is the fact that the Soviets have accepted equal ceilings on numbers of strategic delivery vehicles for each side, thus "capping the arms race" and, by implication, formalizing "parity" with the United States in the strategic weapons arena. The "breakthrough" thus primarily concerns Soviet intentions for the future. As for the present, the prevalent trend seems to be generally accepted by both the champions and critics of the SALT agreement. On the U.S. side of the strategic competition, direct

Kissinger Press Conference of 7 December 1974, reported in the New York Times (8 December 1974).

spending on strategic programs in real terms has been declining by an average of eight percent annually for more than a decade. Soviet spending on strategic programs is difficult to discern, let alone to translate into U.S. equivalents, but there is no question but that Soviet investments have increased relative to U.S. efforts. Both countries are, of course, continuing their respective R&D efforts in both the strategic offensive and defensive fields. Emphasis in both instances is being placed upon maximizing the effectiveness of nuclear payloads, on improved accuracy and range, and on force survivability.

b. Prospects and Contingencies

Although the complex mathematics of the agreements cannot be discussed here, it seems clear that there are three strategic alternatives available to the Soviet Union. The first is that the USSR--or at least the present Soviet leadership--has accepted strategic nuclear parity with the United States, with all of its implications, for the foreseeable future. If so, this assumes that, although the momentum of the strategic weapons race is currently in their favor, the Soviets have decided that the race is too expensive in the context of other Soviet priorities, particularly domestic ones; too dangerous in terms of the relationships with the United States and global stability and survival; and futile with respect to military advantage and political utility. In short, this alternative postulates that the Soviets have abandoned the goal of superiority at the strategic nuclear level.

A second alternative is that the Soviets have accepted the Vladivostok guidelines as the framework for obtaining a significant strategic-nuclear edge over the United States, even given the numerical limits established by the agreement. In this case, they would see the agreement as a convenient way of "stretching out" their own strategic nuclear programs and of slowing down weapons deployments, thus bringing them into better relationship with other priorities. The Soviets would anticipate that the pace of American programs will be braked even more

by domestic opinion in the climate of detente, falling far short of the maximum exploitation of the limits agreed upon, and that Moscow will achieve a recognizable margin of superiority in strategic nuclear capabilities, even while complying with the letter of whatever treaty is signed. It should be noted that neither the SALT I nor the Vladivostok accord essentially altered Soviet plans for future force deployments. SALT I "limited" the USSR to the number of ICBM silos which they had previously determined to construct and to approximately the number of SLEMs which they could have deployed over the lifetime of the agreement. Vladivostok, in turn, permits them to MIRV virtually their entire land-based missile force. Moreover, the Soviets have adroitly interpreted all ambiguities in the SALT I treaty, e.g., the provision restricting expansion in the size of missile silos to 15 percent, to their advantage. It is quite clear that a substantial growth of Soviet strategic power can occur under existing and prospective arms "limitation" agreements.

A third (not mutually exclusive) alternative is that the Soviets see SALT and detente as a temporary "breathing spell" pending a concerted thrust by Moscow for absolute strategic superiority, specifically designed to place the United States and the West at their mercy.

It bears mentioning that some argue that the Soviets must opt for either the second or third alternatives because of considerations which do not necessarily imply an "offensive" policy in the strict sense of that term. If the Soviets are convinced that the "inexorable forces of history" and the "correlation of forces" are in their favor, that the crisis of capitalism is a "permanent" one, and that the principal danger is the possibility that imperialism might lash out against the socialist camp in its death throes, then only Soviet strategic nuclear superiority can guard against this danger. In other words, the Soviets will want to muster clearly recognized strategic nuclear superiority for essentially "defensive" reasons.

For a brief discussion of several of these points, see J. E. Dornan, Jr., "Maybe No Agreement Would Be Better," Armed Forces Journal, pp. 28-32 (January 1975).

In any event, should the Soviets strive for superiority, the general implications for detente are clear. Critical factors would be the speed and visibility of the Soviet buildup relative to that of the United States; whether Soviet superiority is achieved within the ground rules of continued R&D or at the contravention of existing accords; and how superiority is translated by the Soviets into military, political and economic strategies and actions around the globe. In general, nowever, even if "detente" were to survive the advent of clearly demonstrated Soviet strategic-nuclear superiority, it would be a detente different in character from that currently in effect.

2. Balance at Other Military Levels

a. The Trend

Irrespective of their ultimate intentions in the strategic weapons race, the Soviets have made steady and in some instances dramatic advances in other aspects of military power. This applies in particular to the constant expansion and improvements in the warfighting capabilities of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in Europe relative to those of NATO.

In 1962, American land, sea and air forces in Europe totaled 434,000 while the number today is less than 300,000. In 1967, twenty-six Soviet divisions were in Eastern Europe while today there are thirty-one. The Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority, particularly in tanks and aircraft, is widening. NATO forces are credited with an edge in the quality of overall

One of the principal stumbling blocks in SALT is still the question of verification of Soviet programs, especially with respect to MIRV capabilities. See, for example, L. Sloss, <u>SALT Two:</u> An Assessment, pp. 12-15 (Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975).

equipment, but Warsaw Pact forces enjoy the advantages of much greater standardization.

The Soviets have also substantially expanded their naval power. The gains have been dramatic largely because the Soviet Union, long regarded as a land-oriented (and to a large extent land-locked) continental power that traditionally looked defensively upon the sea as a hostile conveyor of invading armies, in the last decade or so not only has deployed a high-seas navy but has dispatched it into heretofore unchallenged preserves of Western naval power.

Considerable controversy, however, has surrounded the growth of Soviet naval power. Some Western analysts argue that Soviet naval expansion has been strictly defensive in character, designed to destroy enemy naval power in the event of war; evidence for this is inferred primarily from the Soviet navy's lack of mobile sea-air power (aircraft carriers) that prohibits remote offensive operations. Others contend that the Soviet Union already has become the dominant seapower in terms of overall capabilities and technological proficiency, and that its lack of air support is being redressed by the Soviet acquisition of access rights to airbases in key theaters of operations.²

Whatever may be the ultimate missions and objectives of the Soviet navy in the event of war, it is clear that the Soviet leader-ship already has assigned to its naval arm the direct support of Soviet political strategies. This is particularly true in the Mediterranean area, but progressively also in the Indian Ocean rimlands. Soviet objectives seem to be to establish the Soviet Union's claim to global power status; to render direct support to allies and clients of Moscow; and to

For precise comparisons, see <u>The Military Balance</u>, 1974-1975, pp. 95-102 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1974).

N. Polmar, Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the 1970s, pp. 99-108 (New York: Crane, Russak & Co.).

give general support to the expansion of Soviet influence in areas previously barred by preponderant Western power.

b. Prospects and Contingencies

Projecting the impact of a progressive shift to the Soviet Union in crucial elements of conventional and naval power is more complex than in the case of strategic-nuclear power, for several reasons. First of all, relative advantage in conventional or naval power is more difficult to define. Secondly, even if the advantage is clear-cut, in the absence of any direct military confrontation this fact is traditionally difficult to convey convincingly to domestic constituencies and allies.

Soviet conventional superiority in Europe is a case in point. The Soviet Union has been credited with this numerical superiority ever since the onset of the Cold War. Successive administrations in the United States and Western Europe have alternatively emphasized and denigrated the threat implicit in Soviet capabilities. The arguments are often based on the quantity-quality relationships between the existing opposing forces, the numerical needs of a defending force, and the technological potential of the West. However, care must be exercised in advancing these arguments as witnessed by the surprise performance of selected Soviet equipment during the Arab-Israeli conflict. One consequence of this is that electorates, and their leaders, have generally become inured against alarms raised concerning the relentless growth in Warsaw Pact conventional forces. It is difficult to envisage that even a widening gap in conventional capabilities will seriously threaten detente--unless and until the Soviets, confident of their superiority and dispensing with caution, should engage in direct actions (not necessarily of a military nature) to demonstrate and enforce their superiority. Clearly, however, Soviet activities of this nature would have to be even more provocative than the Soviet activities in the October 1973 War, which ordinarily would have been considered reasonable cause for terminating detente.

A rapid expansion of Soviet naval capabilities, accompanied by an aggressive Soviet naval policy on a global scale, would be likely to have a significant impact on both U.S. policymakers and public opinion. This projection is based on several considerations: the traditional U.S. emphasis on naval power; with the retrenchments of direct U.S. presence on other continents, the heightened reliance by the United States on naval and airpower as the principal instruments of American power and influence; and the sharpened awareness on all levels of American opinion of the critical need to sustain access to increasingly scarce and imperiled energy sources and raw materials abroad.

3. Shifts in the Sino-Soviet-American Triangle

a. The Trend

As was emphasized in Chapter II, U.S. policy has based its expectations of viable detente relationship with the Soviet Union, and of global stability more generally, upon a dwindling of Russo-American bipolarity in favor of a more distributive balance of power in the world. Larly in the Mixon Administration the United States predicted the emergence of a "pentagonal balance" consisting of the United States, USSR, China, Western Lurope and Japan. Recent trends, however, have cast doubt on this view of the world. Nevertheless, detente from the American perspective depends heavily upon the continued functioning of the Sino-Soviet-American triangle in terms of a fluid power relationship among the three militarily strongest nations in the world (although in the Chinese case this power status is more prospective than real). "Continued functioning" in the U.S. definition means no reconstruction of the Soviet alliance on the one hand and no Sino-Soviet conflict on the other. Between these two extremes of potential developments in the Sino-Soviet relationship lies an area of opportunity for U.S. policymakers, to select courses of action vis-a-vis both Russia and China which will keep the triangular relationship in a balance beneficial to U.S. security interests.

There is no question but that the "China factor" has loomed large in Soviet detente motives and objectives. Detente in Europe and vis-a-vis the United States has enabled the Soviets to avoid the strains of a two-front confrontation and to focus their attention on what is undoubtedly perceived by them as a more immediate military danger along their long eastern frontier. On the international stage, detente has assisted them in their policy of "containing" China, the partial Sino-American rapprochement notwithstanding.

Although the polemical battle between Moscow and Peking has subsided somewhat, there is little reason to assume that the Soviets have come to accept their present relationship (or lack of relationship) with their erstwhile ally as a permanent condition. China represents a military threat which by the mid-1980s will include Chinese long-range nuclear capabilities threatening Moscow and other Soviet population centers. Moreover, Peking continues to challenge Soviet preeminence in the world communist movement and to compete with Moscow for influence with revolutionary movements in various parts of the globe.

From the Soviet perspective, the imperative of some sort of action vis-a-vis China probably bears a deadline before 1984-35, when Chinese long-range nuclear forces will drastically change the situation. For the present, the Soviet policy seems to be one of "watchful waiting" for the appropriate opportunity for political and possible military intervention.

b. Prospects and Contingencies

A critical phase in China's internal evolution and external policies will come with the struggle for the succession of power after Nao--a struggle that according to many Sinologists already is in full swing. Because the struggle is being waged in the tightest secrecy, however, there are almost as many analyses and predictions in the West as there are Chinese leadership personalities. Thus Chou En-lai's recent reelection to

the Chinese premiership is variously interpreted as a triumph for the "moderate" Mao faction and as representing the selection of Chou as a figurehead pending Mao's death and an open takeover by the "radical" faction. What makes outside analysis even more difficult is lack of fundamental knowledge regarding the contending factions and what they stand for, particularly with respect to China's external relations.

A great deal of speculation has focused, however, on the leaders of the People's Liberation Army. There is evidence to suggest both that China's military leaders have amassed strong regional power positions (in the Chinese warlord tradition) and that they have asserted their strength and independence in Peking. If the official Chinese version of the Lin Piao incident has any validity, moreover, there might be pro-Soviet sympathies among the Chinese military.

Against the background of this speculation, scenarios such as the following could be envisaged:

- A radical faction takes over and throws the country into a new but even more intense turmoil reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. The Soviets deem the opportunity ripe for direct military pressure and intervention.
- The radical regime is opposed by a provincial military commander close to the Sino-Soviet border who appeals for Soviet assistance. The Soviets stage an invasion with the "limited" objective of fragmenting China and establishing a friendly buffer state or with the "maximum" objective of fashioning a regime in Peking that is subservient to Soviet interests.

This interpretation seems to be particularly popular in Japan. (See Jun Tsunoda, "Trends in Peking and Sino-Soviet Relations," a private paper circulated in January 1975. Tsunoda is a prominent member of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and Chief Librarian in the Japanese Diet.)

• The military takes over in Peking, either directly in the wake of Mao's passing or in a coup against a post-Mao regime. It charts a rapprochement with the Soviet Union that, while it may not feature the close ideological affinity of the Stalin-Mao era, nevertheless entails military (including nuclear) cooperation that may be even closer than in the early postwar period.

Other scenarios are of course possible, as well as variants of these. The implications for the United States of either a Sino-Soviet conflict or a rapprochement would be uniformly grave. A Sino-Soviet war would not only have grave repercussions for global stability in general, but it would also confront U.S. policy with a sharp dilemma. The alternative of letting the two Communist giants "fight it out" might be tempting in the light of relative gains in American power, but both the course of battle and its outcome could prove damaging to American interests in Asia and elsewhere. A decisive Soviet victory would remove the constraint that has been a compelling factor in Soviet detente policies and probably serve as a precursor for a more confident and aggressive Soviet strategy at large. A Chinese victory (in the limited sense of beating back a Soviet invasion) would inject even greater instability into the Sino-Soviet relationship, with implications for an eventual nuclear confrontation. It might also encourage the Chinese to pursue an aggressive policy elsewhere in Asia, particularly with regard to Taiwan.

The implications of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement would be even more serious. The United States then would confront, as it did in the 1950s, the combined power of two massive Communist countries—only this time from a position of marked military inferiority and global political influence. If detente were to survive that contingency, it would be detente according to Soviet definition: namely, a comprehensive, progressive American accommodation to the growing superiority of the "Socialist camp."

It is not necessary, however, for the United States to watch helplessly while either of these gloomy prospects—a major Sino—Soviet war, or a rapprochement between the two powers—becomes reality. The United States has sufficient power and resources to influence the Sino—Soviet relationship in a variety of ways; American power, used in timely fashion, can introduce constraining factors into Soviet and Chinese policies, whether they be moving towards heightened Sino—Soviet tension or towards reconciliation. Up to now, the United States has not made much of the opportunities for maneuver flowing out of the 1972 Sino—American rapprochement. The pursuit of detente with the Soviet Union is undoubtedly the chief reason for relative inaction along the Sino—American axis. The erosion of Soviet—American detente would raise both the opportunity and the necessity for the United States to use the relationship with China to its advantage.

B. Destabilization Within Geographic Areas

The basic common denominators of U.S. and Soviet detente policies are avoidance of nuclear war; avoidance of direct confrontations that might trigger a general conflict; and reciprocal caution in impinging on the vital interests of the other. "Caution" may be defined differently by each power, however. The American concept of detente includes the notion of Soviet cooperation in sustaining stability at regional levels as well as in the "central" nuclear relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviets seem to have at best a very narrow perception of "stability," as evidenced in the October 1973 Middle East War.

Moreover, whatever their short and long-range goals, the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in regional environments in which superpower interests diverge and where those interests could easily be submerged in local developments. This is true in general in several areas of the globe, but the outlook differs markedly from region to region. Thus, given relative stakes of power and influence, there is little likelihood of a U.S.-Soviet collision in sub-Saharan Africa. Although the Soviets

may endeavor to broaden inroads into Latin America directly or via Cuba, such an eventuality would most likely result from the extension of Soviet naval power, alluded to earlier; it is at best a longer range prospect and entails contingencies that can be foreseen dimly at best. Possible contingencies in Northeast and Southeast Asia belong essentially to the functioning (or disfunctioning) of the Sino-Soviet-American triangle discussed earlier.

This leaves two major geographical areas in which substantial superpower interests are at stake and where collisions of these interests are particularly plausible: Europe and the Middle East-Persian Gulf region. In the case of Europe, the focus in this respect clearly must be on Western Europe. Although crisis and even armed conflict have taken place in Eastern Europe before and may occur again, the United States and its allies have clearly acknowledged that Eastern Europe is an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence (most recently in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968). It is highly unlikely that the United States will (or will be able to) change its policy of forbearance. The one possible exception could be a post-Tito crisis in Yugoslavia and consequent Soviet intervention in such a crisis. Yet although Yugoslavia is not generally regarded as an integral member of the "Socialist camp," and while a crisis there might have a greater spillover potential, nevertheless there is little likelihood that it would provoke a direct U.S.-Soviet clash or result in the collapse of detente.

As will be noted below, the principal danger in Western Europe is a gradual process of destabilization and possible Soviet attempts to exploit future instabilities. In the Middle East, by contrast, the dangers are near-term and clearly discernible in the volatility of the region.

For an analysis of trends in Yugoslavia, see Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Yugoslav Succession Crisis in Perspective," World Affairs (Fall 1972).

Moreover, conflict in this region, as well as in other geographical areas, may well be exacerbated by another visible prospect, that of nuclear proliferation, which is discussed below.

1. Western Europe

a. The Trend

On 22 October 1974, Mikhail Suslov, the Soviet Union's leading ideologist and an acknowledged leader of the conservative faction in the Politburo, pointed to the spreading crisis in the capitalist countries, asserting that the economic and political problems of the West revealed that Western capitalism had entered its final decline. Suslov's remarks followed similar ones by Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev earlier in October, indicating that there seems to be a general confidence in Moscow (although muted for external consumption) that the capitalist world may be in its death throes.

Such confident assertions might be dismissed as mere propaganda, or as a result of the standard tendency in Moscow to look at the West through ideological prisms, but even gloomier forecasts have been heard in the West itself. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, before his resignation in May 1974, forecast to his advisers that democracy would not survive in Europe much longer. And French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing has been quoted to the effect that in the West "all curves point to catastrophe."

Such prognoses of doom may be exaggerated, even when coming from heads of state. Nevertheless, there is no question but that the Western world is in the midst of a ubiquitous crisis which is affecting

[&]quot;Soviet Sees Gains for Reds in West," New York Times (23 October 1974).

Walter Laqueur, "World Crisis-Stage One," Commentary (July 1974).

³ Le Monde (26 October 1974).

the very fabric of democratic societies, not to speak of the cohesion of these societies within the broader framework of what is characterized as the "Atlantic Community." The crisis is too complex to permit detailed analysis, let alone comprehensive treatment, within the compass of this study. The salient manifestations, however, are described below.

(1) Economic trends. The industrialized world of the West, after decades of unprecedented economic prosperity, is learning the bitter lesson that economic strength in a progressively independent world begets its inherent vulnerabilities.

The major blight of the industrialized world is rampaging inflation. To be sure, the spiral of inflation already was evident before the crisis of 1973. Until 1973, however, inflation, although it impacted unevenly upon the Western economies, was generally contained in most countries within acceptable limits in terms of relative rates of economic growth. This was so largely because the prices of raw materials, including food, mineral and energy supplies, remained relatively stable.

The shock waves that were triggered in Western Europe, Japan and the United States in the wake of the staggering rises in the prices not only of oil, but also of other raw materials from the "Third World," need no recounting here. Inflation has stunted economic growth, created deep balance-of-trade deficits and sharply increased unemployment. It has exacerbated the crisis in the West's monetary system, which was well in train before the onset of the larger crisis.

The crisis has impacted generally, even though the effects have been more severe in some cases than in others, such as Italy, Denmark, and the UK.

The malaise is less ominous but nevertheless serious in France and the Benelux countries. In contrast, the Federal Republic of Germany, with an abiding balance-of-trade surplus and an inflation rate

of less than 10 percent, represents the soundest economy in Western Europe. Yet inflation and unemployment have eroded popular confidence even in the FRG. Such domestic problems as well as external constraints (principally the continuing sensitivities in Western Europe vis-a-vis German demonstrations of strength and leadership) inhibit West Germany's willingness and ability to come to the rescue of its partners in the EEC. 1

(2) <u>Political trends</u>. The economic dislocations affecting Western Europe have exacerbated domestic contradictions, the interrelationships among the European members of NATO, and their relations with the United States.

Economic crisis has fueled a crisis of political leader-ship that seems to be affecting every member of the Western Alliance. In Great Britain, the Labour Government of Harold Wilson is clinging to a narrow ledge of political power, dependent for survival upon the grudging cooperation of the trade unions. Wilson is presiding over a Party that is deeply divided within itself—particularly on the crucial issue of whether Britain will consummate its union with Western Europe. In the country at large there is an observed trend toward political polarization that leads some analysts to speculate about the arrival of the "class war" that Britain has avoided in the last two centuries.²

In France, President Valery Giscard d'Estaing is endeavoring to lead a tenuous alliance of Gaullists, Centrists and moderate reformers against a Socialist-Communist coalition that came within a narrow margin of defeating him in the last presidential election. He has been

The FRG has articulated its reticence to help other members of the ELC unless "they make a greater effort to help themselves." See the speech by West German Minister of Finances Haas Apel on 18 January 1975 in Bremen, reported in the <u>Bulletin</u> (Bonn: Federal Press and Information Agency, 21 January 1975).

See, for example, the analysis in the New York Times (5 January 1975).

aided by fissures in the "new Popular Front," but the issue of France's future leadership and direction continues to be clouded.

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, while he has managed to some extent to slow down the declining popularity of the SPD-FDP coalition in Bonn among the West German electorate, nevertheless approaches the 1976 national elections with faltering prospects, as evidenced by a consistent string of local electoral victories by the opposition Christian Democratic Union. Schmidt faces harsh opposition from the left wing of his own party and the demanding task of maintaining cohesion with the Free Democratic coalition partner. In approaching the 1976 elections, the Christian Democratic Union still has to solve the problems of its own internal cohesion and leadership.

From the NATO vantage point, the picture is even darker in other parts of Western Europe. The government of the Netherlands seems to be following Norway and Denmark in a drift toward <u>de facto</u> disarmament and perhaps neutralism. The growing strength of the communist party in the political life and government of Portugal places the future of that country's membership in NATO (and of the significant U.S. base privileges in that country) in serious doubt. Similar doubts attach to Italy where political trends point to the likely entry of the communist party into government.

b. Prospects and Contingencies

At least in the near-term time period, the prospects in Western Europe suggest continued economic and political instability and a weakening of the links both within the European Community and between its members and the United States. NATO will remain in force as a formal institution, but commitment to the alliance may vary sharply among its members. With or without a comprehensive MFR agreement, national defense budgets will dwindle relative to national GNPs. It is possible to imagine a situation in which Western Europe would be fragmented into three basic

groupings: first, those countries that would seek to retain strong security links to the United States (the FRG, UK and perhaps in time France); second, smaller nations (chiefly Benelux and perhaps Turkey) that would remain in the Alliance but contribute little to it; and third, the Scandinavian countries plus Italy, Portugal and Greece, pursuing de facto neutralism. Depending upon the political leadership in Bonn and the forces impinging upon the FRG, neutralist trends could assert themselves more strongly in that critical country as well.

If such a process of erosion were to take place, it would be a gradual one. Its very progress would threaten a fundamental premise of U.S. detente policies: namely, a continued U.S. alliance relationship with a strong Western Europe able at least to block a Soviet extension of influence and power and at best to exert its own weight in a global balance of power. The rapidity and extent to which the process would impinge upon the U.S.-Soviet detente relationship would depend upon Soviet policies and actions when presented with opportunities to make gains in Western Europe.

It is beyond the compass of this brief discussion to try to analyze and project Soviet motives and objectives in Western Europe (beyond what has already been posited in Chapter II, above). Suffice it to say that either one of two Soviet strategies (not mutually exclusive) would sooner or later upset the detente relationship:

(1) A deliberate and discernible Soviet strategy for the "finlandization" of Western Europe. This would entail a subtle Soviet campaign of intimidation and cajolements, aimed at transforming the nations of Western Europe into virtual dependents of the USSR. The West European countries would be allowed to maintain their internal political and social systems (perhaps within limits, e.g., "progressive" political forces would be allowed to operate freely), but they would be expected to key their foreign, military and trade policies to the predilections of Moscow.

(2) Soviet resort to open pressures and intimidations. As was suggested earlier, this alternative course might overlap to a considerable extent with the "finlandization" strategy adumbrated above. Indeed, in all likelihood it would appear at some stage of the "finlandization" process—at a stage when the leadership in Moscow decides to throw subtlety and caution to the winds and to intervene more directly in the evolving situation in Western Europe. It could involve Soviet military threatman—ship—primarily directed at the FRG, but at other West European countries as well—aimed at compelling the West European countries to renounce NATO membership in favor of an "All-European Security System," to reduce their armies, to dissolve the European Economic Community, and more generally to bend their foreign and economic policies to the wishes of Moscow.

2. The middle East-Persian Gulf Region

a. The Trend

There is little question but that U.S. and Soviet interests and objectives clash today most markedly in the Middle East.

Whatever may be Moscow's long-range interests in the region, the Soviets have amply demonstrated that their interests are strong and abiding. Ever since Khrushchev directed Soviet strategy into that area in the mid-fifties, the Soviets have evinced the determination to sustain and expand the bases of their military power and political influence. They have been daunted neither by temporary evictions and setbacks (Iraq in 1962 and Egypt in 1972), nor by the defeat of their clients on the battlefield (1967), nor by expenditures in military and economic assistance. They have expanded their naval and airpower in the area and have deliberately fanned the Arab-Israeli conflict.

American policy interests in the Middle East are less starkly defined. The United States bears a commitment to the survival of the state of Israel—a commitment that is compounded of perceived moral obligations

and domestic politics in the United States. Beyond that, U.S. objectives relate generally to the military, political and economic stability of the area. The increasing strategic importance of oil supplies underscores this interest.

The objective of fashioning a regional stability based primarily upon a lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict has animated intense American diplomatic efforts since the 1973 war. Although Secretary of State Kissinger has been careful not to attack Soviet policies in the area—and more generally has endeavored to treat U.S.—Soviet relations in the Middle East in a context somewhat separate from the "central" detente relationship—it seems clear that the Soviets have not cooperated in this quest, as evidenced in their accelerated shipments of modern arms to Syria and their open support of restrictive Arab oil policies vis—a—vis the West.

The failure of the Kissinger peace mission in March 1975 to arrange even a further limited adjustment of the Sinai border between Israel and Egypt demonstrates the difficulty and uncertainty inherent in the regional political environment. Equally unpredictable are the chances of a renewed Arab-Israeli conflict.

The aftermath of the October 1973 war in the Middle East focused attention also upon the Persian Gulf and adjacent areas. The situation that confronts the United States in that region, which contains roughly one-third of the world's proven oil reserves, is a disquieting one. The Soviet Union has purposefully, if cautiously, moved into the vacuum of power left by the British departure in the late 1960s. Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region have steadily increased, substantially outnumbering the small, token flotilla of American

For a more detailed analysis of U.S. interests and objectives, see William R. Carpenter and Stephen Gibert, "Great Power Interests and Conflicting Objectives in the Mediterranean--Middle East-Persian Gulf Region," SSC-TN-3115-2, SRI/Strategic Studies Center, p. 9 (December 1974).

vessels on permanent station in the area. The Soviets have entered into close relationships, including access to naval and air bases, with India, Iraq, the Southern Yemen People's Republic, and Somalia. The prospect is that Soviet naval power will be increased once the Suez Canal is reopened.

The Soviet presence provides a backdrop for proliferating signs of instability in the region. In spite of the recently arranged settlement of the Kurdish question, the relationship between Iran and Iraq can be expected to continue to fluctuate. Radical Arab movements have made their entry into the Gulf--particularly in Dhofar, where a continuing rebellion against the Sultan of Oman is abetted by Soviet shipments of arms. To the east, a dismembered and weak Pakistan faces separatist stirrings in the strategically located regions of Baluchistan and the North-west Province. To the south in Ethiopia, a radical military regime, whose basic policy orientations remain unclear, is battling rebels in the north-west province of Eritrea. In the wake of the October 1973 war, the politics of the area have been drawn more squarely into the Arab-Israeli conflict. The tribal and feudal character of many of the states, coupled with a growth of terrorism as a political weapon, adds to the instability.

The United States, recognizing the strategic importance of the area and the signs of danger, has endeavored to make adjustments through arms sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Oman and through the ending of the embargo on military assistance to Pakistan. Yet the issue of direct U.S. military presence and capabilities remains in doubt. It is apparent that the United States possesses dwindling assets of military power and political influence in a region in which vital interests of the United States and its allies may be increasingly at stake.

For a succinct discussion of current trends in the area, see W.A.C.

Adie, Oil, Politics and Seapower: The Indian Ocean Vortex (New York:
Crane, Russak & Co., 1974).

b. Prospects and Contingencies

As was suggested above, the Middle East is the most likely area for a collision of U.S. and Soviet interests. This possibility has been heightened by the fact that Middle East oil supplies have become inextricably intertwined with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The possible contingencies that could be analyzed are many, but with respect to U.S.-Soviet relations one basic possible scenario stands out:

A new Arab-Israeli war is triggered by a preemptive attack by Israel on its Arab neighbors that succeeds relatively quickly in destroying Egyptian and Syrian air defense and airpower and initiates a devastating Israeli onslaught against the Arab armies. The Israelis, convinced that the conflict represents their last chance for lasting survival, push their offensives relentlessly toward Cairo and Damascus, heedless of UN resolutions and diplomatic pressures. Egypt and Syria appeal desperately for direct Soviet assistance. The Soviets, fearing the total loss of their interests and investments in the region and acting on the (perhaps miscalculated) assumption that the United States will not react, deploys ground and air forces and orders its naval forces to render direct support to the Arab armed forces. The United States does react; superpower war is averted but detente irrevocably collapses.

Even short of such dramatic contingencies, however, it is possible to contemplate a more gradual evolution in the area that would impact significantly upon the U.S.-Soviet detente relationship. Thus, for example, a generally expanded Soviet military and political presence in the Arab world, accompanied by active Soviet encouragement to their clients to withhold oil supplies to the Western nations, would quickly fray the fabric of U.S.-Soviet detente.

There is little likelihood that the United States will or can substantially redress its relative military disadvantage in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean region in the foreseeable timeframe. Although the development of facilities in Diego Garcia would upgrade the credibility of American military access to the area--and while more frequent U.S. naval deployments into the Indian Ocean would also strengthen this credibility-nevertheless the "shadow of power" projected by the United States into the region will continue to be an essentially remote one. The only feasible alternative for the United States is to strengthen the capabilities of key countries in the area: Iran, Saudi Arabia and, to a limited degree, Pakistan. The policies of these countries may not be in total accord with U.S. interests (especially as they relate to the politics of oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict) but they share with the United States, in one measure or another, at least the major interests of maintaining a "lid of stability" over the area and (in the case of Iran) of sustaining the flow of oil to the West.

3. Nuclear Proliferation

a. The Trend

The implications of the explosion by India of a nuclear device in May 1974 are essentially twofold. First, the action suggests a possible new round in the proliferation of nuclear weapons on a global scale; and second, given India's close relations with the Soviet Union, the direction that its nuclear program has taken may cast a new light on Soviet interests and objectives in the nuclear proliferation arena.

India's detonation has demonstrated the relative ease with which peaceful nuclear production can be shifted toward military capabilities. According to conservative estimates, by 1982 the world's nuclear power stations are expected to produce some 100,000 kilograms of plutonium a year—enough to fashion tens of thousands of nuclear explosives. There is no dearth of scientists and engineers with the knowledge necessary to construct such weapons.

Some 62 nations have not signed and/or ratified the Suclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Even those that have ratified the Treaty, moreover, can take recourse to its provisions for abrogation.

The common desire by the superpowers to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons has been presumed to be a major and enduring link in the U.S.-Soviet detente. Yet the history of U.S. and Soviet approaches to the problem, even before the Indian explosion, shows considerable differences. The United States has approached nonproliferation as essentially a universal and indivisible phenomenon. The Soviets were more narrowly motivated by immediate threats: principally from Western Europe and China. The fact that Moscow seems to have tolerated the Indian nuclear effort (which after all is addressed primarily to China) underscores the pragmatic approach by the Soviets to the proliferation problem. This does not imply that Moscow will necessarily encourage proliferation; it does mean at the very least that in specific cases the United States will not necessarily find in the Soviets a shared interest in, let alone a common approach toward, the problem.

b. Prospects and Contingencies

India's explosion does not necessarily signify a global rush toward nuclear capabilities. Nevertheless, there is little question but that the incentives toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons are growing in various parts of the world. These incentives are the function of dwindling security guarantees by the superpowers, intensified regional competition and conflicts, and strong nationalistic penchants for the international prestige that seems to attach to nuclear ownership.

India's acquisition already suggests a pattern of possible proliferation in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area, with resulting pressures on Pakistan and Iran to follow India's lead. An Iranian nuclear capability in particular would impact on Soviet security perceptions and interests, and might engender a Soviet-Iranian confrontation.

A much more volatile situation could obtain in the Middle East. Nost qualified observers seem agreed that if Israel does not already possess a nuclear device, it is on the threshold of such a capability. Tel Aviv is sensitive to the counterproductive trends that would be triggered by an open deployment of Israeli nuclear weapons—particularly the likelihood that the Arab nations would appeal to the Soviet Union for direct nuclear assistance (probably in the form of Soviet weapons emplaced in Arab territories under Soviet control). Yet these risks from the Israeli perspective could be outweighed in a conflict situation, or even in a protracted arms race in the Middle East that threatens to tilt decisively in the Arab favor.

Other nuclear candidates and conflict situations could be projected for other regions: the Republic of South Africa in Africa, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, (possibly if not probably) Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and perhaps even South Korea in Asia and the Federal Republic of Germany in Europe.

It may be that the specter of nuclear proliferation could strengthen detente—that the Soviets would come to recognize that the dangers of nuclear tripwires would overshadow any opportunities for Soviet gains in local conflict situations. To the extent that this would mean in effect a Soviet global retrenchment, however, it would entail a decisive change in Soviet policy.

C. Leadership Changes in the Soviet Union

A reversal of detente could also be prompted, of course, by changes in leadership personalities in Moscow. The continuing closed nature of the Soviet system makes it speculative to look for "trends" in the evolution of the Soviet hierarchy and their possible outcomes. It is possible, nevertheless, to speculate about several general contingencies.

Growth of Western "Presence" in USSR

The upper and middle levels of the Soviet Party, government and police hierarchies continue to be well populated by domestic "hardliners" who would like to reassert policies of economic autarky by reducing reliance on the West. This reliance has been generally encouraged by U.S. policy regarding technological transfer and product sales, and supported by both Western Europe and Japan. The fruits of Western R&D, both defense and domestic, have been sought and received in such diverse areas as automuted air traffic control systems, jet aircraft manufacturing technology, oil refining, and communications equipment. These consequences of detente have helped to support the arguments of the more moderate party members for a continuation of the thaw in East-West relations. However, Western economic disorder and the linkage by the United States of trade with the Soviet Union to more liberal Soviet emigration policies have strengthened the hand of the hardliners. Despite the USSR's rejection of the Soviet-American trade agreement, the prospect of a continuing influx of Westerners into the Soviet Union provides ammunition to those elements in the KGB responsible for internal security. They will argue, as they have in the past, that economic cooperation and cultural exchange must be subordinated to insulating the population from Western contacts. At present, Soviet leaders appear to have struck a compromise among themselves, whereby hardliners are permitted to intensily domestic repression as compensation for pursuit of a moderate foreign policy. But to the extent that Western businessmen and technicians are permitted into the USSR, the more likely outcome is pressure from security officials for a domestic crackdown and movement away from international detente. Thus the paradox: while growing economic cooperation and other contacts increase the commitment of some sectors of the Soviet elite to detente, it engenders greater opposition to detente among hardliners in the Party and police.

2. Leadership Instability: Accession to Power of New Leaders

The present Soviet leadership will not survive much longer, and it is by no means certain that its successors will be equally moderate, in

particular if the world situation should offer temptations for more aggressive action. The average age of the present Soviet leaders is about seventy. Political leaders of that age are usually reluctant by nature to embark on high-risk political and military adventures. To this extent the predilections of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and their contemporaries are fairly predictable, but there is no such confidence with regard to the next generation of Soviet leaders.

It is often assumed that the "new men" (the "technocrats" or "managerial types") will not only continue detente but work toward an even closer relationship with the West. It is thought that these new leaders will be less motivated by ideology. While paying lip service to the basic tenets of Leninism, such as the global victory of communism, it is supposed that they will in fact accept a status quo policy. But political leaders in their forties and fifties are frequently more dynamic and enterprising than their elders. New leaders have to prove themselves to establish both their competence as leaders and the legitimacy of their rule. This is not to say that they will be more deeply ideologically motivated than the Brezhnev-Kosygin generation, but the issue of ideology and revolutionary zeal may be less significant than the tactical advantages offered by pursuit of a more assertive policy.

Increased Power of the Military Coupled with "Obsolescence" of Detente

The Soviet military is effectively subordinated to the authority of the Party at present.² In the event, however, of a prolonged succession struggle following the passing of Brezhnev from the political scene, the contestants for power may appeal for military support, opening currently unforeseen opportunities for strategically situated Soviet commanders.

Robert Conquest, "If Brezhnev Goes," <u>Soviet Analyst</u>, pp. 1-3 (16 January 1974).

William E. Odum, "The Soviet Military: The rarty Connection," Problems of Communism, pp. 12-26 (September-October 1973).

Although the Soviet military generally favor an activist but not an "adventurist" foreign policy, the scales could be tipped in the direction of the latter by perceptions of disarray abroad or mounting strength at home. This would be particularly true if the original motivations for detente were to diminish.

A major reason for the shift to a more moderate foreign policy between 1969 and 1972 was the stagnation of the Soviet economy. In the decade of the 1960s, agricultural production, scheduled under Khrushchev to expand 250 percent, grew by only 50 percent. The scientific-technological revolution in electronics, petrochemicals and computers was retarded in the Soviet Union. Since a chief purpose behind the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" is to reverse these trends, it follows that once these objectives are attained (or seen as unattainable), detente loses a cardinal rationale. In circumstances of an enlarged political role for the military and a marked growth in Soviet military capabilities, the result could be a turn to a more aggressive foreign policy. Aimed at capitalizing on Soviet military superiority, such a policy would seek to manipulate Western perceptions of weakness to make political gains which the United States might find unacceptable, thus causing the collapse of detente.

i). Soviet-American Trade

1. The Trend

Western experts on the Soviet economy have noted the slowing of the growth rate of Soviet GNP over the last two and one-half decades as well as the marked decline in factor productivity—the return on investment of resources in the economy—since 1967. These observations clearly

llerbert S. Levine, "An American View of Economic Relations with the USSR,"

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, AAPSS,

Philadelphia, July 1974. Dr. Levine cites the following growth rates for

Soviet GNP and total factor productivity:

| | <u> 1950–58</u> | <u> 1958-67</u> | <u> 1967-73</u> |
|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| GNP | 6.4% | 5.3% | 3.7% |
| Factor Productivity | 1.7% | 0.7% | -0.7% |

indicate the insufficiency of the Soviet growth model, which relies on the expansion of factor inputs on an extensive basis, in providing the healthy rate of growth experienced by the USSR in the immediate postwar period. Indeed, Abram Bergson has calculated that, should factor productivity grow at an average annual rate of 1 percent, if the Soviets seek to maintain growth through extensive methods, (i.e., 9 percent annual growth in capital stock, given U.S. estimates of demographic trends), gross annual investment in the economy would have to be about 50 percent of the gross national product. Given the claims of other sectors on the GNP and the program enunciated by Soviet leaders to raise the living standards of the Soviet worker, such an allocation would be untenable. The goal must then be to increase the growth of factor productivity.

To meet this goal the Soviet leaders have turned outward, as did Stalin, Lenin, The Tsarist Minister Witte in the 1890s, and Peter the Great before them. Rather than reform—and reform within politically acceptable limits had been tried and found disappointing—the path to intensively based economic growth is to be the mass importation of modern Western technology—equipment and know—how. The United States is particularly attractive to the Soviets as a source for large—scale imports. They have a great deal of respect for the United States as a technology leader and regard the United States as a more fitting partner for large—scale endeavors than Western Europe or Japan. The United States is then a preferred, but not a unique, candidate for expanded economic relations.

The possible interrelation of expanded trade and political-military detente is evident in the pronouncements of both the U.S. and USSR proponents of these policies. Economic considerations may sweeten the pot of detente for the Soviets, and political concessions by the USSR would enhance the benefits of improved economic relations for U.S. policymakers, who are well-aware that the benefits of expanded trade for the United States as a whole

Abram Bergson, "Towards a New Growth Model," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXII (March-April 1973).

are a matter of debate. Soviet spokesmen for increased U.S.-USSR business activity remind the West continually of these linkages. At a Moscow conference for Western businessmen sponsored jointly by SRI and the USSR Council of Ministers' State Committee for Science and Technology, J. M. Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee and a prominent figure in U.S.-Soviet business activity, stated:

... the greatest significance of international cooperation in science and technology is the influence it exerts on political relations between states. It helps to ensure international security, and to create an atmosphere of confidence and mutual understanding among peoples. 1

William J. Casey, then Acting Secretary of State, now President of the Export-Import Bank, expressed similar sentiments after a short discussion of the possible contribution of U.S. technology to the Soviet military effort:

... we see relations evolving along a broad front of interrelated subjects. These will involve increased economic, technical, cultural, and human contact as well as deepening understanding and agreement on political and security issues. We have learned over the past several years that this range of contacts is not only interrelated, but is mutually reinforcing. It also creates interests among a widening range of groups in maintaining stable and mutually advantageous relations between the participating countries.²

The recent repudiation of the 1972 U.S.-USSR Trade Agreement by the Soviet Union provided some measure of the sensitivity of Soviet commitment to detente to setbacks in U.S.-USSR trade development as well as of the determination of the USSR to develop that trade. This Soviet action

J. M. Gvishiani, "International Economic Cooperation," The Moscow Report, S.R.I. International No. 23 (1974).

William J. Casey, "Technology Exchange With the USSR, Current Status and Outlook," Research Management, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (July 1974).

was a response to the inclusion of Jackson and Stevenson Amendments in the Trade Reform Act of 1974 which predicated the granting of Most Favored Nation status to the Soviet Union on assurances of freer emigration of Soviet citizens and imposed a \$300 million ceiling on Export-Import Bank credits which can be exceeded only by congressional approval. Secretary Brezhnev in subsequent speeches in hungary and Czechoslovakia, and in meetings with Prime Minister Marold Wilson, reaffirmed his subscription to a policy of detente. In Prayda and in the journal of the Institute for U.S. Studies the limitation of strategic arms was called the major task for the leadership of both the United States and the USSR. In the latter publication, Ye. S. Shershnev, Deputy Director of the Institute, wrote:

Although the question of economic cooperation between the USSR and the U.S.A. seems to us very important, this is not the whole issue. We speak of a more important matter, of the fact that after many years of an unlimited arms race, the beginning of a prospect of mutual understanding and trust appears. The significance of these achievements is difficult to overestimate. And, if under such conditions, in the U.S.A. there are forces ready to risk the loss of what has been achieved and even consider the possibility to return to confrontation, such actions can only be called irresponsible.

Shershnev goes on to say that the effective use of economic cooperation under conditions of equality remains an important task of foreign policy.

Senate Committee on Finance and House Ways and Means Committee Staffs, Trade Act of 1974, Summary of the Provisions of H.R. 10710, Washington (1974).

G. A. Trofimenko, "Na Stepzhnevom napravlenii" (In the Pivotal Direction), Pravda (4 February 1975).

M. A. Mil'shteyn, "Progress na giavnom napravlenii" (Progress in the Chief Direction), USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 2 (1975).

Ye. S. Shershneti, "To Adhere to the Condition of Equality," <u>USA:</u> <u>Economics</u>, <u>Politics</u>, <u>Ideology</u>, No. 2, p. 69 (1975).

2. Prospects and Contingencies

It can be seen from statements such as these that the USSR has not abandoned detente despite a setback in trade development, nor has hope for increased trade vanished. The Soviets meanwhile have made formidable credit arrangements with the British and with Iran. 1 A. W. Clausen of the Bank of America has offered to form a private syndicate to lend the Soviets \$500 million to finance imports from the United States. 2 Moreover, with the recent price rises for oil and gold, the USSR's prime hard currency earners, the problem of financing imports from hard-currency countries has become less acute. Although credit ceilings may limit U.S. participation in large-scale projects to develop Soviet natural resources, and although Tailure to grant MFN status to the USSR, while affecting only products imported with a significant degree of prefabrication, is an insult to Soviet pride, U.S. firms will undoubtedly continue to do business with the USSR, though probably not at the \$3 to \$10 billion per year level envisioned in the first enthusiasm of the 1972 agreements. Renegotiation of the trade agreements, of course, is not ruled out by the Soviet side.

Thus, U.S.-Soviet trade, now at about the \$0.9 billion level (see Figure 1 and Table 1), although given its initial impetus by the onset of detente and playing a role in the acceptance of that policy, does not have its fate bound up with detente. A return to the cold war would chill economic relations. A chill in economic relations, of course, reduces the cost of abandoning detente, but it is also clear that the leverage which economics provide the United States in its relations with the Soviet Union is limited.

It is conceivable that expanded economic relations between the United States and USSR have still another motivation on the Soviet side.

Jaques Amalric, Le Monde, p. 33 (27 February 1975).

John H. Allen, "Bank of America Offers Credit to Soviet," New York Times (7 March 1975).




Figure 1 U.S. - USSR TRADE 1950 - 1974 71

all.

Table 1
U.S.-USSR FOREIGN TRADE*
(Million U.S. \$)

| | $\overline{\gamma}$ | \overline{G} | <u>x-0</u> | F | <u>X-F</u> | <u>I</u> | <u>T</u> |
|--------------------|---------------------|----------------|------------|----------------|------------|----------|----------|
| 1950 | 0.8 | | | | | 38.3 | 39.1 |
| 1951 | 0.1 | | | | | 27.5 | 27.6 |
| 1952 | Negligible | | | | | 16.0 | 16.5 |
| 1953 | Negligible | | | | | 10.8 | 10.8 |
| 19 54 | 0.2 | | | | | 11.9 | 12.1 |
| 1955 | 0.3 | | | | | 17.1 | 17.4 |
| 1956 | 3.8 | | | | | 24.5 | 2h.3 |
| 1957 | 4.6 | | | | | 16.8 | 21.4 |
| 19 58 | 3.4 | | | | | 17.5 | 20.9 |
| 1959 | 7.4 | | | | | 28.6 | 36.0 |
| 1960 | 39.6 | | | | | 22.6 | 62.2 |
| 1961 | 45.7 | | | | | 23.2 | 68.9 |
| 1962 | 20.2 | | | | | 16.3 | 36.5 |
| 1963 | 22.9 | | | | | 21.2 | 44.1 |
| 1964 | 146.4 | 110.0 | 36.4 | | | 20.7 | 167.1 |
| 1965 | 45.2 | | | | | 42.6 | 87.8 |
| 1966 | 41.7 | | | | | 49.6 | 91.3 |
| 19 6 7 | 60.3 | | | | | 41.2 | 101.5 |
| 196 8 | 57.7 | | | | | 58.5 | 116.2 |
| 1969 | 105.5 | | | | | 51.5 | 157.0 |
| 1970 | 118.7 | | | | | 72.3 | 191.0 |
| 1971 | 162.0 | 14.263 | 147.74 | 16.900 | 145.10 | 57.2 | 219.2 |
| 1972 | 542.2 | 334.059 | 208.14 | 365.767 | 176.43 | 95.,5 | 637.7 |
| 1973 | 1190.0 | 836.367 | 353.63 | 842.656 | 347.34 | 216.1 | 1406.1 |
| 1974 | | | | | | | |
| (Jan-Mar) | 165.3 | 93.967 | 71.33 | 95.95 | 69.35 | 99.2 | 264.5 |
| (Jan-Aug) | 383.4 | | | | | 244.8 | 628.2 |
| (Jan-Dec) (Est) | 550.+ | | | | | 350.+ | 900.+ |

X = Total U.S. exports to USSR

G = U.S. exports of grains to USSR (major shipment years only)

F = U.S. exports of food, beverages and tobacco to USSR (includes G)

^{1 =} U.S. imports from USSR

T = Total turnover

Data from International Economic Report of the President, February 1974, p. 101; IMF Direction of Trade, November 1974; and East-West Trade, Export Administration Report, U.S. Department of Commerce, 2nd quarter 1973 and 1st quarter 1974.

At a Joint Symposium in Moscow in September 1974, held by SRI and two Soviet research institutes, IMEMO and IUSA,* Soviet economists assured the U.S. participants that the USSR has embarked on a policy of economic interdependence with the rest of the world in order to take advantage of the world division of labor. If this indeed is the case, then, expanded U.S.-USSR economic relations may receive their impetus from a long-range plan by the Soviet leadership to integrate the Soviet Union into the world economy rather than from a desire for a quick and short term injection of modern technology. The evidence remains to be seen--perhaps first in the Tenth Five-Year Plan due in 1976--because such a policy would require the allocation of a significant share of productive capacity to foreign trade. The Soviet participants at the symposium maintained that such will be the case.

Whatever the real impetus behind U.S.-Soviet trade and whatever can be said about conditions necessary for its continued development, it is undeniable that the expansion of trade between the two powers was concurrent with the relaxation of tension between them. Thus in evaluating the future of detente we must consider U.S.-Soviet trade an important indicator, whether or not improved economic relations with the West are an important factor motivating the USSR to seek detente with the West. The estimated U.S.-USSR trade turnover for 1974 is approximately 450 percent of the turnover for the period 1969-71. Many important U.S. firms have made large investments of funds and key personnel in securing protocols and contracts with Soviet organizations. For the star project of the USSR's Ninth Five-Year Plan, the Kama Truck Plant, the Soviets awarded \$500 million worth of contracts, which is going in varying amounts to over 40 U.S. firms. For a number of large projects, compensatory or buy-back arrangements for repayment insure long-term involvement of Western firms in the USSR (e.g., the fertilizer complex to be built at Kuybyshev by Occidental Petroleum). Recent figures on U.S.-Soviet trade show that despite lack of MFN and a

Institute for the World Economy and International Relations and the Institute for the USA and Canada, both of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

reduction in grain trade due to a bountiful 1974 Soviet harvest, U.S.-USSK trade, considering the relatively small share of the foreign trade sectors in the two economies and the slow pace of bureaucratic negotiation, has reached a respectable level. The current MFN and credit controversies may shift some of the Soviet trade to Western Europe and Japan, but the large, modern firms with which the Soviets most wish to deal are U.S.-based. While the growth of U.S.-Soviet trade first envisioned in the initial throes of detente is perhaps grossly overestimated, a contraction of trade is unlikely, until and if the Soviets choose to return to nondependency as Stalin did in the 1930s.

E. Conclusions

The discussion in this chapter of detente-threatening processes has necessarily been speculative, since it is future oriented. It is not difficult to foresee trends and contingencies that can adversely affect the U.S.-Soviet relationship, however. Serious conflicts, such as those posed by technological transfer and trade constraints, could disturb the relationship sufficiently to modify the terms of detente. It is much more difficult, however, to reach firm conclusions about the relative probability of such trends and contingencies, let alone their likely impact upon the overall and complex structure of U.S.-Soviet relations.

A strong theme that emerges from the analysis is that, notwithstanding the revolutionary and often volatile pace of change in many areas of the globe, the major threats to detente reside not so much in those changes themselves, but rather and more meaningfully in the strategies and reactions of the two superpowers. The United States seems to perceive detente within an essentially static concept of power balances and mutual restraint. The Soviet Union, by contrast, still appears to hew to a dynamic concept, according to which detente is measurable in terms of the willingness by the United States to adapt peaceably to a shifting balance of power in its disfevor. There is little question but that these disparate assumptions and interpretations, if brought to bear in specific crisis situations, could incertain to hostile confrontation.

IV OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

As the foregoing analysis indicates, the extent and duration of the current detente in East-West relations remain largely uncertain. There is no evidence to date that the basic long-term foreign policy objectives of the USSR have undergone a fundamental alteration; even less is there reason to believe that the Soviet Union is ready to cooperate with the United States in maintaining world peace and building a more harmonious and stable international environment. On the contrary, it seems apparent that the USSR perceives the "age of detente" to be merely another stage in the decline of the West. It appears to be the Soviet view that a decisive shift has occurred in the "global correlation of forces" which favors the socialist world over the capitalist world. The proper strategy for the former under the circumstances is to avoid imprudent behavior which might lead to a military confrontation with the West, especially at the nuclear I vel, while at the same time seeking to enhance Soviet power and influence both globally and in regions of particular interest such as the Middle East. As the USSR views it, the political leaders of the West largely recognize the shift which has occurred in the world balance of power, and thus have no choice but to accept detente on Soviet terms. The non-communist nations, and the United States in particular, are said to be increasingly deterred from resisting Soviet advances, and are believed to be anxious as well to expand economic contacts with the socialist world due to mounting dislocations in their own economies. If this interpretation is correct, detente in the Soviet view is not only a painless way to enhance the global power position of the USSR; it also offers the Soviet Union an opportunity to ol.ain Western know-how, technology, and perhaps capital in order to

develop certain previously neglected areas of its economy. Given the continuing economic problems facing the Soviet regime, the USSR appears anxious to take advantage of that opportunity.

Detente could thus be threatened in a variety of ways. In general, the Soviet leadership can be expected to alter the direction of its foreign policy whenever it perceives that the gains expected to accrue as a result of detente either do not measure up to expectations or seriously impede the attainment of long-range Soviet objectives. Under such circumstances a revised Soviet hard-line is probable. Paradoxically, should detente produce the results desired by the USSR, its very success might undermine the Soviet rationale for continuing the policy: if the political and economic deterioration of the Western world continues, perhaps culminating in the collapse of one or more governments in Europe, the Soviets might find it worthwhile to risk detente by moving boldly to exploit Western weaknesses and produce further and more rapid shifts in the "correlation of forces." Finally, detente could be threatened as a result of escalated tensions in an area of the Third World important to both superpowers, or possibly as a consequence of a change in the Soviet leadership.

There are thus evident limits upon the kinds of favorable changes which can be expected to occur in the Soviet-American relationship over both the short and the long term. The United States must remain prepared for the indefinite future to defend its vital interests against a variety of Soviet challenges; many of these challenges will be quite subtle and therefore particularly dangerous.

Detente is thus neither "irreversible," as some Western commentators have asserted, nor the dawn of a brand new era in Soviet-American relations.

For thorough analyses of the Soviet view of detente, see two input papers to this study: (1) Walter Laqueur, "Detente: Western and Soviet Interpretations," SSC-IN-75-5, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (30 January 1975), and (2) Richard Pipes, "Detente: Moscow View," SSC-TN-2625-3, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (August 1974 DF).

As Walter Laqueur has phrased it, "as far as the Soviet Union is concerned detente and cold war are two different sides of the same coin." Nevertheless, the fact that detente and cold war constitute different sides of the same coin is not without significance for U.S. national security policy. Soviet-American relations have entered a phase clearly distinguishable from earlier periods: a number of treaties and agreements have been successfully negotiated between Moscow and Washington during the past 30 months; additional negotiations are in process on a variety of political and military issues; and trade between the two powers has reached an unprecedented (if still limited) level. Perhaps as a direct consequence of this diplomatic activity, there also has been a substantial diminution in the harsh rhetoric formerly characteristic of Soviet-American relations.

While all of this may not constitute detente as idealists envision it, and while clearly the situation contains dangers for the West, the present state of Soviet-American relations may not be without its advantages for the United States as well. The United States is no less interested than the Soviet Union in reducing the likelihood of general strategic war, and in managing crises in Third World tension areas in ways that avoid military confrontations with its principal adversary. Moreover, whatever objections may be raised against the view--recently articulated with vigor by Marxist theorists--that the economic "contradictions" in the Western capitalist economies have reached the acute stage, it is surely accurate to observe that the Western world presently faces a concentration of economic and political problems unparalleled since the 1930s. These problems have strained the social systems of more than one Western nation to the breaking point, 2 and made it difficult for nearly all Western

Laqueur, op. cit., p. 47.

Italy, of course, comes immediately to mind, but that nation's problems in one form or other exist in many other nations of the Atlantic community. For useful analyses of the Italian crisis, see Pellegrino Nazzaro, "Italy in Trouble," <u>Current History</u>, pp. 101-36 (March 1975), and Robert Ball, "Bankruptcy, Italian Style," <u>Fortune</u>, pp. 89-92, 146-50 (February 1975).

governments to maintain adequate levels of defense expenditures. In the United States, public support for an activist international policy continues to wane. A recently released national opinion poll, conducted last December by Louis Harris and Associates for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, reports that only 39 percent of Americans would favor the use of force by the United States if Western Europe were invaded, and only 27 percent if Israel were in danger of conquest by the Arabs. Of twelve postulated threats, the only one to which a majority of Americans would respond with armed intervention is an invasion of Canada. Other polls show that for nearly five years approximately 50 percent of the public has been opposed to increased spending for national defense.

Students of American public opinion offer several reasons for the obvious breakdown in the consensus which has supported an expansive global role for the United States since 1945. Most analyses have stressed the voting public's lingering dissatisfaction with the outcome of the American involvement in Southeast Asia, and a growing feeling among the electorate that the United States ought to devote its attention to domestic problems during a period in which the nation's economy is under considerable stress. Recent studies, however, suggest that there may be other, more long-term factors at work. William Schneider argues that the declining saliency of political party loyalties as a force shaping popular attitudes on public issues and the growing ideological consciousness of the electorate have combined to create deep divisions on international

The British government, ignoring an unprecedented public protest from NATO officials, recently announced that economic circumstances require an \$11.4 billion reduction in military spending over the next eight years. See Bernard D. Nossiter, "Britain Sticks to Arms Cut Move," Washington Post (20 March 1975).

For an analysis of the poll, see David S. Broder, "'Going It Alone,'" Washington Post (23 March 1975).

For a discussion of the data, see William Schneider, "Public Opinion: The Beginning of Ideology," <u>Foreign Policy</u>, No. 17, pp. 108-109 (Winter 1974-75), and William Watts and Lloyd Free, <u>State of the Nation</u>, pp. 179-222 (New York: Universe Books, 1973).

problems among the educated and concerned elite which formed the core of the post World War II foreign policy consensus. Moreover, rising educational levels have expanded the size of that elite. In the 1972 election, liberals and conservatives (a rapidly growing percentage of Americans identify themselves as one or the other) were as sharply divided over Vietnam and defense spending as they were over social issues and race; isolationist sentiment is now nearly as strong among the college educated as it is among those in the lower socioeconomic strata, historically the prime source of "Fortress America" sentiment. If these data represent a trend rather than merely a short-term response to Vietnam, as several analysts suggest, it may be much more difficult in the future than it was in the past to develop a national consensus on behalf of an active U.S. foreign policy. 2

Λ. Policies Aimed at Sustaining Detente

It seems clear, then, that the United States stands to benefit considerably from a period of respite from cold war hostility. Thus it can be argued that a major purpose of American foreign policy in the short term must be the maintenance of detente with the Communist bloc, if for no other reason than to provide time for a change in popular attitudes towards defense and foreign policy issues. Moreover, it may prove easier to maintain

For extended analyses of these and related issues see Schneider, op. cit., pp. 88-120; William Caspary, "The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, 64 (June 1970) and John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley, 1973).

Too much should not be made of widespread popular support for President Ford's action in the Mayaguez affair in this connection. That action involved only a limited commitment of resources for a short time, and was in any case highly successful.

While occasionally one hears expressions of fear in Europe that the American desire for detente may result in a U.S.-USSR "condominium" at Europe's expense, official European opinion in the main has been as enthusiastic about the thaw in the cold war as has American officialdom. See, for example, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report of Senator Mike Mansfield, European Reactions to the Soviet-United States Detente, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 23 July 1973.

detente than sometimes thought since it is possible to argue that there is a greater degree of congruence between short-term Soviet and American foreign policy interests -- and therefore that for the immediate future detente as defined in this study is less "fragile"--than anyone could reasonably have expected four or five years ago. One might argue that if detente could survive Soviet behavior in the Mideast in 1973 then indeed the United States is prepared to go a long way to keep it alive. It is worth noting as well that the USSR has not thus far undertaken any bold foreign policy initiatives designed to capitalize upon the collapse of the American position in Southeast Asia. Indeed, while congratulating the North Vietnamese for their "glorious victory over the forces of imperialism," Brezhnev has taken pains to assure a variety of audiences in recent weeks that the Soviets do not wish the existing climate of relations between the superpowers to be disturbed. 1 Nevertheless, given the strains to which detente inevitably will be subjected, it is necessary to consider what measures might be undertaken by the United States to sustain detente over the short term, or to forestall a breakdown of detente if serious problems develop in the Soviet-American relationship.

Should such strains appear, it is not anticipated that U.S.-USSR relations would immediately revert to a status resembling the cold war of the 1950s. On the contrary, a more gradual deterioration of detente, characterized initially by changes in the tone of the relationship, is far more likely. As detente is a process, so also would its breakdown be a process, and one which is not likely to proceed in straight-line fashion. In any case, it is probably not useful to speak of a possible return to the "Cold War," whatever happens to the Soviet-American relationship; that term, as commonly used by historians, refers to a particular period of international history, with patterns of interaction among the powers and structural characteristics not likely to be repeated. Even if detente collapses completely, world politics would not resemble the period 1947-52.

See, for example, "Brezhnev Says End of Conflict in Indochina Will Help Detente," New York Times (9 May 1975).

Developing strains in the Soviet-American relationship could appear in a variety of forms. The Soviets might directly signal their unhappiness with detente: expressions of dissatisfaction with the pace of progress in the presently ongoing negotiations might be articulated at ever-higher official levels, accompanied by attacks on Western intransigence and stubbornness. Or the signals might be more indirect. The USSR's bargaining position may gradually but noticeably harden on significant unresolved issues in the CSCL, MFR, and SALT talks, while signs of erosion appear in the daily contacts, official and unofficial, now underway between Soviet and American representatives. Should the deterioration of detente gain momentum, the Soviets may take more provocative steps such as increasing the flow of arms to Third World client states or expanding their own military "presence" in areas such as the Middle East or the Persian Gulf. In any case, indications of Soviet unhappiness with detente will be ample.

An analysis of possible U.S. responses must take into account several inherent constraints which limit future options. The Western powers have already taken a lengthy series of steps designed to persuade the USSR that they genuinely desire a relaxation of tensions: early hard-line positions in the MFR and strategic arms control negotiations have been modified or abandoned; a major political role in such areas as the Middle East has publicly been conceded to the Soviet Union by a President of the United States; many restrictions on economic and technological interchanges between the East and West have been removed, and further initiatives in this area are being considered. Any U.S. strategy aimed at sustaining detente must therefore be based on a recognition that substantial concessions to the Soviet Union have already been made. Obviously no strategy ought to be pursued, moreover, which requires the sacrifice of any of the significant interests of the Western alliance, or which would substantially enhance

Mr. Nixon stated on several occasions that the United States had no desire to prevent the USSR from playing a significant role in the Middle East; see, for example, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s:

Shaping a Durable Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, pp. 138-139 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1973).

the capacity of the Communist powers to achieve their long-term political objectives. The United States could not acquiesce in the absorption of Berlin into the GDR, for example, or accept the "neutralization" of the FRG as the price for continuing detente. Meither could the United States agree to the substitution of an "All-European Security System" for the existing NATO and WTO alliance systems, particularly if that entailed the withdrawal of the United States from Europe and the consequent "decoupling" of West European security policy from that of the United States. Finally, it must be recognized that many factors which might be crucial to the future of detente are only marginally sensitive to Western policy initiatives; others are totally beyond American control. The interest of the Politburo in sustaining the existing thaw in relations with the West, for example, obviously would be reinforced by a major agricultural failure in the USSR which required new large-scale grain imports from the United States. Conversely, a change in the ruling group occasioned by Brezhnev's death might bring to power a more aggressive leadership determined to demonstrate its capacity to rule by bold measures at home and abroad. 2

These constraints aside, any decision on the most appropriate policy for the United States should the Soviet-American detente appear to be disintegrating would in considerable measure depend on whether it is believed that a conciliatory or a harder line approach will have the most positive impact on Soviet decisionmakers. Obviously no final distinction can be drawn between the two approaches: an infinite number of combinations and permutations are possible and likely, depending on the particular circumstances which arise to portend the deterioration of detente. Given the assumptions articulated earlier in this study about long-term Soviet policy

For an analysis of the long-range objectives of the USSR in Western Europe with particular reference to Soviet schemes for a European security system, see Wolfgang Klaiber et al., Era of Negotiations (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973).

For a discussion of the possibility that a new Russian leadership group might find it necessary to pursue an aggressive foreign policy, see Michel Tatu, "Decisionmaking in the USSR," SSC-IN-74-23, SRI/Strategic Studies Center, pp. 7-8 (9 September 1974).

objectives, for example, it is clear that even if a conciliatory approach is selected the United States must maintain a level of military strength adequate both to deter unrestrained Soviet adventurism and to sustain-and indeed strengthen--those alliance systems essential to free world security. Neither does a conciliatory approach preclude American initiatives, even under existing circumstances, to improve the political standing of the United States with traditional allies and with selected critical nations in the Third World. Indeed such an effort appears essential. In the wake of the Vietnam debacle several nations in both categories are reevaluating their ties with the United States; American base rights appear to be in jeopardy in the Philippines, Thailand, Spain, and elsewhere. 1 It is clearly essential that the United States intensify its efforts to reverse the growing anti-American trend in these countries. In the event that this does not prove possible, other options must be explored. In the wake of resumed arms shipments to Pakistan, for example, facilities in Karachi might become available to the U.S. Navy, if only on a limited basis. Alternatively, if more CONUS basing for U.S. forces becomes necessary, military air and sea-lift capabilities will have to be substantially expanded.2

More broadly, it is clear that detente has not prevented the USSR from projecting its political and even its military presence abroad on a wide scale. There is no inherent reason why the United States cannot act similarly. Working within the constraints imposed by the domestic realities described above, the nation's political leadership ought to be

Even more startling is the possibility that the United Kingdom may terminate U.S. rights at Holy Loch. Defense Secretary Roy Mason told the House of Commons recently that "it may be possible to seek removal of the United States Polaris bases in Britain as a first step in multilateral negotiations once the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions are concluded." See "Bases in Britain Tied to Talks Outcome," Washington Post (14 May 1975).

Specific military implications of policy options are discussed in the following chapter of this study.

planning measures designed to convince the world that the United States continues to be a dynamic world power, capable of defending its vital interests and willing to meet its commitments to allies and friendly states. While a discussion of such measures would be well beyond the scope of this study, it should be emphasized that what is envisioned here is a series of active initiatives by the United States intended to improve the nation's global position, rather than mere responses—no matter how effective—to the behavior of adversaries. In any case, within the framework of a dynamically oriented global policy, two broadly contrasting policy emphases designed to sustain the existing "thaw" in Soviet-American relations may be identified.

1. A Policy of Conciliation to Sustain Detente

At the very least, a policy of conciliation by the United States will include a continuation of the broad approach to Soviet-American relations pursued by American policymakers since 1969. The United States would demonstrate anew its willingness to continue negotiations and external contacts on the entire range of issues—military, political, economic—presently significant in the Soviet-American relationship. Certain concessions in the political sphere would be made to enhance Soviet interest in the maintenance of detente: for example, the United States might exhibit greater flexibility than heretofore on such matters as the Soviet role in structuring a Hiddle East settlement, and might agree to the long-delayed summit to conclude the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

It is in the economic realm, however, that the most significant options exist for the United States in fashioning policies to sustain detente. While research to identify the importance of economic motivations in current Soviet foreign policy has barely begun, and the importance of such motives should not be exaggerated, most analysts agree that economic considerations have played at least some part in stimulating

Soviet desires for a continued relaxation in Soviet-American tensions. 1 It is known, for example, that Soviet domestic investments have not yielded expected results, that certain longstanding agricultural problems have not been solved, and that Soviet managers have experienced major difficulties in effectively translating basic research into usable industrial applications. A policy of conciliation by the United States would therefore certainly include renewed attempts to gain the acquiescence of the Congress in long-range economic agreements which satisfy particular Soviet needs and desires, especially for long-term credits and loans at favorable rates. Additional efforts might be made to identify, through close consultation with the Soviets, those areas of Soviet industry which could profit most substantially from an immediate infusion of U.S. know-how and technology; steps could then be taken by the relevant executive branch agencies to make the relevant equipment, information, etc. available to the USSR without delay. Finally, intensified efforts might be made to engage the Soviets in what the Secretary of State has called "positive cooperation" on such relatively nonpoliticized issues as pollution control, increasing food production in the Third World, and the exchange of scientific information. Should further agreements with the USSR prove possible in these areas, Secretary Kissinger believes, "habits of cooperation" may develop between East and West which will spill over into other areas.

A policy of conciliation as outlined here (the list of specifics could obviously be substantially expanded; this study has merely attempted to suggest the nature of the general approach) may fail. Indeed, even should such a policy succeed in maintaining the existing East-West detente, the United States will be unable to avoid for long the need to develop a long-term policy intended to cope both with the changes rapidly occurring in the structure of the world political system and with the continuing efforts of the Soviet Union to expand its power and influence. A policy

See, for example, Pipes, op. cit., pp. 20-23, and Philip Hanson and Michael Kaser, "Soviet Economic Dependence on Western Europe," SSC-IN-74-30, SRI/Strategic Studies Center, pp. 10-11 (9 September 1974).

designed to sustain detente, therefore, will to a considerable extent constitute a "quick fix." Given the present outlook of the American public on foreign policy matters, however, it is likely to constitute the most appropriate short-term response to a deterioration in Soviet-American relations; if conciliation is tried and fails it may be somewhat easier than would otherwise be the case to persuade the American citizenry that greater efforts in the national security field are necessary.

If it should become clear, on the other hand, that any developing malaise in the East-West relationship is primarily due to Soviet perceptions of Western weakness and of a declining American resolve to continue a major role in world politics, a different approach may be necessary. Under such conditions a hardening of the American position may be an essential component of a policy designed to forestall the collapse of detente.

2. A Hard-Line Policy to Sustain Detente

While it is difficult to envision any immediate transformation in the willingness of either the public or the Congress to support a higher-than-existing level of defense expenditures—indeed as noted earlier, it may prove impossible to maintain the existing level, given the existing popular attitudes toward national security issues—there are limited measures which can be taken within existing budgetary constraints to improve American defense readiness. Such measures, if effectively communicated to the Soviets, might have a positive impact upon the USSR's perceptions of American resolve. At the very least, research, development and deployment programs for new strategic systems such as B-1, TRIDENT and air— and sea-launched cruise missiles can be continued as planned. Additionally, plans to phase out certain existing systems such as the earlier POLARIS submarines and the B-52 might be abandoned in order to reduce existing Soviet numerical advantages in numbers of strategic delivery vehicles. 1

It is likely that such plans will be modified as a consequence of the Vladivostok Accord in any case.

A broad range of measures to improve the combat readiness and responsiveness of U.S. conventional forces should be undertaken as well. Such measures should alter whatever impressions may exist in Europe and the Third World that the USSR has achieved military superiority over the United States and thus should enhance the credibility of American alliance commitments.

In the political realm a hardening of the American position might embody several possibilities. The United States could increasingly resist any Soviet negotiating demands which do not include real concessions in exchange for those offered by the West. For example, it is apparent that, up to the present, the USSR has made no actual commitment during the CSCE negotiations to permit greater freedom of interchange of ideas and people across the "Iron Curtain" in Europe. The Soviets have been reluctant as well to undertake obligations to provide the West with advance information concerning troop and equipment deployments or redeployments, military maneuvers, and the like. The United States could flatly refuse to participate in any CSCE summit until the USSR is forthcoming on these issues. By the same token, the United States could hold fast to its original MFR position, insisting that any such pact, even an initial-stage agreement, specify substantially larger troop withdrawals for the USSR than for the NATO nations.

A harder Western line on European issues might also include the expansion of contacts with dissident communist states, especially Yugoslavia, Romania, and perhaps Albania, preferably in a highly visible manner. New economic offers of Western technology, long-term credits, and the like might be extended as well. Western diplomacy could call attention to continued Soviet imperial pretensions in Eastern Europe, as evidenced by the USSK's unwillingness to consider substantial reductions in its forces there.

U.S. economic initiatives to the East European states might be particularly welcome in view of the massive shift which has occurred in the terms of trade between the superpowers and the smaller Comecon nations during the past twelve months. Eastern Europe has recently been presented by the USSR with a bill for oil at double last year's prices, and next

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year's prices are expected to be higher still. Although the economic consequences of these enormous increases in the cost of energy will be somewhat offset by an increase in the prices which the East European states receive for manufactured goods sold to the Soviet Union, the Comecon nations are also recling under the impact of imported inflation from the West. Figures recently released by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe reveal that the Comecon deficits with the West for 1974 range from Poland's \$1.4 billion to Hungary's \$400 million and Czechoslovakia's \$118 million.

This situation provides an opportunity for the United States. U.S. initiatives to mitigate the effects of inflation upon East Europe's balance of trade, for example, would contrast favorably with Soviet policy and improve the standing of the United States within the region. Such economic overtures to Eastern bloc states might be particularly effective if accompanied by a hardening of the U.S. position in economic negotiations with the USSR. Here the Western position could assume a strictly-business tone. The existing tendency to offer the Soviets special economic concessions such as Export-Import Bank credits and long-term loans at low interest rates in order to improve the political climate between the two powers might be reversed. American negotiators could insist that all trade agreements between the two powers include real economic advantages for the United States as well as for the USSR, and the implementation of all such arrangements would be monitored with extreme care in order to assess their cumulative impact on the technology balance. Transfer of "high" technology (such as advanced generation computers) could be severely restricted or forbidden. The United States might withdraw as well from such joint ventures as the Apollo-Soyuz space project, in the process denying the Soviets

For a recent discussion of these data, see Jonathan Steele, "Soviet Shift Hurts Trading Partners," <u>Manchester Guardian</u> (3 May 1975). See also Christopher Cviic, "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," SSC-IN-74-22, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (1974).

access to critical areas of technology in which they presently lag far behind the West. 1

While such policy initiatives as these would not by themselves represent a radical alteration in the American manner of conducting relations with the Soviet Union--indeed, occasionally American policymakers have considered pursuing one or more of them even during the "era of detente"--it is nonetheless possible that were the United States to harden its position more or less simultaneously on a broad range of issues involved in the Soviet-American relationship, and if that hardened political position were accompanied by even limited efforts to improve the military capability of the United States, the Soviets might be led to revert to a more conciliatory international stance.

Depending on circumstances, of course, the United States might combine conciliatory and hard-line postures. At the same time that it hardens its position on selected issues in the MBFR, CSCE, and SALT negotiations, for example, the United States could offer the Soviets a series of economic inducements to continue the "thaw" in its relations with the West. Such a combined strategy would appear to offer several of the advantages associated with each strategy. It might at least partially satisfy domestic critics of American policy who believe that cooperative behavior by the United States will induce similar behavior in the USSR, while at the same time ensuring that the United States is in a stronger position to deal with likely Soviet political and military initiatives should it prove impossible to sustain detente. A combined strategy might also serve to disabuse the USSR of any notion that the United States has lost its will

For a discussion of the space project which emphasizes—particularly in former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Foy Kohler's introduction—the Soviet interest in gaining access to American technology, see Dodd L. Harvey and Linda C. Ciccoritti, <u>U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space</u> (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974). Needless to say, the Soviets have denounced such charges; see Hedrick Smith, "Kohler is Scored in Soviet Paper," New York Times (19 September 1974).

to counter Soviet initiatives. Finally, a strategy which included at least some conciliatory efforts might more easily gain the support of American allies than would a sharp shift from a detente to a purely hard-line posture.

B. U.S. Policy in the Event of a Partial Breakdown of Detente

Should the policies pursued by the United States to forestall a break-down of detente fail, the Western nations would surely face more aggressive and intransigent Soviet behavior on a broad front. The existing Soviet strategic and conventional military buildup would continue and doubtless be accelerated. The negotiating stance of the USSR would harden; certain negotiations towards which the Soviets have never exhibited great enthusiasm, such as MBFk, might be suspended or terminated. A more active and provocative policy in Third World tension areas such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf would be pursued; the Soviets would attempt to exploit the political uncertainties and economic dislocations of the Third World in order to deny the United States and its allies access to raw materials and forward base areas.

At the same time, the USSR would attempt to exploit its margin of military superiority in a variety of ways in Europe, actively attempting to disrupt the NATO Alliance and perhaps applying direct pressure against selected NATO countries. The unresolved dispute with Norway over the Spitzbergen island region, for example, might well be an area which the Soviets would select to test such tactics. The Portuguese Communists might be encouraged to seize direct control of the Lisbon government. Pressure on Eastern Europe would most likely be exerted as well; efforts might be made to reintegrate Romania fully into the Bloc, and military pressure, perhaps including direct intervention depending on circumstances and opportunities, could be exerted against Yugoslavía. (The latter may well be likely in any case if political chaos occurs in that nation as the

result of a succession struggle following Tito's death.) Finally, the Soviets would most likely undertake a broad global political campaign against the United States as well, seeking to blame the United States for rising world tensions and attempting to undermine public support both here and abroad for a policy of resistance to Soviet objectives. Such a campaign might prove particularly effective if the United States had been pursuing the harder line rather than the more conciliatory of the two options discussed above.

1. A Conciliatory U.S. Stance to Cope with a Partial Breakdown of Detente

Should these developments occur, domestic and international pressures on the United States to make another attempt to pursue conciliatory policies toward the USSR in order to restore detente would become intense. The conciliatory options available to the United States under circumstances amounting to a partial breakdown of detente, however, would not be numerous. Particularly would this be the case if Washington continued to be unwilling to sacrifice significant interests to the communist world, refusing, for example, to acquiesce in the Soviet design for the political future of Europe. Monetheless, important political forces in the United States might well pressure U.S. decisionmakers to make a final effort to cooperate with the USSR.

Some advocates of a conciliatory policy certainly would suggest that the United States take some unilateral measures to deescalate the arms race in order to persuade the USSR that it sincerely desired to reduce tensions and restore detente.² In particular, the United States

Tito recently has denounced speculation that the Soviets would consider direct intervention in Yugoslav affairs, calling such suggestions an effort by "reactionary circles in the West ... to frighten Yugoslavia." See Malcolm W. Brown, "Tito Derides Idea of Soviet Threat," New York Times (27 February 1975).

In presenting these conciliatory options, it should be emphasized that the authors of this report are not in any sense advocating them as a preferable policy posture.

might decline to match the Soviet strategic force buildup and stretch out or cancel certain programs already under way. Since the Soviets have reacted with particular harshness to Secretary Schlesinger's "multiple options" strategy and to his requests for funds to develop higher yield and more accurate warheads for American strategic missiles, these programs could be terminated in favor of a public declaration that the United States henceforth would rely on a "finite deterrence" strategic posture. Comparable measures might be undertaken in the area of conventional forces, and defense expenditures in general considerably reduced.

In the economic and political realm, there are perhaps fewer bold options remaining. The basic American effort presumably would reflect the outlook of such critics of contemporary American policy as Senator Church, who suggests that the United States "encourage a moderate Soviet foreign policy by making such a policy rewarding for its proponents." While the United States would continue to avoid any long-term economic dependence on the USSR for energy supplies or other natural resources, Washington might substantially extend and deepen offers of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. Existing limits on the extension of credits and loans could be removed and highly favorable terms of trade offered to the USSR. Many restrictions on the export of "high technology" to the Soviet Union could be removed. All demands for Soviet political concessions in return for such agreements might be abandoned.

In fact, if a conciliatory line were to be pursued in the face of a more intransigent and provocative posture by the USSR, the United States would most likely be compelled to offer political concessions of its own. Washington might acquiesce in Moscow's formula for the CSCE

Such a step already has been advocated by Senators Brooke and McIntyre, among others. See Congressional Record, p. S9087 (22 May 1975).

See his address to the Senate, "Substance and Shadow of Detente," Congressional Record, p. S15235 (19 August 1974).

summit, in the process reducing America's contacts with dissident East European states and publicly renouncing any intention to become involved in intra-bloc politics. Existing economic arrangements with Romania and Yugoslavia might be curtailed, and the Secretary of State might pledge to seek advance approval from the USSR before concluding such agreements with the states of Eastern Europe in the future. The demarche with China might also be deemphasized, and U.S. support for some of America's less vital allies could be curtailed or eliminated.

The effects upon Soviet behavior of such an effort to restore detente are difficult to calculate. By making aggressive behavior "rewarding" for the Soviet leadership, the United States might encourage the USSE to persist in its bellicose course, and thus inadvertently precipitate the total collapse of detente. There is little evidence that Western "reasonableness" in the past has been an important consideration in Soviet decisionmaking. On the contrary, there is every indication that the foreign policy of the USSR is largely self-generated, a product of the historical experience of the Russian state, the world view of the ruling group, and the continuing judgments of Soviet leaders concerning the steps necessary to maintain themselves in power. 1 Moreover, such a policy contains grave dangers for the West in any case. The Soviets might accept the proffered Western concessions, appearing temporarily to change course while so doing, and then return to a hard-line posture when the stream of concessions appeared to be drying up. At the end of such a process the West would be worse off than earlier, having contributed to an overall augmentation of the power position of the Soviet Union.

In one respect, however, the position of the United States, and perhaps of other Western nations as well, might be improved. The failure of a policy of conciliation might make it possible to gain the support of the American public for the difficult measures necessary to deal effectively

¹ Pipes, op. cit., pp. 4-12.

with the Soviet challenges certain to develop should detente begin to disintegrate.

.. A hard-line Policy to Cope with a Partial Breakdown of Detente

the pursuit of a conciliatory line by the United States, Western decision-makers must consider a substantially different policy. Indeed, as the above analysis suggests, a relatively hard-line Western response, be it a medified form or "containment" or even a more activist, offensive-minded approach to policy, may, depending on circumstances, constitute the most relevant policy for the non-communist world as soon as the present detente beging serious 1 to erode

With regard to the military implications of such a policy, at a minimum the United States will need to set in motion strategic force deployments surficient to efface any impression that the USSR has gained strategic superiority over the West. It is not necessary to discuss whether or not such quantitative advantages as the Soviets now possess in numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and the like truly constitute strategic superiority; even less is it necessary to analyze whether strategic superiority is an attainable objective for either superpower under current technological conditions. The relevant issue here concerns the political implications—for the Soviet Union, for the United States, for respective allies, and for Third World nations—of various strategic balances (or imbalances). Admittedly this question involves a host of intangibles which have yet to be subjected to detailed examination; analysts have only begun to grapple with such issues as the significance for national behavior of self-perceptions

These are more fully presented in Chapter V of this study.

For a pioneering effort to grapple with these issues, see the study of Soviet missile diplomacy in the Khrushchev era by Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

of military strength and perceptions of the strength of one's adversaries. The importance of similar perceptions held by allies and neutrals has also been largely ignored until recently. But it is at least plausible to argue that under certain circumstances the political consequences of perceived Soviet strategic superiority could be profound. 1

In crisis situations, for example, the Soviets' superiority in numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and throw-weight might well embolden the ruling group and inspire provocative or even aggressive behavior. The result could be either an increased danger of a nuclear confrontation or a Western surrender of vital interests to the USSK. Conversely, if militarily inferior to the Soviet Union, the United States might well shrink from challenges offered by the Soviet bloc, especially if these are ambiguous or indirect, and slip almost without awareness into the role of the No. 2 power, leaving the initiative in world politics in the hands of the USSR. Soviet and Western allies may be similarly affected, partaking respectively of the hubris and the timidity of their alliance leaders. There is evidence that Third World nations tend to be visibly impressed with such tangible indicators of military power as numbers of missiles and aircraft; even relatively sophisticated Europeans were easily convinced, as a consequence of Sputnik and other Soviet space spectaculars during the late 1950s and early 1960s, that the balance of power had shifted sharply in favor of the communist bloc. 2 Finally, it must be recalled that the Soviet Union has been much more aggressive than the United States in attempting to exploit its military strength for political purposes, even when grossly inferior to the United States in strategic striking power. Khrushchev, in his day a leading Soviet proponent of peaceful coexistence, is also known to history as the originator of "missile diplomacy" and "nuclear blackmail." While it is not possible to predict with certainty how Soviet behavior might be affected by their steadily increasing

For a forceful statement of this position, see Secretary of Defense James K. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T, pp. II-1-10 (Washington, Government Printing Office, February 1975).

² Horelick and Rush, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

military strength, the possibility that the USSR might embark upon a more adventuresome course in world politics must not be overlooked.

Should detente partially collapse, then, and a policy of conciliation either fail or be deemed an inappropriate response, a substantial improvement in America's strategic forces, including a major R&D effort, would be required. In order to restore further the credibility of the Western deterrent, the United States might also take the lead in encouraging Anglo-French cooperation on strategic issues. There have been indications that traditional French antipathy to cooperative ventures with the British in this area may be softening to some extent; were the United States to offer to share nuclear information with the French on an equal basis with Britain as an inducement, substantial changes in French policy might result.

Such measures as these, however, will by no means solve all the military dilemmas facing the United States. Even if the United States succeeds in maintaining "essential equivalence" with the USSR in the area of strategic arms, the Soviets will have no difficulty in sustaining their own "assured destruction" capability vis-a-vis the United States in the future. Europeans may thus continue to question the relevance of America's strategic forces for the defense of Europe. A substantial improvement in America's general purpose forces, with emphasis on an augmented capability to respond quickly to local crises, will therefore be necessary in the event of a partial breakdown of detente. New and sophisticated weapons systems should be distributed in quantity to allies and client states, particularly in Europe; renewed efforts would be made to persuade the

See Wyntred Joshua and Walter F. Hahn, <u>Nuclear Politics: America</u>, <u>France and Britain</u>, pp. 38-69, The Washington Papers, Vol. I, No. 9 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1973). For a broader study of French national security policies in the post De Gaulle era, see Wilfred L. Kohl, "France and European Security: De Gaulle and After," in William T.R. Fox and Warren R. Schilling (eds.), <u>European Security and the Atlantic System</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973).

Europeans that a larger NATO force-in-being was badly needed. If a partial breakdown of detente were to lead to provocative military demonstrations by the USSR in Europe or elsewhere, such efforts might meet with greater success than in the recent past. The visible U.S. military presence in tension areas of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and perhaps elsewhere would need to be considerably increased.

Improvements in the relative military position of the United States, in order to achieve maximum results, should be accompanied by a toughened diplomatic stance as well. Several critics of post-World War II American foreign policy have long maintained that the United States failed to capitalize upon numerous possible opportunities to seize the initiative in the cold war with the Soviet Union. Should a partial but serious breakdown of detente occur, a major attempt to do so might be attempted. Such an effort might begin with an aggressive bargaining stance in whatever East-West negotiations were continuing. Maximum positions could be stated for bargaining effect, and given maximum publicity; Soviet refusals to make actual concessions, rather than the prospects for compromise, could be continually highlighted by Western diplomats. In the process the United States would be forced to undertake a serious effort to deal with the disarray in NATO, in order to build the foundation for an effective Western bargaining posture vis-a-vis the East.

An aggressive American diplomatic position against the Soviet bloc, moreover, would appear to call for a substantial change in strategy toward the bloc itself. Options on a wide scale for new relations with the West should be offered to the East European nations, as part of an attempt to convince ruling groups there that increased tensions between the West and the USSR need not mean a resumption of hostility between the West and Eastern Europe. It should be made clear to Albania, Yugoslavia, and Romania in particular that there might be possibilities other than

See, for example, Robert Strausz-Hupe et al., A Forward Strategy for America (New York: Harper and Bros., 1961).

supine surrender in the event of Russian military pressure. Concrete measures, such as an offer of new-technology antitank weapons to Yugoslavia, as well as covert activities, might be taken to support such diplomatic overtures.

The purpose of new American initiatives in Eastern Europe, of course, would not be the encouragement of open rebellion by the Slavic states against the USSR, reminiscent of the so-called "liberation" policy of the early 1950s. Such a policy in the military context likely to prevail for the foreseeable future would be risky in the extreme, especially for the East Europeans. The United States would seek morely to make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to control its own sphere of influence and thus complicate the efforts of the USSR to conduct a wide-ranging foreign policy. At the same time, the United States could undertake more direct activities designed to prevent the USSR from expanding its power and influence elsewhere in Europe. Covert operations to deal with the deteriorating situation in Portugal might be substantially expanded. Such operations might include appropriate measures to safeguard base rights in the Azores, such as cooperation with the incipient independence movement there.

Above all, however, a more vigorous American diplomatic stance would attempt to capitalize on the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Soviet obsession with the Chinese threat has often been noted, despite relative Chinese military weakness; some observers have been suggesting for several years that anything resembling a serious U.S. tilt toward China creates worries in Moscow all out of proportion to the event itself.² Any number of explanations for this phenomenon have been offered: the ideological challenge

Reports indicate that Yugoslavia has recently acquired certain categories of advanced weaponry from the USSR, including FROG 7 SSMs, several types of SAMs, and SAGGER antitank missiles. The latter, however, is considered inferior to the U.S. TOW. See Dusko Doder, "Belgrade Shows Missile Power," Washington Post (10 May 1975).

See, for example, the excellent analysis in "Russia Fears China is Stealing Its Friends," <u>Baltimore Sun</u> (19 May 1975).

posed by China to Soviet leadership of the communist world; China's revanchist claims against Soviet territory, which obviously call into question the legitimacy of Russian control of territory and peoples elsewhere; and the continuing military tensions along the USSR's long border with the PRC. In any case, there is little doubt that the relationship with China weighs heavily in Soviet policy calculations. For its part, China has in recent years reacted with glee to any indication that the Soviet-American relationship is in difficulty.

Needless to say, it would not be easy for the United States to rish successfully in Sino-Soviet waters. The PRC has shown few signs recently of desiring a substantial warming of relations with the United states. It has in any case set what has been regarded up to now as too high a price--the effective termination of the American connection with taiwan. Moreover, the Chinese attitude toward future economic relations with the West remains uncertain. Although the PRC in 1973 and 1974 purchased nearly \$2 billion worth of capital equipment on credit from Western suppliers, late in 1974 the Peking press began once again attacking the Soviet Union for seeking loans from the United States to modernize its economy and develop its natural resources. Although these contradictory indicators of Chinese intentions may reflect in part the continuing struggle between moderates and radicals for control over Chinese policy which has been underway since mid-1973, it is clear that the PRC has by no means totally abandoned its desire for a high degree of economic autarky.2 In any case, Chinese and American interests obviously continue to diverge on a number of political issues. Finally, the United States cannot take the permanence of the Sino-Soviet rift for granted; it is impossible to foresee what alterations might occur in the relationship after the coming changes in the leadership groups in both nations. Nevertheless, the United

See, for example, "China Says U.S., Soviet Rift Grows," <u>Baltimore Sun</u> (2 January 1975).

See the London Times dispatch, "China Appears Uncertain on Imports," reprinted in the New York Times (6 April 1974).

States and the PRC have mutual interests which may facilitate new American policy initiatives.

Efforts could be made to make the Chinese-American connection more visible than has recently been the case, through exchanges of delegations at various levels. High U.S. officials could express sympathy for the Chinese position in the border dispute with the USSR in forums which would command substantial attention. Parallels might be drawn with the Soviet refusal to surrender to Japan the four islands in the Kurile chain held by the Soviets since World War II. Indeed, the United States might take the lead-in the process departing somewhat from present policy--in encouraging a more complete detente between Japan and the PRC. In the past, the Soviets have viewed with alarm signs that Japan is moving closer to China. 1 Since late in 1974 Japan and China have been engaged in negotiations on a prospective Treaty of Peace and Friendship, first mentioned in the 1972 communique which announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two powers. The talks have deadlocked, however, over Chinese insistence that the Treaty include a rather explicit condemnation of Russian hegemonial ambitions in Europe and Asia -- a demand which the Japanese, reluctant to antagonize the USSR, have resisted. The United States might urge Japan to accommodate the Chinese on this issue, emphasizing that the Sino-American Shanghai communique of February 1972 included such a provision and offering in return to provide more vigorous diplomatic support to the Japanese in their efforts to recover the Kuriles.

Such an effort could be combined with new diplomatic overtures to Eastern Europe. The United States, for example, might sponsor a four-region economic conference, with East and West European nations invited to join representatives from the United States, Japan, and the PRC in an

James F. Clarity, "Soviet Gently But (learly Cautions Japan Against Moving Toward Closer Ties with China," New York Times (16 March 1975).

See Don Oberdorfer, "Japan-China Pact Held Up By One Word," Washington Post (19 May 1975).

exploration of the possibilities for increased trade and joint resource development. If an economic conference of the sort envisaged here were accompanied by a vigorous revival of "linkage" in the Soviet-American economic relationship, with all agreements made dependent on progress in the political realm, the effect on Soviet behavior might be significant.

C. U.S. Policy in the Event of a Collapse of Detente

While most observers feel that a total collapse of detente is unlikely and that even a partial breakdown would not mean the resumption of a cold war of the 194/-52 type, such an eventuality cannot be ruled out. Emboldened by success or believing a hostile policy toward the West to be necessary in order to deal with challenges to its leadership at home or within the communist movement, the Soviet ruling group may opt for an aggressive stance across the board. New MIRVed missiles would be deployed up to the maximum level permitted by the SALT agreements; those agreements themselves might be renounced. In the process the USSR would most likely acquire a high-confidence capability to destroy the American land-based missile force. The Soviet tactical forces buildup, including naval strength, would continue at an accelerated rate. Military intervention by the USSR in support of client states in tension areas might occur with increasing frequency. Active political warfare and other direct efforts to topple pro-Western governments in the Third World and even in Europe could become common. Finlandization might become the least of the dangers confronting the West in Europe. All of this would constitute, for all practical purposes, an open declaration by the USSR that the "era of detente" had come to an end.

In some important respects, this situation would be the easiest of the various possibilities discussed in this study for the United States to manage. It is assumed that policies of conciliation have been attempted and have led to no change in Soviet policy. Such a militant posture by the USSR could thus be expected to arouse public opinion in the Western world, and should lead to a far greater popular and congressional willingness to support a large national security effort in order to counter the

revived Soviet threat on the broadest possible scale. The operative consideration under the circumstances would be what is possible. Two possibilities for a new U.S. grand strategy present themselves: a Great Power emphasis, and a Third World emphasis.

1. A Great Power Strategy in the Event of a Collapse of Detente

Under the Great Power emphasis, the United States would devote its principal attention to the defense of Europe and Japan, and vigorously pursue diplomatic overtures to the PRC. Fundamentally, the United States would attempt to manage the renewed cold war through coalition diplomacy based on renewed Western alliance systems and the manipulation of regional power centers, in order to utilize available resources most effectively. The attempt to solidify "trilateral" arrangements among Western Europe, Japan, and the United States would be attempted in an effort to bind the industrialized world together militarily, politically and economically. Depending on the timeframe envisioned, emergent middle-range powers such as Iran and Brazil may command considerable U.S. attention. The military requirements for such a policy are presented in detail below; at the very least it is assumed that the United States will act to eliminate any residual Soviet strategic and conventional military superiority, and that the U.S. and allied capacity to respond directly to Soviet threats will have been substantially augmented.

In the diplomatic and economic areas, similar considerations would prevail. Any continuing negotiations with the USSR would be managed in a manner that highlighted Soviet hard-line policies. The United States would seek a united front with other nations to deny the Soviets access to capital, technology and raw materials. American trade, aid, and guarantees to Third World nations with particular potential for causing difficulties for the Soviet Union would be continued, although new commitments would not be assumed lightly. Selected allied states might be encouraged to pursue activist policies of their own, perhaps threatening the interests of Soviet client states and increasing the claims on Soviet resources.

It is uncertain what possibilities for a further improvement in the Sino-American relationship might present themselves. Depending on the stance toward China adopted by the USSR, a closer military relationship between the United States and the PRC might become possible, perhaps including a mutual assistance pact involving stratagic guarantees. The Chinese would most likely welcome a continued U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia, as tangible evidence of the American commitment to oppose Soviet designs in the area; a modest U.S. force buildup in Korea could be considered. If Chinese-Japanese relations substantially improved as well and if Japan were induced to participate actively in a containment policy directed against the USSR in Asia, Okinawa might once again become an American staging area in the region.

It must be observed, however, that it would be politically difficult to pursue such a strategy, even if provoked by a substantially more militant international posture on the part of the Soviet Union. The willingness of Japan to participate in an anti-Soviet coalition, for example, can by no means be taken for granted. Domestic political opposition to a larger role for Japan in Pacific security arrangements remains strong. Indeed, the very structure of Japanese nationalism itself has undergone a profound transformation since the end of World War II: largely deprived of state patronage and harnessed almost exclusively to economic reconstruction and development, it survives principally as economic nationalism, and could be redirected only with great difficulty. Despite the dazzling statistics often cited on Japan's postwar economic growth, moreover, Japan is not yet an economic superstate, and perhaps not even a giant. In terms of GNP, Japan is still far behind the United States and the USSR, and is likely to remain closer in production capacity to West Germany, Great Britain and France than to the two superpowers for the foreseeable future.

For an analysis of the political and military options open to the United States on the Korean peninsula, see W. Carpenter et al., "The Maintenance of U.S. Forces in Korea," SSC-TN-3115-10, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (May 1975).

For a discussion of this point, see Swadesh R. DeRoy, "Prospects for Militarism in Japan," Pacific Community, V, pp. 289-92 (January 1974).

Finally, the Japanese might set a price for their cooperation with the United States on security matters in the Pacific--such as greater access to American markets--which the United States for domestic political reasons might find it difficult to pay. 1

Neither is it certain that all of America's present NATO allies would be willing or able to cooperate in a U.S.-orchestrated Great Power strategy. If the Soviet Union succeeds in its long-term objective of detaching several of the West European states from the American coalition, the successful development of a much stronger great power alliance in Europe would be impossible.

2. A Third World Strategy in the Event of a Collapse of Detente

Such contingencies may lead American statesmen to consider an alternate emphasis for dealing with the Soviet Union in the event of collapse of detente. That emphasis, here designated the Third World strategy, would be based on an effort by the United States to construct an anti-Soviet coalition among the world's rimland nations and the emergent—and future emergent—middle—range powers of the Third World.

In the short term, regional defense systems could be established or revived, both with and without direct U.S. guarantees. The OAS and ANZUS organizations should receive immediate priority, with consideration given to establishing a new defense alliance in the Southeast Asian archipelago as well, possibly with PRC cooperation or at least acquiescence. Over the longer term, powers such as Iran and Brazil, and further along

For useful analyses of these and related issues see Martin E. Weinstein, "Is Japan Changing Its Defense Policy?" Pacific Community, IV, pp. 179-194 (January 1973); Junnosuke Kishida, "Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy," Survival, XV, pp. 15-20 (January-February 1973); Masataka Kosaka, Options for Japan's Foreign Policy, Adelphi Paper No. 97, International Institute for Strategic Studies (1973); and Robert Scalapino, American-Japanese Relations in a Changing Era, Washington Papers, No. 2, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University (1972).

still, Mexico, Indonesia, and perhaps Nigeria, would become the focal points of the strategy. Highly mobile U.S. general purpose forces would have to be available for introduction into critical areas as circumstances warranted.

Existing American policy on the proliferation of nuclear weapons might also be reassessed. Quite obviously a shift in American policy on proliferation should not be undertaken without a careful analysis of its implications. Should detente collapse and the formation of a great power coalition prove impossible, however, the United States would be confronted with a security problem perhaps unique in the nation's history. Under such circumstances the disadvantages and problems usually thought to be associated with proliferation might be outweighed by other considerations. The acquisition of even a small number of nuclear weapons by selected Third World nations might substantially enhance their capacity to resist Soviet pressures; the "value" of such countries to the USSR in most instances would not be worth the risk of a military confrontation which might result in the destruction of a number of Soviet cities (even if that confrontation als resulted in the annihilation of the smaller power). At the very least it can be said that Soviet policy calculations would be considerably complicated if anti-Soviet powers in the Third World possessed a nuclear capability. It may prove impossible for the United States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in any case; many observers feel that the Indian nuclear test has considerably increased pressure on Iran, 1 Pakistan, and other nations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf areas to consider a nuclear weapons development program. Moreover, the Indian test may have served to make the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Third World nations more respectable than previously for "world public opinion."

The Shah, however, flatly denied during his recent visit to the United States that he has any intention of embarking upon a nuclear weapons program. "The idea of Iran having nuclear weapons," he said, "is ridiculous." Joseph Kraft, "What Restrains the Shah?" Washington Post (29 April 1975).

Should the United States alter its policy on nuclear proliferation, a direct renunciation of the Nonproliferation Treaty would not be necessary. Although there might be circumstances under which an open renunciation of the Treaty might be a useful way of communicating to the USSR America's new determination to resist Soviet expansionism by whatever means are available, the United States may wish to avoid paying the political costs which might be involved in such a course. If this is the case there are several options available. The United States could quietly communicate to selected Third World powers its changed position on the proliferation issue, letting it be known that Washington is no longer unalterably opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons. Beyond that, the United States might end its recent insistence that nations which receive American assistance for nuclear powerplant construction agree to accept extra safeguards and inspection procedures beyond those presently required by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This would mean, for example, that the United States would not insist that spent uranium fuel from American-built powerplants be reprocessed in the United States; such a shift in American policy would facilitate the diversion of plutonium into weapons programs. Finally, the United States might take a purely passive position on the proliferation question, letting events run their course. Such a posture might by itself be sufficient to ensure that at least some Third World nations acquire nuclear weapons in the near term.

Whether or not the United States alters its policy on nuclear proliferation, it would be necessary as part of a Third World strategy to increase substantially military and economic aid to Third World nations. Measures would also need to be taken to ensure U.S. access to the military bases and raw materials necessary to support a global effort to deal with the Soviet Union. Requisite changes in the U.S. force posture are analyzed in the following chapter.

The \$7 billion nuclear powerplant sale to Iran is presently deadlocked over this issue. Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S. Nuclear Deal With Iran Delayed,"

New York Times (8 March 1975).

It is obvious that the United States would face grave danger if forced to rely on Third World powers to help contain a Soviet drive for world hegemony. Indeed, from several perspectives such a policy would constitute an act of desperation by the United States. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that a Third World strategy is necessarily doomed to failure. Fluidity rather than stability has been the characteristic of international relations for many millenia. Under contemporary conditions, the dependence of much of the industrialized world on the energy and other resources of the Third World nations has conferred on many of these nations both increased power and new opportunities for growth and development. These states, having emerged from colonial bondage in the relatively recent past, will normally be resistant to the prospect of a new form of colonialism which they would perceive in Soviet attempts to draw them into the USSR's sphere of influence. There might be opportunities, therefore, for the United States--provided it can avoid a heavyhanded approach--to construct a Third World coalition to oppose Soviet expansionism.

Neither are the Great Power and Third World strategies inherently incompatible, although for purposes of analysis it has been convenient to discuss them separately. Should detente collapse, U.S. policymakers will obviously work with all powers, great and small, who exhibit the will and determination to resist Soviet pressures. The likely U.S. strategy in the event of a renewed Soviet-American confrontation, then, is a combined approach, in which the United States would attempt to build a global coalition consisting of those nations who wish to avoid absorption into the Soviet sphere of influence.

V MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF DETENTE OPTIONS

This chapter examines the impact on military planning of the national options previously discussed, analyzed in terms of the sustaining of detente, a partial breakdown of detente, and the collapse of detente. The analysis includes a consideration of the implications for strategic forces, general purpose forces and U.S. military postures related to alternative strategies in the major world regions.

A. General Considerations

Military considerations constitute an important factor both in determining whether or not detente can be sustained and in formulating options to cope with the contingencies of a partial or a complete breakdown of detente. The relationship between the military balance and the broader U.S.-USSR relationship, however, is exceedingly complex. At least three basic situations are logical possibilities:

- The Soviet Union might continue and even accelerate its present strategic and conventional force buildup. The maximum numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and MIRVed warheads allowable under arms control agreements would be deployed, general purpose forces would continue to be reequipped with new technology weapons on the broadest possible scale, and ship construction and deployment could increase. Moreover, the Soviets might attempt to exploit to a greater degree their growing military power for political purposes, seeking to expand their power and influence on a global scale to the maximum extent feasible. Under these conditions, detente obviously would be subject to severe strains.
- The Soviets might continue with their present force buildup, in the process attaining strategic and/or conventional superiority over the United States, but fail to utilize that superiority to improve their global political position. The continuing risk of a nuclear confrontation with the United States might dampen the enthusiasm of the Politburo for an

adventuresome foreign policy, or, having attained the status of the world's number one military power, the regime might decide to devote its principal attention to domestic problems. Under these circumstances, it would prove relatively easy to sustain detente, providing the United States was willing to accept military inferiority.

• The Soviets might continue, although perhaps at a slower pace, their present force buildup, but the United States might refuse to "drop out" of the arms race and accelerate its own force improvement program. Essential equivalence between the superpowers would thus be maintained over time. Under these circumstances the course of the Soviet-American relationship would be determined primarily by nonmilitary factors.

There is a precedent (in reverse) for the second condition in the immediate post-World War II period when the United States enjoyed a clear strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. That the United States was reductant to exploit fully that advantage is, of course, a matter of history. As Adam blam has written, "... in retrospect... the era of American monopoly passed without any special advantage to the United States."

Given that the United States was restrained from capitalizing on its clear-cut superiority in the 1950s and early 60s, can this nation expect the Soviet Union to exhibit an equivalent restraint under similar circumstances? The consensus of successive post-World War II U.S. administrations has answered this crucial question in the negative: the United States could not permit the USSR to achieve clear-cut military superiority over the West. At least initially, the United States was restrained from capitalizing on its nuclear advantage by moral considerations, but there is little reason to expect the Soviet state, given its historical tradition, the nature and operational code of the regime and its particular ideological outlook, to behave in similar fashion.

Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 497 (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

Gene M. Lyons, "The Pressures of Military Necessity," in Burton M. Sapin, ed., Contemporary American Foreign and Military Policy, p. 1 (George Washington University, Scott Forespeker and Co., 1970).

The third condition noted above (essential equivalence) is that which generally is said to prevail between the United States and the Soviet Union at present. This situation does not require that the military balance be totally symmetrical but for each apparent advantage possessed by one side the other should have a perceived countervailing advantage. For example, Soviet advantages in missile throwweight and in numbers of strategic launchers are counterbalanced for the near future at least by the greater accuracy of U.S. reentry vehicles. Likewise, the Soviet advantage in conventional ground forces arrayed against Europe is thought by many to be counterbalanced by NATO advantages in tactical nuclear weaponry and in the quality of antitank weapons, precision guided munitions, and tactical aircraft. At present the Soviets have no equivalent to U.S. carrier task forces, and are probably not capable of rapidly introducing and sustaining a large number of ground troops in areas distant from the Soviet Union. The USSR, however, has embarked upon a carrier building program, possesses a large cruise-missile force Which would constitute a serious threat to the U.S. surface fleet in wartime, and has geopolitical advantages over the United States such as interior lines of communication. The net result is probably an overall military balance, although, as already indicated, that balance is threatened by the continuing Soviet military buildup.

For the United States the evaluation of the military factor in the Soviet-American competition therefore appears to hinge on maintaining strength sufficient to deny the Soviet Union clear-cut political or military advantages, where strength is a function of:

- The usable power of the Soviet Union to threaten U.S. core interests.
- Limited economic resources, which, if squandered, could erode the total American position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union even if the United States maintains a highly credible military deterrent.
- U.S. will to employ its military force if core interests are threatened, and the successful communication of that will to both adversaries and allies.

1. Protection of U.S. Core Interests

To sustain detente and hedge against its failure, U.S. priorities continue to require a defense posture which would deter aggression against the United States and its allies and which allows the United States the flexibility to exercise a selective combination of political, economic, psychological and, where necessary, military options in areas of critical interest. It is now a generally accepted premise of U.S. strategy that to rope and the Middle East are the most seriously threatened areas of strategic significance to the United States and therefore have priority in U.S. planning. Europe has throughout the post-World War II era had lirst priority, but the rise in importance of the Middle East is a much more recent phenomenon, displacing the former second priority accorded to Assia. Notwithstanding the Vietnam debacle, the continued Western orientation of such allied and friendly states in Asia as Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Tharland and the Philippines will be of significant concern for U.L. policy. In the case of Europe and the Middle East the utility of military force is direct and demonstrable as a deterrent and in the event deterrence fails, in defense. In Asia, although the political utility of force has somewhat changed, American allies and friendly nations will require the reassurance of a United States fully committed to the deterrence of aggression; this will require the presence of forces when possible use remains credible to potential adversaries. Such considerations can be summed up as follows:

- There must be an awareness that there is an increasing potential for local conflict which may, according to the specific case:
 - Require sufficient U.S. military strength in the theater to make credible U.S. warnings against intervention by other parties when such intervention would be inimical to U.S. interests
 - Lither not vitally affect U.S. security interests, or result in a situation in which the degree of force the United States may be willing to employ might prove to be ineffectual, and

- Warrant U.S. detachment rather than involvement, or the taking of political, economic or psychological rather than military initiatives.
- there will be a continuing requirement to maintain a capability for rapid deployment of military forces to those areas where a continued presence is either impractical or undesirable. This requires higher priority for:
 - Recognition of the political utility of an early manifestation of U.S. force whose presence suggests a full U.S. commitment, and
 - Readiness and mobility of forces trained and equipped to provide a deterrent to outside powers.

2. Economic Considerations

The amount of national resources the nation will be willing to apply to defense is determined by a trade-off between the requirements for wilitary strength and competing domestic programs. The perceived state of detente influences the priority which defense spending requirements will receive relevant to such programs. A military program which is designed merely to sustain detente would seemingly enjoy a lower priority in competition for funding than would one designed to compensate for a partial or total breakdown of such relaxation of tensions. It appears that under such circumstances a high degree of innovation and optimizing of resources will be required. The longer the period in which policy is motivated by a desire to sustain detente, the more complacent the American public and legislators are likely to become; over the longer term this attitude could result in reduced levels of funding for essential military programs.

The economic squeeze is made increasingly complex by certain factors which will remain largely unaffected by the Soviet-American relationship itself. Inflation, high personnel costs, and the rapidly rising costs of new weapon systems have all been clearly recognized and

documented by both and others. What is harder to quantify or illustrate is the combined effect of all three phenomena on the usable military power which the defense budget will buy. Inflation alone has reduced actual defense purchasing power by 40 percent since 1968. Manpower costs have more than doubled since 1964, even while military manpower declined over 20 percent; during this period the relative manpower costs have risen from 43 to 53 percent of the defense budget. By contrast, while the Soviet Union is not immune to these problems, none of these three phenomena have comparable cirects on the USSR defense budget, which now exceeds \$100 billion per year and is continuing to expand at a rate of 4 to 5 percent per year in real terms.

Under such circumstances, innovative approaches to deal with the dual realities of competing domestic economic demands and reduced purchasing power must receive priority. The following two examples are illustrative of the possibilities:

- U.S. Military Strategy. There are many precedents in U.S. history for shaping U.S. strategy to effect economics or to compensate for shortfalls in defense financing. The Nixon Doctrine with its concept of Total Force Planning, although never implemented, is such an example which may still be a possibility. Massive retaliation is an example from the more distant past, although now eliminated as a viable strategy by the advent of strategic parity between the superpowers. Options which are available and feasible currently include three which should be vigorously pursued to help compensate for quantitative force shortfalls:
 - Limited Strategic Options. This will extend the flexible range of options for strategic forces to improve the capacity of the United States to deter threats against U.S. core interests.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs News Release No. 46-75, 3 February 1975; Philip Odeen, "In Defense of the Defense Budget," Foreign Policy, pp. 93-108 (Fall 1974).

² Ibid.

James R. Schlesinger, Boston Globe (12 January 1975).

- Development of Countervailing Power Centers.

 Support for key countries and encouragement for them to block Soviet advances in critical areas where limited resources and political constraints preclude direct U.S. containment efforts. The United States should attempt to foster local and regional power balances rather than to organize anti-communist coalitions; prime areas are China and the Middle East.
- Total Mobility Concept. Recognizing the increasing probability that host countries will be reluctant to permit bases on their territory to be used for regional or global contingencies not threatening to their own interests, the United States should develop a concept for reliance only on U.S.-controlled bases to deploy and support contingency forces. Air mobility forces and naval forces in support of ground forces tailored for rapid deployment and austere support must replace the slow staging and logistic buildup concepts of the past. This is not an argument for giving up bases, but rather for planning for the possibility that bases will not be available and treating such bases as those in the Philippines as a peacetime convenience and a crisis bonus.
- Control of the Technological and Manpower Cost Spiral. While it is true that high technology at higher cost has provided better performance, as illustrated in Table 1, so also the impact of rising costs on quantity procured must be recognized. In 1943, \$2.47 billion procured 24,847 aircraft as compared to the 98 aircraft to be procured by the USAF for a FY1976 budget figure of \$1.07 billion. Some of the methods that need to be applied:
 - Hi-Lo Mix. Prior application of this concept to fighter aircraft and naval escorts can be an example for widespread future application; theater air defense and artillery systems are likely candidates.
 - Application of Technology to Reduce Cost. For those systems that are at the apparent limits of technology (wheeled and tracked vehicles are a case in point), technology objectives could emphasize cost reduction rather than improved performance

William D. White, "P-38, Where Are You?", The Washington Monthly (December 1974).

Table 2
COST AND PERFORMANCE

| New/Old | Cost | Performance | | | | | |
|--------------------|--------------|-------------|-------|-------|----------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| | Unit Cost | Payload | Range | Speed | Avionic Functions | Crew Comfort and Safety | Weapon Delivery and Navigational Accuracy |
| F-15/F-4 (1954) | 3X | 1.0X | 1.3X | 1.1X | 3 X | 3X | 2X |
| Λ-7/Λ-4 (1954) | 2 X | 2.2X | 1.8X | 1.1X | 2X | 2X | 3 X |
| S-3/S-2 (1950) | 7X | 2.0X | 2.7X | 2.7X | 4X | 3 X | 3X |
| c-5/c-133 (1952) | 5X | 2.4X | 2.1X | 1.6X | 5X | 2 X | 10X |
| UTTAS/UH-1 (1959) | 5X | 5.5X | 1.6X | 1.6X | 2X | 7X | 3X |
| 00963/00710 (1942) | 3X | 3.1X | 1.5X | 0.9X | 2X | 2x | 5X |

Source: Fortune, p. 146 (December 1972).

characteristics. Design-to-cost techniques could strive for designs at 50 percent and 75 percent of existing models and see what, if any, performance characteristics need be surrendered. It may be that none of consequence need be sacrificed and some may even be improved. The Marine LVTP7 (amphibious assault vehicle) is a remarkable example of a system that was procured at 88 percent of the cost of its predecessor in current dollars and yet improved performance in virtually every category as illustrated in Table 2.

Application of the Principle of Marginal Utility. As an example, the Army has been plagued with problems in attempting to select a follow-on to the M-60 tank. The MBT-70 was rejected by Congress and the XM-1 generates less than all-out enthusiasm since, although the cost increased by a factor of three, performance improved barely enough to be perceptible while sophistication greatly increased. Indeed, some analysts have begun to ask whether the tank has reached the top of its technological curve, and whether substantial improvements in its performance are possible at any cost. Meanwhile the United States and its NATO allies face the Warsaw Pact outnumbered 3 to 1 in tanks in operational service. Yet only in FY1976 under pressures of production limits on M-60 tanks has the solution of upgrading M-48 tanks to diesel propulsion and a 105 mm gun (designated the M48A5) been undertaken. The interesting aspect of the solution (originally an Israeli approach) is the cost tradeoff, as shown in Table 3. It is difficult to believe that the M48A5 is not closer to equivalence in performance to the M-60 than its cost factor of one-quarter. Likewise, given the state-of-the-art, it is equally difficult to believe that the M-1 will provide performance sufficiently improved to justify a 2+ cost factor. What is important is to recognize that the cost/technology squeeze is going to be relevant indefinitely and that hard choices will have to be made. Illustrative of this is the relative utility of a large inventory of M48A5/M60 tanks versus a smaller inventory of XM-1 tanks. The Army has periodically evaluated on this basis proposals that the inventory of pistols be modernized by replacement of the M1911 caliber .45 pistol.

Ian Bellamy, "The Tank: A Theoretical Exploration of Its Limitations," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 119, pp. 34-38 and pp. 61-63 (March 1974) (December 1974).

Table 3
HIGHER PERFORMANCE AT LOWER COSTS

| New/Old Weapon | Unit Cost New/Old | Difference | Payload New/Old | Difference | Range Land | Range Water | Maintenance Man Hrs/100 100 Miles New/Old |
|-------------------|--|------------|------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------|----------------|--|
| LVTU7/ LVTP5 | \$129,000/ 146,000 | -\$17,000 | 25/34 | -11* | 300/ 190 | 70/70 | 6/22 |
| New/Old Weapon | Operating Cost Per Hour New/Old | Difference | Top Speed Land (MPH) New/Old | Difference | Water (Knots) New/Old | Difference | Track Life In Hours New/Old |
| LVTP7/ LVTPS | \$ 40/70 | -\$ 30 | 41.6/30 | +11.6 mph | 8/6 | +2 knots | 600/200 |

^{*} A negative comparison cited in source as an advantage in that more room was provided per man Source: Armed Forces Journal International, p. 21 (May 1974) as confirmed by G-4 Branch Headquarters Marine Corps.

Table 4
COMPARISON OF M48A5 AND XM-1 TO M60A1

| <u>Tank</u> | Cost | Cost Factor | Performance Factor | | |
|-------------|-------------------|-------------|--------------------|------|--|
| :148A5 | 110,005 - 236,000 | .22X47X | .22X | .99X | |
| M60A1 | 494,000 | 1X | 1 | X | |
| XM-1 | 1,000,000+ | 2X | 1X | 2X | |
| | | | | | |

Regardless of the effectiveness and other arguments posed for various competitors, the decision consistently has been that the advantages of a new handgun would be so marginal that the expenditure of millions of dollars in procurement of new pistols and ammunition stockpiles would not be justified. This decision is relatively easy for secondary systems like the pistol. The same principle, however, must be applied to all systems where costs are high and performance gains are marginal.

Continuation of Trend of Converting Support Manpower Into Combat Manpower. The issue is not solely that of "short war vs. long war," but that of meeting D-Day requirements effectively so that there is sufficient assurance that there will be a D+30, D+60, or D+90. Unfortunately, there is ample evidence, for example, that NATO's D-Day capabilities range from marginal to clearly inadequate. The DOD response to the Nunn Amendment is a good start in rectifying the imbalance.² A similar effort must be made to upgrade the D-Day capabilities of allied forces as well. There is no lack of ideas on how to proceed. Simply stated, the issue is that the United States and NATO get insufficient combat power out of their military manpower (356,190 out of 2,391,000 for the United States in 1973).4 Commitment to change this imbalance is essential to improving NATO's defense posture in Europe. Civilianization of support services and new concepts of organizing must be implemented to realize cost savings. 3

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report (pp. 1-19) characterizes the present balance as "somewhat precarious equilibrium."

The 1975 Manpower Authorization Act (Public Law 93-365) contained an amendment proposed by Senator Nunn requiring a 20% reduction in Army non-combat troop strength in Europe. It did, however, permit a comparable increase in the strength of Army combat troops (see Senate Report No. 93-884, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 131, 29 May 1974). DOD implementation included addition of two combat brigades and other ground combat elements as reported by SECDEF (see Annual Defense Report, op. cit., p. III-29).

See, for example, Komer et al., "Rationalizing NATO's Defense Posture,"

RAND Corporation, R-1657 (March 1975) and Steven Canby, The Alliance and

Europe: Part IV, Military Doctrine and Technology (Adelphi Paper No. 109,

London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975).

^{&#}x27; Anthony L. Wermuth, "How Big is Big Enough"?, Army, p. 13 (July 1973).

lbid. Also Michael N. Bettramo, "Considering the Cost of DOD Personnel: A Look at Some of the Issues Requiring Further Analysis," RAND Paper P-5166 (January 1974). Also see William Houser, America's Army in Crisis (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

3. Military Option Approach Considerations

In theory there are military options associated with both the conciliatory and hard-line policy approaches to the three conditions of detente considered in this study. The differences, however, between the military itplications of a conciliatory versus a hard-line approach are not sufficiently clear-cut to identify highly differentiated sets of military options in the situation of sustaining detente. The emphasis therefore under the condition of sustaining detente is on force optimization measures to be undertaken in an era of budgetary constraints. In the event of a full breakdown of detente, a conciliatory approach is not considered appropriate and hence conciliatory military options are not presented. In contrast, in the condition of a partial breakdown of detente, national security policymakers will be confronted with a distinct choice between a set of conciliatory measures and a hard-line approach. These alternative possibilities have been developed in the following discussion.

6. Military Measures to Sustain Detente

There would be little impact on military strategy and programs during a period in which policymakers were attempting to assess the depth and direction of the Soviet commitment to detente. The process of determining whether any change in the "tone" of the Soviet-American relationship is merely a stage in the development of a more stable relationship or is the start of a Soviet shift to a more appreciate stance would not generate significant changes in U.S. detense policy or lead to a better political consensus on defense issues and budgets. The principal tools for coping with Soviet policy would be diplomatic, political, and economic; the impact on military policy would be primarily indirect. The general military posture, however, will be at least marginally affected by the decision to take either a conciliatory posture or a hard-line diplomatic stance.

If the United States chooses to continue a basic stance of conciliation, this will require the continuation of public expressions of confidence in the efficacy of detente as both a policy and a process. Such a stance--even if merely rhetorical posturing--would tend to undermine the rationale for strong defense postures and continued high-level defense spending.

Most delicate and difficult would be the task of developing an allied consensus for a resolute NATO posture. Without clear evidence of a change in Soviet policy, it would be extremely difficult to deal with the disarray in NATO, especially if efforts to solve current economic, energy, and political problems are not successful. A resolute U.S. stance vis-a-vis the USSR could strengthen the posture of allied forces committed to the Central Front. Success here would depend heavily upon improving the deployment and reinforcing capability of the UK and the reintroduction of France into the Alliance's military structure. Little can be expected from the countries of the southern tier until there is an increase in the perceived threat or some resolution of intra-alliance problems, such as that between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus.

In any case, domestic political and economic issues in the United States will reinforce the view that threats to U.S. interests have substantially diminished. Efforts by Congress to "cap the arms race" by imposition of unilateral spending limits might jeopardize continuntion of strategic force R&D programs and deployments. Pressures for reduction of overseas deployments in Europe and Korea, eased somewhat after the collapse in Southeast Asia, may resume. Even if the MBFR negotiations fail to result in a reduction of Soviet forces in Europe, there will be no increase in the perceived threat to Western security on the continent. Allied disarray probably would continue as each nation concentrates on seeking solutions to internal problems in the belief that detente continues to moderate the external threat. In sum, the primary impact of the conciliatory option at this stage involves not so much a strategy choice as a budget constraint. Preventing further deterioration in U.S. and allied defenses would be the best that could be expected. Such a situation, however, would not preclude some improvements in military effectiveness to be brought about by internal efficiencies and economies. Such measures should be undertaken without delay in any case.

A hardening of Western positions, especially by the United States, necessarily assumes a broader acceptance of the need for strength in inducing the Soviets to continue the process of detente. The principal tools of this policy approach are again nonmilitary, but it would be based on a wider consensus that the West (particularly the United States) must demonstrate its resolve to compete with the USSR by taking a posture which would serve to refute the Soviet contention that there has been a shift in its favor in the "correlation of forces." Since this policy approach involves a sophisticated balancing of confidence in the detente process and a cautious hedging against the failure of detente, the military component would entail essentially the current defense program. Stability in force levels would signal continued interest in the detente process, including commitment to a continuation of arms control negotiations and conflict

avoidance measures. However, by making selective variations in a playment patterns, and heightening the perception of force to dimess--including the conduct of more frequent military exercises—the overall defense posture could be made to reflect the harder policy line.

Of the processes which threaten detente (discussed in Chapter 111) two clearly are influenced by the military posture maintained by the United States--shifts in the world balance of power and destabilization within geographic areas. To contribute to the prevention of undesirable shifts in the world balance of power and to the stabilization of potential regional crises the United States must retain the essential equivalence in overall military power which is generally now conceded to exist (although it may be threatened if current Soviet deployments continue with no commensurate American response). As a first step there must be the arrest of the post-Vietnam erosion of U.S. influence and power. This will be a difficult task for the President and the national strategy policymakers, in the face of strong Congressional sentiment to curtail detense spending and to reduce overseas deployments. The May 1975 visit to Europe by the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense was a step in the process of restoring the U.S. image of strength and commitment to alliances, and in strengthening the President's hand with Congress, occurring as it did while the Congress was debating on the defense budget. Congressional support for defense programs over the long term to some extent will be influenced by the President's success in exercising a strong leadership role in foreign policy. It will also be affected, however, by developments over which he has less than full control, such as the future of the economy, external events, and the course of detente. Regardless, the pressures of the cost spiral will continue to require innovative actions to achieve desired military postures within constrained budgets.

1. Strategic Force Considerations

Maintenance of essential equivalence in military power must necessarily begin with strategic forces. Reducing the likelihood of strategic nuclear war is generally accepted as a mutual interest of both superpowers, but at the same time the critical importance of the nuclear balance will cause each side to take such steps as are deemed necessary to protect unilaterally its deterrent posture. Despite detente, this entails:

- Λ continuation of the second strike deterrent strategy. Forces should be capable of being withheld for a considerable period of time to allow deliberate selection of response options.
- A strategic option for limited response, including some damage avoidance, hard-target capability.
- A concept and mechanism for war termination should deterrence fail.

Maintenance of essential equivalence suggests continuation of the current approach of compatible redundancy (ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers) along with continued force modernization at a deliberate pace. This should be coupled with research and development on advanced systems to hedge against technological breakthroughs, a breakdown of SALT, or a violation of agreements already reached. The debate on strategic force requirements will continue, but the standard measures (see Figure 1) indicate that the USSR is unlikely to achieve a militarily useable strategic superiority over the United States during the next decade. The Soviet throwweight

For examples, see James E. Dornan, Jr., "Maybe No Agreement Would Be Better," Armed Forces Journal (January 1975) and Robert L. Leggett, "Two Legs Do Not a Centipede Make," Armed Forces Journal (February 1975).

advantage, however, will make it possible for them to deploy a hard-target-capable force sufficient to put the U.S. Minuteman force at risk by the mid-1980s, as Figure 2 illustrates. Priority programs therefore are:

- Continued production of the TRIDENT submarine and the 4,000-mile TRIDENT 1 missile to provide greater ocean operating areas for protection against advances in ASW.
- Accelerated R&D on ASW to counter Soviet ballistic missile submarine advances.
- Development of improved guidance, reentry vehicles, and increased yield warheads for MINUTEMAN and TRIDENT to support limited strategic options.
- Development programs for alternatives to MINUTEMAN should the threat illustrated in Figure 2 eventuate to include cruise missiles from various launch platforms and advanced mobile missiles (M-X in its air mobile or shelter-based mode).
- Research on ABM technology to hedge against abrogation of the ABM treaty.
- Continued development of the B-1 as replacement for the B-52.

2. General Purpose Force Considerations

To sustain detente it is essential to arrest the apparent trend of declining western (particularly U.S.) strength in the face of increasing Soviet capabilities. NATO as the accepted area of prime U.S. interest must be the initial focal point of this effort. The perception of essential equivalence of military power is jeopardized by continued Soviet ground and air modernization and naval expansion coupled with U.S. overseas retrenchment, which, should it spread to Europe, would lead to an erosion of U.S. and NATO military strength. Steps already being undertaken to increase the active army

of five divisions, and increase tank production may help to restore credibility to the American military posture. Likewise, the impending decision of Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark and Norway to proceed with producement of a follow-on to their F-10-3--most likely the 1.3. F-16--would reflect a continued allied commitment to a militarily strong NAFO. However, these steps, partial as they are, are more than offset by the disarray suggested by developments on the southern flank of NATO, the increase in the number of "special" to lationships within the Alliance (Greece and possibly Turkey in emulation of France), and the potential loss of Portugal to the communists. To overcome these weaknesses in U.S. posture and allied as lidarity, it is essential that further steps be taken. Illustrative are:

• To stabilize the U.S. presence at present levels. As Senator Nunn concluded last year, a cut of 100,000 men from the U.S. contingent would substantially weaken NATO's military posture and could be sufficiently destabilizing politically to lead to "Finlandization" and eventual Soviet dominance. Any lesser cut would not produce sufficient financial savings to the United States to warrant the political and military risks involved, even if those opposed to a strong defense were thereby pacified.

Defense Report, op. cit., pp. III-42-III 51.

[&]quot;Policy, Troops, and the NATO Alliance," Report of Senator Sam Nunn to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, p. 10 (2 April 1974).

- To undertake a major NATO initiative for increased rationalization of force deployments as a means of improving capabilities.¹ As a matter of priority, seek agreements which:
 - Enhance standardization, rationalization, and interoperability on a priority basis with the FRG and UK in the mission areas of tactical land warfare, tactical air warfare and ocean control.
 - Seek European support of the reception and intra-theater movement of U.S. augmentation forces in exchange for U.S. measures to insure arrival of such forces by M + 1...
 - Endorse standardization as an economic as well as a purely military objective. Apply strict marginal utility analysis to field available systems rather than wait for the ultimate weapon or the American solution. "Off the shelf" or a European system may be better than no capability at all (e.g., SHORAD).
 - Lighten the support load in Europe by recommending the withdrawal of dependents² and instituting unit rotation.³
 - Increase firepower of artillery by adding multiple rocket launcher capability to each artillery battalion for all area fire missions now accomplished by multiple volley fire missions. Add scatterable mine capability.
 - Thin out, modernize and rationalize the theater nuclear posture by development of tailored effects weapons, coupled with PGM, and a viable doctrine for their employment.

Komer, op. cit., pp. XXV-XXXVI. Also see the study done for the Assembly of Western European Union by General Ulrich de Maiziere (Rtd), "Rational Deployment of Forces on the Central Front," Assembly Document 663 (2 April 1975).

Has the additional advantage of freeing dependent housing for the garrisoning of additional combat troops in a tactically sound manner.

An interesting concept of how to proceed is contained in R.H. Sinnrerch and G.K. Osborn, "Revive the Regiment, Rotate, Reorganize," Army, p. 12 (May 1975).

In other areas of the world, the United States must follow a patient process of rebuilding confidence in the U.S. willingness and ability to defend its interests and those of its allies, by such steps as the following:

- Stabilize U.S. power in Northeast Asia where the interests of four major powers intersect--U.S., USSR, PRC and Japan. Retain U.S. forces in Korea.¹
- Attempt to retain U.S. bases in the Philippines by stressing the continued U.S. commitment to defend the Philippines.
- Support regional cooperation among such nations as Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.
- Continue support of military sales programs in Iran and Saudi Arabia as necessary for creation of regional power centers as a counter to Soviet attempts to dominate the Middle East.
- Continue U.S. naval visits to the Indian Ocean and development of Diego Garcia as a means of showing presence and interest.

As the analysis indicates, the opportunity for new military initiatives is relatively limited by both international and domestic circumstances as long as there remains a significant hope that detente presages a new era in U.S.-Soviet relations. There are some signs that the current U.S. reappraisal of the limits of detente will make possible the stable military posture necessary for the maintenance of essential equivalence and it is essential that national security decisionmakers stress the imperative necessity of doing so.

See William M. Carpenter and Young C. Kim, "The Maintenance of U.S. Forces in Korea," SSC-TN-3115-10, Stanford Research Institute (May 1975).

C. Military Measures in the Event of a Partial Breakdown of Detente

As discussed in Chapter IV, this situation assumes a partial deterioration of the existing U.S./USSR relationship. While ambiguitles about Soviet intentions would continue to exist, the increasing signs of Soviet intransigence would cause a greater polarization of opinion as between conciliatory and coercive alternatives.

Which policy choice would prevail would depend on the specific Soviet initiatives and on the existing political and economic situation within the United States and allied states. The changed international climate, however, would result in a clearer delineation of policy options than in the earlier situation and likely make possible a wider range of military options. It is the purpose of this section to analyze military options available for both a conciliatory and hardline posture without, however, recommending which of these alternative approaches should be chosen.

1. Conciliatory Alternative

The conciliatory approach would attempt to convince the USSR of continued U.S. dedication to detente by increasing the political and economic benefits to be derived by the Soviets from a more cooperative posture toward the West. While the principal concessions would be economic and political, detente proponents would seek an essentially passive military posture by the United States. Defense programs would be either scaled down or stretched out and overseas retrenchment would continue.

a. Strategic Forces

For proponents of this approach U.S. nuclear strategy would stress the retaliatory capability of invulnerable second-strike

systems. 1 Assured destruction of countervalue targets would become the sole criterion for force design. The concept of limited strategie options would be abandoned and programs for yield and accuracy improvement discontinued. The backbone of the deterrent would be the TRIDENT/POSETION force with an accelerated building program for the former and a retrofit program for longer range missiles for the latter. Only modest programs for alternatives such as cruise missiles, M-X, and ABM would be continued as a hedge against unanticipated ASW breakthroughs. MINUTEMAN programs would be stabilized at present levels in recognition of continuing uncertainties concerning the ability of the Soviets to achieve a counterforce capability against U.S. land-based systems and in view of the continued assured destruction capability represented by the TRIDENT/POSEIDON fleet. The B-52 force would be maintained to complicate Soviet planning, but the B-1 program might be terminated with only state-of-the-art research continuing.

This force posture, closely related to a "finite deterrence" strategy, abandons counterforce alternatives in favor of a countervalue posture. As measured by potential area covered by 5 psi overpressures (sufficient to destroy municipal structures) the United States has at present a clear sufficiency (Figure 3). Since approximately two-thirds of the area capability is provided by the PHARIS/POSEIDON fleet, it is insensitive to Soviet missile deployments which threaten the MINUTEMAN force. Introduction of the TRIDENT and longer range missiles for the POSEIDON will markedly increase total coverage area of the missile force and also increase operating areas of the submarine force thereby hedging against improved Soviet ASW capabilities (Figure 4).

See, for example, the proposal of Senators Brooke and McIntyre, op. cit.

b. General Purpose Forces

The selection of a conciliatory stance in a climate of partial breakdown of detente would lead to the maintenance of a low-profile, general purpose force posture without drastic changes in strategy or deployments. There might be sought in MBFR negotiations acceptance of the Soviet formula for "token" withdrawals in Phase 1. Proponents might seek limited unilateral force reductions by the United States as well. One possibility for unilateral action parallel with the MBFR reductions in the NATO Guidelines Area would be a symbolic, if not necessarily militarily significant, reduction of forces in the category the Soviets refer to as forward based systems (FBS). 1 For example, the United States could reduce deployments at, or even withdraw from and close, the bases at Holy Lock and Rota. All or part of the FB-111 force could be withdrawn from the UK and/or rotational squadrons could be withdrawn from Turkey. Withdrawal from Holy Loch and Rota would reduce the on-station time of the POLARIS/POSEIDON fleet initially; this might delay but would not eliminate effective retaliation by U.S. SLBM forces in the event of war. By 1978, when TRIDENT is to begin entering the inventory, the longer range missiles provided by that system will overcome this handicap. The elimination of FB-111s and tactical squadrons in Turkey would reduce NATO D-Day capabilities but not severely enough to change the NATO-WP balance, since they are quickly returnable in a crisis. Adverse allied reactions would be the most severe consequences of the withdrawals. Concern for the U.S. commitment to alliance defense and the apparent decoupling of the U.S. nuclear

For a useful analysis of European attitudes on FBS and related issues, see Walter F. Hahn and Wynfred Joshua, "The Impact of SALT on British and French Nuclear Forces," in Robert L. Pfaltzgraf, Jr., ed., Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control, pp. 160-173 (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1974).

guarantee would have to be compensated for by further political assurances, increased assistance for allied military programs (such as UK nuclear modernization or F-4s for Turkey), or earmarking of additional POLARIS submarines for SACEUR. It is, of course, not certain that such measures would satisfy the Europeans.

As long as Soviet intentions remain ambiguous, the conciliatory approach would continue the process of shifting responsibility for local security to local forces in non-NATO areas of the world. The U.S. disengagement from Southeast Asia would continue, bases in the Western Pacific would be consolidated, and the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean would be limited to occasional task force visits. Diego Garcia would remain only an austere communications facility. Approximately the present level of forces in Korea, Okinawa and Japan would be maintained.

The overall U.S. force strength would be maintained at nearly the present level, but with some erosion possible by suspending the Army's increase from 13 to 16 divisions. Further reductions could be accomplished by the transfer of one brigade in each of six of the CONUS divisions to the reserves. Aircraft carriers would continue to decline to 12. Overall manpower would level out at approximately 2 million.

To hedge against the uncertainties in Soviet policy trends, modernization and R&D programs should continue, although some stretch-out in procurement could be employed to reflect a stable or slightly declining defense budget.

If such a conciliatory alternative were to be followed, few specific measures could be undertaken to shore up U.S. military posture because of the political and fiscal climate which would exist.

Emphasis would have to be on maintenance of the most effective posture possible with priority to the following measures:

- Maintaining the highest possible readiness of CONUS divisions by deferring modernization.
- Retain maximum rapid deployment capability and concentrate on improved packaging of deployment elements for rapid response.
- Maintaining visible R&D initiatives on a stretched-out basis where there is a possibility of low-cost improvements in future capabilities.
- Proceed with NATO standardization, rationalization and interoperability initiatives. This latter action would be instrumental in maintaining a relatively low profile activity at minimum cost, while at the same time enhancing Allied military effectiveness.

2. A Harder Line Response

This option is built on the premise that the Soviet Union might act to repair erosion in the process of detente if compelled to recognize that the United States has the will and the means to challenge attempted inroads by the USSR into areas of interest to the United States. Military initiatives would be more significant in this option than in the conciliatory response, in that clear signals would be given to the Soviets that a continued aggressive policy carries risks which it is presumed the USSR would not wish to incur.

a. Strategic Forces

A major element of the hard-line response would be eliminating not only any real Soviet strategic superiority, but even the appearance of Soviet superiority in strategic systems. Soviet MIRV deployments would be compensated for even if the USSR

did not acquire a high-confidence first-strike capability against the U.S. land-based missibe force. Since at this stage the Soviets may not have chosen to terminate the SALT II agreement, a perceived essential equivalence could be restored by accelerating the TRIDENC program, producing the B-1 bomber in substantial appears and increas-Ing R&D funding for strategic cruise missiles and a modifie M-X. A new program should be begun for development of a larger, higher throwweight MINUTEMAN IV which would capitalize on the 15 percent silo expansion provision of SALT and on cold-launch techniques. In addition, funding for improved higher yield warheads and greater accuracy would be increased, both to support limited strategic options and potentially to threaten (by yield/CEP combinations) the Soviet ICBA force. Announcement of the intention to increase programs to the limits allowed by the Vladivostok agreement by deployment of M-K or MINUTEMAN IV might provide the necessary signal (with sufficient timelag from the decision to actual achievement) for the Soviets to return to a detente posture, without an irreversible or excessively costly U.S. commitment. A continued heavy emphasis on R&D of new systems would constitute a hedge against a total breakdown of detente.

b. General Purpose Forces

Like the strategic forces posture outlined for this option, the GPF posture must signal to the Soviets both America's determination to defend the nation's vital interests and Washington's willingness to restore detente should the Soviets respond appropriately. The first objective of this military policy would be, therefore, to stabilize general purpose force posture against erosion produced by political and economic pressures.

As a minimum the United States should continue its basic GPF programs based on 16 active divisions, 22 tactical fighter wings and 13 carriers. Manpower should stabilize at least at the 2.1 million level and modernization programs must continue. Consensus must be found to support retention of deployments, both in Europe and the Far East.

Gensistent with this hard-line approach, initiatives avoid be taken to accelerate modernization of Europe-oriented forces with the F-F5, F-16, LANCE, PGMs, and improved tactical nuclear weapons. Efforts to improve D-Day capabilities and weapons standardization within NATO should be vigorously pursued. Allied support should be rallied for improved capabilities, particularly with the FRG in the tactical land warfare area, the UK in ocean control, and both countries in the field of tactical air support.

The importance of the Middle East to the West necessitates that the United States use its power wisely and firmly to counter further Soviet encroachments. The complex regional issues, including the Arab-Israeli problem, the problem of access to oil and the massive inflow of wealth, local tension and conflicts, and the rivalry for influence among external powers, will keep the Middle Last high on the U.S. foreign policy agenda for many years. 1 It is particularly important for the United States to establish effective relationships with the three key countries Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia since these nations have responsibilities transcending purely local issues. Regarding security matters, military sales and assistance and advisory programs are effective instruments, but a U.S. military presence in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean should continue. Access to local bases, such as Diego Garcia, while valuable for support of U.S. Indian Ocean deployments, is more important for its signal to the Soviet Union of U.S. interest in the region. Unless Soviet policies in the region become more overtly threatening, the United States must expect the Arabs and Iranians to maintain a flexible posture toward the West because of the Arab-Israeli conflict

See William M. Carpenter and Stephen P. Gibert, "Great Power Interests and Conflicting Objectives in the Mediterranean-Middle East-Persian Gulf Region," SSC-TN-3115-2, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (December 1974).

and oil politics. Further, there is not likely to be a public consensus for closer military arrangements or greater U.S. military presence in the Middle East until the threat becomes more perceptible. Nevertheless, the United States should seek to increase its presence through additional Indian Ocean deployments, negotiation of base rights in Iran or Pakistan (to include port facilities), and an air-base capable of acting as an advance staging base and a minimal logistic infrastructure. Under this policy approach, these moves are both political signals to the USSR of the risk of confrontation and concrete measures to improve U.S. military capabilities in the region.

In the Western Pacific the U.S. strategy would be to maintain an insular base and deployment structure plus its Korean deployments. Diplomatic moves to enhance security would be sought through favoring China in the Sino-Soviet dispute, with a continued U.S. presence acting as a deterrent to aggression in Korea and Japan. Continued access to bases in the Philippines would be crucial not only to the support of the deterrent in the Western Pacific, but for support of the Middle East/Persian Gulf presence. While erosion of the U.S. position in mainland Southeast Asia probably cannot be arrested, the United States would use diplomatic measures to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute in order to prevent either major communist power from gaining hegemony in Southeast Asia.

Those specific measures discussed under policies to sustain detente should be pursued vigorously with emphasis on:

- NATO initiatives, including:
 - NATO rationalization and standardization and interoperability as a major program covering all DOD mission areas.
 - Modernization of tactical nuclear capabilities and doctrine

Carpenter and Kim, The Maintenance of U.S. Forces in Korea, op. cit.

- An initiative toward Anglo-French nuclear cooperation with U.S. assistance.
- An increase of U.S. forces by two armored divisions, employing rotational concepts.
- A strategy of countervailing forces in the Middle East and Indian Ocean, concentrating on Iran and Saudi Arabia through
 - Military sales
 - Λ support base at Diego Garcia and possibly Masira
 - Naval deployment in the Indian Ocean for up to six months per year utilizing Sixth Fleet assets through the Suez Canal as well as Pacific fleet assets
- The maintenance of U.S. forces in Korea and Japan as the anchor of U.S. presence in the Western Pacific
 - Back-up bases in trust territory
 - Best possible base arrangement in the Philippines.

Although a partial breakdown of detente can provide for greater latitude in U.S. military options than in the situation of sustaining detente, the probable ambiguity of Soviet policies during a partial breakdown situation and a resulting lack of policy consensus in the United States would probably dictate a mixed strategy, including elements of both the conciliatory and hard-line alternatives. Given these conditions, a bolstering of strategic capabilities as set forth in the hard-line alternative above would be the least expensive, minimum-risk, easily reversible military option based on a mixed approach.

Wynfred Joshua and Walter F. Hahn, <u>Nuclear Politics: America</u>, <u>France and Britain</u>, The Washington Papers, Vol. I, No. 9 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1973).

1. Military Measures in the Event of Total Breakdown of Detente

A change in Soviet policy to one of overt challenge and confrontation would make apparent the threat to the world balance of power. This would lead to wider consensus concerning the need to redress the balance, to modify the Soviet view of the correlation of forces, and to demonstrate U.S. will to protect its interests. However, it would be improper to conceive of this as a reversion to the former situation of the cold war. Strategic parity, the emergence of new power centers, and new technical and economic developments have eliminated the power monopoly which enabled the United States to pursue its containment policy of the late forties and fifties. Some of the options discussed below are subject in execution to factors outside U.S. control or influence. No longer can the United States expect easily to create alliances or acquire base rights and overflight rights to support overseas deployments. While a heightened sense of threat felt by all except the most obtuse will reduce considerably the problem of budgetary constraints, the costs of the weapon systems of the seventies and eighties will still be an important consideration in determining force postures. Military policies and programs must therefore be geared to a long-term competition with the USSR rather than relying on short-term fluctuations in force posture with the wastefulness such fluctuations inevitably entail.

1. Strategic Forces

A massive deployment of the Soviet SS-16 to SS-19 family of missiles with MIRVed warheads and improved accuracy would probably accompany a total breakdown in detente. With projected capabilities, such a Soviet deployment (even within Vladivostok limits) could constitute an effective capability to destroy the MINUTEMAN force. The continued invulnerability of the SLBM force and the launch-on warning defense of the bomber force would prevent Soviet expectation of preemptive success, but the U.S. margin of safety would be clearly

reduced. The Soviets would acquire greater leverage for the political use of nuclear superiority, especially by capitalizing on the perceptions of waning U.S. strength among its allies and in the Third World.

In such a situation, it would be essential for the United States to restore essential equivalence even if the SLBM leg of the TRIAD remained viable as a strategic deterrent. Therefore the United States should

- Define essential equivalence in terms of forces totaling the allowable limits of the Vladivostok agreement and build to those limits.
- Immediately announce and undertake a program to compensate for the potential neutralization of the MINUTEMAN and bomber forces.
- Accelerate efforts to give demonstrable substance to the strategy of limited strategic options.
- Depending on the growth of Soviet capabilities and the development of the U.S.-USSR relationship, renounce the Vladivostok agreement and add new strategic systems to those already deployed as they become ready.

U.S. options for redressing the potential imbalance of strategic forces have been widely discussed. Programs to hedge against this eventuality are already underway: TRIDENT, B-1, cruise missiles (air and sea-launched) M-X, and continued ABM research and development. For the purpose of convincing the Soviets of U.S. will and forestalling their perception that there has been a shift in the correlation of forces (and without foreclosing a restoration of detente), several options are available. First and most obvious, the invulnerability of the SLBM force could be reinforced by increasing its available operating areas by accelerating the deployment of longer range TRIDENT missiles on both POSEIDON and new TRIDENT class boats. Second, as a "quick fix" to the total effectiveness of the strategic

forces, the deployment of an air-launched cruise missile appears to be a simple, flexible and (if the terrain-following guidance system works as well as projected) an effective means of adding capability. Although this would be an expensive program involving a large buy of 747-type aircraft and missiles, it would have the psychological effect of introducing a new system to compensate for MINUTEMAN vulnerability. Various forms of M-X and SLBM appear at present to require greater leadtime, higher cost, and greater technological risk. In the long run, M-X may be the system with the greatest potential, but circumstances may preclude waiting for it. Although high cost may make the B-l a relatively unattractive hedge against the increased vulnerability αf MINUTEMAN, the United States could proceed with procurement under this alternative to demonstrate resolve and maintain the uncertainties which redundancy of capabilities provides. Improved accuracy and higher yield warheads, especially for TRIDENT, should be vigorously pursued and deployed.

In the context of the total breakdown of detente, the Schlesinger concept of flexible strategic options takes on increased importance by providing a U.S. capability to employ strategic nuclear weapons in a controlled, selective, and limited manner for political purposes. While assured destruction capabilities are maintained (and improved) in this option, the increased strategic responses available to the United States would provide a wider range of deterrence in a variety of political-military situations and would complement assured destruction by facilitating war termination should deterrence fail. Improved accuracy, limited hard target kill capability, reduced collateral damage, and targeting flexibility are inherent requirements of the concept.

2. General Purpose Forces

Increased recognition of the renewed aggressiveness of Soviet policy and the continued buildup of Soviet military capabilities undoubtedly would permit increased defense budgets. Unlike the earlier two situations the United States would have the flexibility to make strategy choices rather than merely allocating budget shortages. The nature of the new Soviet stance and whether it would be aimed at breaking the unity of the developed world directly or whether it stresses the continuing revolution in the Third World and its successes in doing so would partially dictate the most desirable emphasis for the U.S. strategy. Two basic strategic alternatives suggest themselves: (1) a Great Power strategy, and (2) a Third World strategy. While these are hypothetically divisible for the purpose of analysis, in reality the strategy would be a combination of both, with the relative emphasis determined according to Soviet initiatives and achievements.

3. The Great Power Strategy

As discussed in Chapter IV, this strategic approach would emphasize direct application of pressure on the USSR by stressing NATO capabilities in the West and a power balance among China, Japan, and the United States in the East. Countervailing forces would be supported in Iran and other emerging middle-rank powers. From a military point of view, force design and deployments would not differ markedly from the present. Rather the integration of NATO capabilities would be furthered under the impetus of a renewed sense of threat. Efforts at standardization, rationalization and specialization would

oc accelerated. Demonstration of U.S. will to further NATO defense would be enhanced by such specific U.S. measures as the following:

- Increasing Army division forces to 18 division equivalents by activation of six tank destroyer brigades consisting of one Cobra/TOW battalion and two heliborne TOW/DRAGON battalions each for use as SACEUR reserve forces to blunt armor penetrations.
- Deploying two division equivalents to Europe as a SACEUR reserve, which would include:
 - One armored division
 - Three tank destroyer brigades
 - The standardization of NATO doctrine and command and control to facilitate utilization of SACEUR reserves across national corps boundaries.
- Accelerating modernization of U.S. forces with TOW, DRAGON, LANCE, UTTAS, ROLAND, F-15, F-16, and A-10
- Accelerating deployment of PGMs especially MAVERICK, laser guided artillery, and scatterable mines, and provide to allies by sale or lease²
- Initiating negotiations with France for contingency LOC rights in France and a closer French relationship with NATO military planning in return for U.S. assistance in nuclear weapons modernization
- Proceeding with advanced nuclear technology for small-yield, tailored-effects weapons with precision guidance and a doctrine for their use.

Allied responses to these initiatives would be dependent on Soviet initiatives in Europe and on the degree of success of each ally in resolving economic problems. As a minimum the FRG must agree

De Maiziere, op. cit.: Komer, op. cit.

De Maiziere, op. cit., pp. 46-47, discusses some interesting lease concepts for assisting those allies which cannot afford sophisticated new systems.

to improve capabilities by reversal of present intentions to reduce D-Day forces. The FRG should also increase force effectiveness, particularly by improvement of antitank capabilities. Augmentation of standing forces by a citizen's militia would be a helpful demonstration of will and might be a useful (if limited) added capability. The UK would need to transfer additional divisional headquarters to Germany to facilitate implementation of reinforcement plans.

Meeting the increased Soviet threat to the alliance would call primarily for a coordinated response of the United States and Germany. Other allies would be urged to contribute to the greatest extent possible. A reorientation of French policy toward the alliance, even if not involving a recommitment to the military structures of NATO, would significantly add to both the deterrent value of NATO and the political stability of the region.

The Middle East would have a continuing importance to the United States and Europe and would therefore represent the major contingency area in U.S. military planning. Continued reliance would be placed on the development of indigenous capabilities in Iran and to a lesser degree in Pakistan and other nations as appropriate. Full development of the base at Diego Garcia would be pursued. By making more frequent naval task force visits to the Indian Ocean, and engaging in occasional combined exercises with indigenous friendly armed forces (both at sea and ashore), the United States would signal U.S. intent to protect its interests in this region.

J. Lellenberg, "Overview of the Citizen Army Concept," SSC-TN-8914-82, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (November 1972).

In the Far East, the maintenance of a U.S. posture on the Asian rimland is a necessary adjunct to a U.S.-Japanese-Chinese balance to the Soviet Union. U.S. forces in Korea should be maintained and kept up to modernized standards. It would be an important part of this option to encourage and assist Japan in improving its defense capabilities, especially air and naval. If it were possible to reach agreement with Japan on the necessity for a firm and coordinated U.S.-Japanese response to shifts in Soviet policy and behavior, Okinawa could assume once again the key role in providing an offshore reserve and logistic base in the Western Pacific. If this degree of cooperation is not forthcoming, the strengthening of logistic and air support capabilities on Okinawa for the northwestern Pacific area should be undertaken as a minimum. An additional Army division could usefully be stationed in the region as a Pacific reserve, located, if possible, in Okinawa, or alternatively in South Korea. Air Force tactical fighter deployments would be increased from the current 9 to 16, possibly with three of these in Japan on a base-sharing arrangement with the Japanese. The Philippine base structure would be maintained for support of air and fleet deployments and both staging and support of operations in the Indian Ocean.

4. The Third World Strategy

This strategic approach attempts to take a more global perspective in meeting Soviet challenges in the Third World. Although recognizing the importance of Western Europe to the United States and accepting the consequent risks of nuclear confrontation in its defense, the U.S. strategy would be to employ economy-of-force approaches to European strategy and to orient general purpose forces towards contingencies in the Third World. Security assistance (including sales) would have high priority in such a U.S. strategy, but by maintaining highly mobile intervention forces the United States would signal its intention to protect its interests in the

Third World wherever threatened. Prime areas of concern would be the Middle East, Latin America, and insular Southeast Asia. Secondary importance would be given to selected countries in peninsular Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa.

European strategy would rely on the deterrent effect of nuclear capable forces, stressing improving U.S. strategic capabilities. Theater nuclear and tactical nuclear forces would emphasize high accuracy, tailored-effects weapons with minimal collateral damage potential. Conventional capabilities would be somewhat downgraded, and the early use of nuclear weapons espoused in the Athens Guidelines would become a policy objective. The size of U.S. forces in the theater would depend on political developments in Europe but most likely would be reduced to no more than a corps, supported by increased deployments of LANCE, PERSHING II and nuclear-equipped PGMs. Reliance on the theater-deployed aircraft (vulnerable to surprise attack) would be reduced, although QRA aircraft would be maintained until additional mobile missile capability could be deployed. Additional SLBMs would be earmarked for SACEUR. French-UK nuclear cooperation would be furthered with U.S. assistance in weapon and delivery system technology.

CONUS-based reserves would be redesigned to reduce the Europe reinforcement mission and stress rapid intervention capabilities. Since base rights and overflight rights likely would be more restrictive than in the past, greater emphasis should be placed on light mobile forces with self-contained logistic support supplied by air. High-technology weapon systems with dual capability and precision guidance will be needed to give maximum firepower and shock action to the commitment of intervention forces. Such forces would supplement indigenous capabilities built up by military assistance and sales. Where possible, the United States should strive to achieve high levels of indigenous capability through sales of arms, technical assistance, and the provision of advisory teams. U.S. commitment of forces would preferably be limited to support and to demonstrative intervention.

Naval forces would play a key role by maintaining a U.S. presence in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans. This would require a base structure not only in the western Pacific but also on the Indian Ocean littoral. Iran or Pakistan would be candidate locations. Inherent naval and Marine Corps capabilities would be exploited to intervene and to support other intervention forces, helping to avoid the need for extensive infrastructure ashore.

L. American Options in Perspective

Detente is a major element in contemporary Soviet global strategy. It is not a new concept; on the contrary, it is rather the operationalization of the familiar Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. It should be stressed that it has been Western leaders and commentators, not the Soviets, who chose to convert the negative-sounding term "peaceful coexistence," with its faintly hostile overtones, into the more positive and friendly term "detente." Once this fundamental fact is recognized, detente can be viewed in perspective: a strategy intended by the Soviet government to assist it in accomplishing both internal and external goals, with American acquiescence in some cases and active help in others. Of priority among these goals are (1) expanding Soviet military power to a point where essential parity has been replaced by distinct Soviet superiority and (2) obtaining active U.S. assistance and the acquisition of advanced Western technology to foster Soviet economic growth.

It is important to note, in assessing Soviet priorities, that detente, while a useful long-range strategy, does not inhibit the USSR from policies intended to weaken the West when a crisis presents such an opportunity. It is in that light that Soviet behavior before, during, and subsequent to the October 1973 war in the Middle East should be interpreted. Similar Soviet behavior should be expected should there be an accelerating deterioration of political, military and socioeconomic conditions in the Middle East, Europe or in the United States itself. The Soviets do not concede that the exploitation of such situations is inconsistent with detente. Indeed, under Soviet conceptions of detente it is not. It is only if detente is viewed from the Western perspective that Soviet actions seem inexplicably hostile in the light of detente expectations. These perceptual assymmetries have been of considerable utility to the USSR and account for its success in helping Moscow attain its objectives of capitalizing on the current disarray in the West.

Should detente collapse completely, either from U.S. or Soviet initiatives, it may prove to be very difficult for the United States to marshall its own strength and obtain support for an anti-Soviet coalition, either of "Great Powers" or of Third World nations. Indeed, detente may collapse precisely because large parts of the present non-communist world have passed within the Soviet sphere of influence, and because a Soviet Union thus emboldened with success sees no reason any longer to behave cautiously in its dealings with the United States.

A less drastic situation, that is, a partial failure of detente, could present American decisionmakers with a more serious dilemma than its total collapse. Since even with a resumption of Soviet "cold war" behavior, it would be difficult to galvanize U.S. public opinion to support necessary countermeasures. Furthermore, it probably would not significantly alter the emphasis Congress is according domestic problems or the present reluctance to increase funding for national security programs. It certainly seems unlikely that it would restimulate the willingness of the American people to support an activist foreign policy. Thus the building of a new consensus among decisionmakers and its communication to the people plausibly enough to elicit their support are essential for developing U.S. policies to respond adequately to changing conditions of detente.

Of great concern is the prospect that the Soviets will emphasize the economic advantages of detente and affirm the present policy as a means for both superpowers to reduce tensions and not exploit erupting global crises. Under such conditions, it is likely that the United States will not pursue policies which adequately safeguard its national interests. To fail to remain aware of the fundamental differences between Soviet and American perceptions of detente could lead to widespread disposition on the part of American policymakers to believe that the Soviet Union has become a status-quo power, and that stable and even cooperative relations between the two powers are achievable.

The Soviets, to the contrary, believe that the world correlation of forces has shifted decisively in their favor; by exploiting the internal contradictions in American society and by capitalizing on the erosion of the American position abroad, they expect to ensure the continued decline of the United States as a world power. The Soviet strategy of detente is designed to accomplish this reduction of the U.S. position in the world without increasing the risk of nuclear confrontation with the United States.

basic strategy, carefully calculated to take advantage of both systemic trends and opportunities perceived to be inherent in contemporary world conditions. Nevertheless, as this study indicates, the United States is not without appropriate options to deal with Soviet advantages stemming from detente. A wide-ranging series of measures have been presented in this report. Collectively they serve at the very least to suggest the range of possibilities available, particularly those which would substantially improve the military preparedness of the United States.

None of these measures by themselves will suffice. Unless the United States achieves the necessary leadership and political consensus to conduct itself in international relationships in a manner commensurate with its power, even a substantial improvement in the military capability of the United States will have but a limited impact upon the course of events in the decade to come. The United States must accept the fact that it is engaged in a serious, long-term competition with the Soviet Union and fashion its policies accordingly.

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